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-rw-r--r--rcynic/rcynic.c236
1 files changed, 152 insertions, 84 deletions
diff --git a/rcynic/rcynic.c b/rcynic/rcynic.c
index bdd9a344..69511379 100644
--- a/rcynic/rcynic.c
+++ b/rcynic/rcynic.c
@@ -256,6 +256,10 @@ static const struct {
QG(backup_ghostbuster_accepted, "Backup Ghostbusters accepted") \
QB(backup_ghostbuster_rejected, "Backup Ghostbusters rejected") \
QB(disallowed_extension, "Disallowed X.509v3 extension") \
+ QB(crldp_mismatch, "CRLDP doesn't match issuer's SIA") \
+ QB(manifest_missing, "Manifest pointer missing") \
+ QB(manifest_mismatch, "Manifest doesn't match SIA") \
+ QB(trust_anchor_with_crldp, "Trust anchor can't have CRLDP") \
MIB_COUNTERS_FROM_OPENSSL
#define QV(x) QB(mib_openssl_##x, 0)
@@ -354,7 +358,7 @@ typedef struct rcynic_ctx {
typedef struct rcynic_x509_store_ctx {
X509_STORE_CTX ctx; /* Must be first */
const rcynic_ctx_t *rc;
- const certinfo_t *subj;
+ const certinfo_t *subject;
} rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t;
/**
@@ -1114,7 +1118,7 @@ static int install_object(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
/**
* Check str for a trailing suffix.
*/
-static int has_suffix(const char *str, const char *suffix)
+static int endswith(const char *str, const char *suffix)
{
size_t len_str, len_suffix;
assert(str != NULL && suffix != NULL);
@@ -1124,6 +1128,18 @@ static int has_suffix(const char *str, const char *suffix)
}
/**
+ * Check str for a prefix.
+ */
+static int startswith(const char *str, const char *prefix)
+{
+ size_t len_str, len_prefix;
+ assert(str != NULL && prefix != NULL);
+ len_str = strlen(str);
+ len_prefix = strlen(prefix);
+ return len_str >= len_prefix && !strncmp(str, prefix, len_prefix);
+}
+
+/**
* Iterator over URIs in our copy of a SIA collection.
* *iterator should be zero when first called.
*/
@@ -1475,9 +1491,24 @@ static int rsync_file(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const char *uri)
}
/**
- * rsync an SIA collection.
+ * rsync a single file that we should have fetched already.
+ */
+static int rsync_file_check(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const char *uri)
+{
+ if (strlen(uri) > SIZEOF_RSYNC && rsync_cached(rc, uri + SIZEOF_RSYNC))
+ return 1;
+ logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Unexpected cache miss for %s, URI out of SIA baliwick?", uri);
+#if 0
+ return rsync_file(rc, uri);
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ * rsync an entire subtree, generally rooted at a SIA collection.
*/
-static int rsync_sia(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const char *uri)
+static int rsync_tree(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const char *uri)
{
static const char * const rsync_args[] = { "--recursive", "--delete", NULL };
return rsync(rc, rsync_args, uri);
@@ -1828,19 +1859,14 @@ static X509_CRL *check_crl(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
char path[FILENAME_MAX];
X509_CRL *crl;
- if (uri_to_filename(rc, uri, path, sizeof(path), rc->authenticated)) {
- unsigned char hashbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- if (hash)
- crl = read_crl(path, hashbuf, sizeof(hashbuf));
- else
- crl = read_crl(path, NULL, 0);
- if (crl)
- return crl;
- }
+ if (uri_to_filename(rc, uri, path, sizeof(path), rc->authenticated) &&
+ (crl = read_crl(path, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
+ return crl;
logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking CRL %s", uri);
- rsync_file(rc, uri);
+ if (!rsync_file_check(rc, uri))
+ return NULL;
if ((crl = check_crl_1(rc, uri, path, sizeof(path), rc->unauthenticated,
issuer, hash, hashlen))) {
@@ -1897,17 +1923,17 @@ static int check_x509_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
*/
if (rctx->rc->allow_stale_crl) {
ok = 1;
- if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(rctx->rc->stale_cache, rctx->subj->crldp) >= 0)
+ if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(rctx->rc->stale_cache, rctx->subject->crldp) >= 0)
return ok;
- if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push_strdup(rctx->rc->stale_cache, rctx->subj->crldp))
+ if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push_strdup(rctx->rc->stale_cache, rctx->subject->crldp))
logmsg(rctx->rc, log_sys_err,
- "Couldn't cache stale CRLDP %s, blundering onward", rctx->subj->crldp);
+ "Couldn't cache stale CRLDP %s, blundering onward", rctx->subject->crldp);
}
- logmsg(rctx->rc, log_data_err, "Stale CRL %s", rctx->subj->crldp);
+ logmsg(rctx->rc, log_data_err, "Stale CRL %s", rctx->subject->crldp);
if (ok)
- mib_increment(rctx->rc, rctx->subj->uri, stale_crl);
+ mib_increment(rctx->rc, rctx->subject->uri, stale_crl);
else
- reject(rctx->rc, rctx->subj->uri, stale_crl, "due to stale CRL %s", rctx->subj->crldp);
+ reject(rctx->rc, rctx->subject->uri, stale_crl, "due to stale CRL %s", rctx->subject->crldp);
return ok;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
@@ -1927,9 +1953,9 @@ static int check_x509_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (rctx->rc->allow_non_self_signed_trust_anchor)
ok = 1;
if (ok)
- mib_increment(rctx->rc, rctx->subj->uri, trust_anchor_not_self_signed);
+ mib_increment(rctx->rc, rctx->subject->uri, trust_anchor_not_self_signed);
else
- reject(rctx->rc, rctx->subj->uri, trust_anchor_not_self_signed,
+ reject(rctx->rc, rctx->subject->uri, trust_anchor_not_self_signed,
"because trust anchor was not self-signed");
return ok;
@@ -1951,9 +1977,9 @@ static int check_x509_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
if (ok)
- mib_increment(rctx->rc, rctx->subj->uri, counter);
+ mib_increment(rctx->rc, rctx->subject->uri, counter);
else
- reject(rctx->rc, rctx->subj->uri, counter,
+ reject(rctx->rc, rctx->subject->uri, counter,
"due to validation failure at depth %d: %s",
ctx->error_depth,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
@@ -1968,7 +1994,7 @@ static int check_x509_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static int check_x509(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509 *x,
- const certinfo_t *subj)
+ const certinfo_t *subject)
{
rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t rctx;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
@@ -1977,7 +2003,7 @@ static int check_x509(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
X509 *issuer;
int ret = 0;
- assert(rc && certs && x && subj && subj->crldp[0]);
+ assert(rc && certs && x && subject && subject->crldp[0]);
issuer = sk_X509_value(certs, sk_X509_num(certs) - 1);
assert(issuer != NULL);
@@ -1985,19 +2011,29 @@ static int check_x509(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&rctx.ctx, rc->x509_store, x, NULL))
return 0;
rctx.rc = rc;
- rctx.subj = subj;
+ rctx.subject = subject;
- if (!subj->ta &&
- ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer)) == NULL || X509_verify(x, pkey) <= 0)) {
- reject(rc, subj->uri, certificate_bad_signature,
- "because it failed signature check prior to CRL fetch");
- goto done;
- }
+ if (subject->ta) {
- if ((crl = check_crl(rc, subj->crldp, issuer, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
- reject(rc, subj->uri, certificate_bad_crl,
- "due to bad CRL %s", subj->crldp);
- goto done;
+ if (subject->crldp[0]) {
+ reject(rc, subject->uri, trust_anchor_with_crldp,
+ "because it's a trust anchor but has a CRLDP extension");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+
+ if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer)) == NULL || X509_verify(x, pkey) <= 0) {
+ reject(rc, subject->uri, certificate_bad_signature,
+ "because it failed signature check prior to CRL fetch");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((crl = check_crl(rc, subject->crldp, issuer, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
+ reject(rc, subject->uri, certificate_bad_crl,
+ "due to bad CRL %s", subject->crldp);
+ goto done;
+ }
}
if ((crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null()) == NULL ||
@@ -2025,7 +2061,7 @@ static int check_x509(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
* Redundant error message?
*/
logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Validation failure for %s",
- subj->uri[0] ? subj->uri : subj->ta ? "[Trust anchor]" : "[???]");
+ subject->uri[0] ? subject->uri : subject->ta ? "[Trust anchor]" : "[???]");
goto done;
}
@@ -2089,14 +2125,14 @@ static X509 *check_cert_1(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
const char *prefix,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
const certinfo_t *issuer,
- certinfo_t *subj,
+ certinfo_t *subject,
const unsigned char *hash,
const size_t hashlen)
{
unsigned char hashbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
X509 *x = NULL;
- assert(uri && path && certs && issuer && subj);
+ assert(uri && path && certs && issuer && subject);
if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, path, pathlen, prefix)) {
logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Can't convert URI %s to filename", uri);
@@ -2122,41 +2158,63 @@ static X509 *check_cert_1(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
goto punt;
}
- parse_cert(rc, x, subj, uri);
+ parse_cert(rc, x, subject, uri);
- if (subj->sia[0] && subj->sia[strlen(subj->sia) - 1] != '/') {
+ if (subject->sia[0] && subject->sia[strlen(subject->sia) - 1] != '/') {
reject(rc, uri, malformed_sia,
- "due to malformed SIA %s", subj->sia);
+ "due to malformed SIA %s", subject->sia);
goto punt;
}
- if (!subj->aia[0]) {
- reject(rc, uri, aia_missing, "due to missing AIA");
+ if (!subject->aia[0]) {
+ reject(rc, uri, aia_missing, "due to missing AIA extension");
goto punt;
}
- if (!issuer->ta && strcmp(issuer->uri, subj->aia)) {
- reject(rc, uri, aia_mismatch, "because AIA %s doesn't match parent", subj->aia);
+ if (!issuer->ta && strcmp(issuer->uri, subject->aia)) {
+ reject(rc, uri, aia_mismatch,
+ "because AIA %s doesn't match parent", subject->aia);
goto punt;
}
- if (subj->ca && !subj->sia[0]) {
- reject(rc, uri, sia_missing, "because SIA extension is missing");
+ if (subject->ca && !subject->sia[0]) {
+ reject(rc, uri, sia_missing,
+ "because SIA extension repository pointer is missing");
goto punt;
}
- if (!subj->crldp[0]) {
+ if (!subject->crldp[0]) {
reject(rc, uri, crldp_missing, "because CRLDP extension is missing");
goto punt;
}
- if (!check_cert_only_allowed_extensions(x, !subj->ca)) {
+ if (subject->ca && !startswith(subject->crldp, issuer->sia)) {
+ reject(rc, uri, crldp_mismatch,
+ "because CRLDP %s points outside issuer's publication point %s",
+ subject->crldp, issuer->sia);
+ goto punt;
+ }
+
+ if (subject->ca && !subject->manifest[0]) {
+ reject(rc, uri, manifest_missing,
+ "because SIA extension manifest pointer is missing");
+ goto punt;
+ }
+
+ if (subject->ca && !startswith(subject->manifest, subject->sia)) {
+ reject(rc, uri, manifest_mismatch,
+ "because SIA manifest %s points outside publication point %s",
+ subject->manifest, subject->sia);
+ goto punt;
+ }
+
+ if (!check_cert_only_allowed_extensions(x, !subject->ca)) {
reject(rc, uri, disallowed_extension,
"due to disallowed X.509v3 extension");
goto punt;
}
- if (!check_x509(rc, certs, x, subj)) {
+ if (!check_x509(rc, certs, x, subject)) {
/*
* Redundant error message?
*/
@@ -2179,7 +2237,7 @@ static X509 *check_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
char *uri,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
const certinfo_t *issuer,
- certinfo_t *subj,
+ certinfo_t *subject,
const char *prefix,
const int backup,
const unsigned char *hash,
@@ -2188,7 +2246,7 @@ static X509 *check_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
char path[FILENAME_MAX];
X509 *x;
- assert(rc && uri && certs && issuer && subj && prefix);
+ assert(rc && uri && certs && issuer && subject && prefix);
/*
* If target file already exists and we're not here to recheck with
@@ -2208,7 +2266,7 @@ static X509 *check_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
rc->indent++;
if ((x = check_cert_1(rc, uri, path, sizeof(path), prefix,
- certs, issuer, subj, hash, hashlen)) != NULL) {
+ certs, issuer, subject, hash, hashlen)) != NULL) {
install_object(rc, uri, path);
mib_increment(rc, uri,
(backup ? backup_cert_accepted : current_cert_accepted));
@@ -2363,7 +2421,7 @@ static Manifest *check_manifest_1(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
goto done;
rctx.rc = rc;
- rctx.subj = &certinfo;
+ rctx.subject = &certinfo;
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&rctx.ctx, certs);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&rctx.ctx, crls);
@@ -2431,7 +2489,8 @@ static Manifest *check_manifest(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking manifest %s", uri);
- rsync_file(rc, uri);
+ if (!rsync_file_check(rc, uri))
+ return NULL;
if ((manifest = check_manifest_1(rc, uri, path, sizeof(path),
rc->unauthenticated, certs))) {
@@ -2682,7 +2741,7 @@ static int check_roa_1(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
goto error;
rctx.rc = rc;
- rctx.subj = &certinfo;
+ rctx.subject = &certinfo;
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&rctx.ctx, certs);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&rctx.ctx, crls);
@@ -2739,7 +2798,8 @@ static void check_roa(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking ROA %s", uri);
- rsync_file(rc, uri);
+ if (!rsync_file_check(rc, uri))
+ return;
if (check_roa_1(rc, uri, path, sizeof(path), rc->unauthenticated,
certs, hash, hashlen)) {
@@ -2856,7 +2916,7 @@ static int check_ghostbuster_1(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
goto error;
rctx.rc = rc;
- rctx.subj = &certinfo;
+ rctx.subject = &certinfo;
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&rctx.ctx, certs);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&rctx.ctx, crls);
@@ -2910,7 +2970,8 @@ static void check_ghostbuster(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking Ghostbuster record %s", uri);
- rsync_file(rc, uri);
+ if (!rsync_file_check(rc, uri))
+ return;
if (check_ghostbuster_1(rc, uri, path, sizeof(path), rc->unauthenticated,
certs, hash, hashlen)) {
@@ -2945,16 +3006,16 @@ static void walk_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
static void walk_cert_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
char *uri,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- const certinfo_t *issuer,
- certinfo_t *subj,
+ const certinfo_t *parent,
const char *prefix,
const int backup,
const unsigned char *hash,
const size_t hashlen)
{
+ certinfo_t child;
X509 *x;
- if ((x = check_cert(rc, uri, certs, issuer, subj, prefix, backup, hash, hashlen)) == NULL)
+ if ((x = check_cert(rc, uri, certs, parent, &child, prefix, backup, hash, hashlen)) == NULL)
return;
if (!sk_X509_push(certs, x)) {
@@ -2963,7 +3024,7 @@ static void walk_cert_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
return;
}
- walk_cert(rc, subj, certs);
+ walk_cert(rc, &child, certs);
X509_free(sk_X509_pop(certs));
}
@@ -2972,7 +3033,30 @@ static void walk_cert_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
* daisy chain recursion is to avoid having to duplicate the stack
* manipulation and error handling.
*/
+static void walk_cert_2(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
+ char *uri,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ const certinfo_t *parent,
+ const char *prefix,
+ const int backup,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ const size_t hashlen)
+{
+ if (endswith(uri, ".cer"))
+ walk_cert_1(rc, uri, certs, parent, prefix, backup, hash, hashlen);
+ else if (endswith(uri, ".roa"))
+ check_roa(rc, uri, certs, hash, hashlen);
+ else if (endswith(uri, ".gbr"))
+ check_ghostbuster(rc, uri, certs, hash, hashlen);
+ else if (!endswith(uri, ".crl"))
+ logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Don't know how to check object %s, ignoring", uri);
+}
+/**
+ * Recursive walk of certificate hierarchy (core of the program). The
+ * daisy chain recursion is to avoid having to duplicate the stack
+ * manipulation and error handling.
+ */
static void walk_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
const certinfo_t *parent,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
@@ -2982,14 +3066,13 @@ static void walk_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
if (parent->sia[0] && parent->ca) {
int n_cert = sk_X509_num(certs);
char uri[URI_MAX];
- certinfo_t child;
int iterator = 0;
Manifest *manifest = NULL;
FileAndHash *fah;
rc->indent++;
- rsync_sia(rc, parent->sia);
+ rsync_tree(rc, parent->sia);
if (!parent->manifest[0]) {
@@ -3003,27 +3086,12 @@ static void walk_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
logmsg(rc, log_debug, "Walking unauthenticated store");
while ((fah = next_uri(rc, parent->sia, rc->unauthenticated, uri, sizeof(uri), manifest, &iterator)) != NULL)
- if (has_suffix(uri, ".cer"))
- walk_cert_1(rc, uri, certs, parent, &child, rc->unauthenticated, 0, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length);
- else if (has_suffix(uri, ".roa"))
- check_roa(rc, uri, certs, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length);
- else if (has_suffix(uri, ".gbr"))
- check_ghostbuster(rc, uri, certs, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length);
- else if (!has_suffix(uri, ".crl"))
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Don't know how to check object %s, ignoring", uri);
-
+ walk_cert_2(rc, uri, certs, parent, rc->unauthenticated, 0, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length);
logmsg(rc, log_debug, "Done walking unauthenticated store");
logmsg(rc, log_debug, "Walking old authenticated store");
while ((fah = next_uri(rc, parent->sia, rc->old_authenticated, uri, sizeof(uri), manifest, &iterator)) != NULL)
- if (has_suffix(uri, ".cer"))
- walk_cert_1(rc, uri, certs, parent, &child, rc->old_authenticated, 1, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length);
- else if (has_suffix(uri, ".roa"))
- check_roa(rc, uri, certs, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length);
- else if (has_suffix(uri, ".gbr"))
- check_ghostbuster(rc, uri, certs, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length);
- else if (!has_suffix(uri, ".crl"))
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Don't know how to check object %s, ignoring", uri);
+ walk_cert_1(rc, uri, certs, parent, rc->old_authenticated, 1, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length);
logmsg(rc, log_debug, "Done walking old authenticated store");
Manifest_free(manifest);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-05-12 18:03:44 +0000