diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ext/POW.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ext/POW.c | 655 |
1 files changed, 313 insertions, 342 deletions
@@ -351,7 +351,6 @@ typedef struct { PyObject_HEAD X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; X509_STORE *store; - PyObject *status; } x509_store_ctx_object; typedef struct { @@ -1256,318 +1255,6 @@ static int check_manifest_FileAndHash_name_cmp(const FileAndHash * const *a, con } /* - * Check a lot of pesky low-level things about RPKI certificates. - */ - -static int check_x509(X509 *x, - X509 *issuer, - PyObject *status, - const int is_ta, - X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) -{ - EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey = NULL, *subject_pkey = NULL; - AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *sia = NULL, *aia = NULL; - STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *policies = NULL; - ASN1_BIT_STRING *ski_pubkey = NULL; - STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp = NULL; - EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku = NULL; - BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bc = NULL; - unsigned char ski_hashbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - unsigned ski_hashlen, afi; - int i, ok, crit, loc, ex_count, is_ca = 0, routercert = 0, ret = 0; - - /* - * We don't use X509_check_ca() to check whether the certificate is - * a CA, because it's not paranoid enough to enforce the RPKI - * certificate profile, but we still call it because we need it (or - * something) to invoke x509v3_cache_extensions() for us. - */ - - (void) X509_check_ca(x); - - if (!check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notBefore(x)) || - !check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notAfter(x))) - record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_ASN1_TIME_VALUE); - - if (x->cert_info == NULL || - x->cert_info->signature == NULL || - x->cert_info->signature->algorithm == NULL || - OBJ_obj2nid(x->cert_info->signature->algorithm) != NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption) - record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); - - if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_get_subject_name(x))) - record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_SUBJECT_NAME); - - if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_get_issuer_name(x))) - record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_ISSUER_NAME); - - /* - * Apparently nothing ever looks at these fields, so there are no - * API functions for them. We wouldn't bother either if they - * weren't forbidden by the RPKI certificate profile. - */ - - if (!x->cert_info || x->cert_info->issuerUID || x->cert_info->subjectUID) - record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_CERTIFICATE_UID); - - /* - * Public key checks postponed until we've checked extensions (in - * particular, until we've checked Basic Constraints and know - * whether to apply the CA or EE rules). - */ - - /* - * Keep track of allowed extensions we've seen. Once we've - * processed all the ones we expect, anything left is an error. - */ - - ex_count = X509_get_ext_count(x); - - /* Critical */ - if ((bc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { - ex_count--; - if (!crit || bc->ca <= 0 || bc->pathlen != NULL) - record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS); - } - - is_ca = bc != NULL; - - if (is_ta && !is_ca) - record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_TRUST_ANCHOR); - - /* - * Check for presence of AIA, SIA, and CRLDP, and make sure that - * they're in the correct format, but leave checking of the URIs - * themselves for Python code to handle. - */ - - /* Non-criticial */ - if ((aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { - ex_count--; - if (crit) - record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); - ok = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia) > 0; - for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia); i++) { - ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, i); - ok = (a != NULL && a->location->type == GEN_URI && - OBJ_obj2nid(a->method) == NID_ad_ca_issuers); - } - if (!ok) - record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_AIA_EXTENSION); - } - - /* Non-criticial */ - if ((sia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sinfo_access, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { - ex_count--; - if (crit) - record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); - ok = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia) > 0; - for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia); i++) { - ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(sia, i); - int nid = a == NULL ? NID_undef : OBJ_obj2nid(a->method); - ok = (a != NULL && a->location->type == GEN_URI && - (nid == NID_caRepository || nid == NID_ad_rpkiManifest || - nid == NID_ad_signedObject || nid == NID_ad_rpkiNotify)); - } - if (!ok) - record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_SIA_EXTENSION); - } - - /* Non-critical */ - if ((crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { - DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, 0); - ex_count--; - if (crit) - record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); - ok = (sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp) == 1 && - dp->reasons == NULL && dp->CRLissuer == NULL && - dp->distpoint != NULL && dp->distpoint->type == 0); - for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname); i++) { - GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, i); - ok = gn != NULL && gn->type == GEN_URI; - } - if (!ok) - record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_CRLDP_EXTENSION); - } - -#warning Too many things need to know whether we are looking at a router cert, need a signaling mechanism - /* - * We used to do this using the URI, but that doesn't fly here. - * We tried an enumerated type, but that didn't work out. - * - * May just need an explicit parameter all the way from the Python - * level. Simplest might just be an explicit EKU OID, which, if - * provided, must match the certificate and correspond to a set of - * rules we know how to apply (currently just router certs). Python - * API default of None, obviously, which again is a good match. - */ - - /* Non-critical */ - if ((eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { - ex_count--; - if (crit || is_ca || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku) == 0) - record_validation_status(status, INAPPROPRIATE_EKU_EXTENSION); - else - for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) - routercert |= OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i)) == NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router; - } - - /* Critical */ - if ((policies = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_certificate_policies, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { - POLICYQUALINFO *qualifier = NULL; - POLICYINFO *policy = NULL; - ex_count--; - if (!crit || sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) != 1 || - (policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, 0)) == NULL || - OBJ_obj2nid(policy->policyid) != NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber || - sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(policy->qualifiers) > 1 || - (sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(policy->qualifiers) == 1 && - ((qualifier = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(policy->qualifiers, 0)) == NULL || - OBJ_obj2nid(qualifier->pqualid) != NID_id_qt_cps))) - record_validation_status(status, BAD_CERTIFICATE_POLICY); - else if (qualifier != NULL) - record_validation_status(status, POLICY_QUALIFIER_CPS); - } - - /* Critical */ - if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0) - record_validation_status(status, KEY_USAGE_MISSING); - else { - ex_count--; - if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_key_usage, -1))) || - x->ex_kusage != (is_ca ? KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | KU_CRL_SIGN : KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) - record_validation_status(status, BAD_KEY_USAGE); - } - - /* Critical */ - if (x->rfc3779_addr) { - ex_count--; - if (routercert || - (loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, -1)) < 0 || - !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, loc)) || - !v3_addr_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_addr) || - sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr) == 0) - record_validation_status(status, BAD_IPADDRBLOCKS); - else - for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr); i++) { - IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, i); - afi = v3_addr_get_afi(f); - if (afi != IANA_AFI_IPV4 && afi != IANA_AFI_IPV6) - record_validation_status(status, UNKNOWN_AFI); - else if (f->addressFamily->length != 2) - record_validation_status(status, SAFI_NOT_ALLOWED); - } - } - - /* Critical */ - if (x->rfc3779_asid) { - ex_count--; - if ((loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, -1)) < 0 || - !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, loc)) || - !v3_asid_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_asid) || - x->rfc3779_asid->asnum == NULL || - x->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL || - (routercert && x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)) - record_validation_status(status, BAD_ASIDENTIFIERS); - } - - if (!x->rfc3779_addr && !x->rfc3779_asid) - record_validation_status(status, MISSING_RESOURCES); - - /* Non-critical */ - if (!x->skid) - record_validation_status(status, SKI_EXTENSION_MISSING); - else { - ex_count--; - if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1)))) - record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); - if ((ski_pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(x)) == NULL || - !EVP_Digest(ski_pubkey->data, ski_pubkey->length, - ski_hashbuf, &ski_hashlen, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || - ski_hashlen != 20 || - ski_hashlen != x->skid->length || - memcmp(ski_hashbuf, x->skid->data, ski_hashlen)) - record_validation_status(status, SKI_PUBLIC_KEY_MISMATCH); - } - - /* Non-critical */ - if (x->akid) { - ex_count--; - if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, -1)))) - record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); - if (!x->akid->keyid || x->akid->serial || x->akid->issuer) - record_validation_status(status, AKI_EXTENSION_WRONG_FORMAT); - } - - if (ex_count > 0) - record_validation_status(status, DISALLOWED_X509V3_EXTENSION); - - /* - * Public key checks. - */ - - subject_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); - ok = subject_pkey != NULL; - if (ok) { - ASN1_OBJECT *algorithm; - - (void) X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&algorithm, NULL, NULL, NULL, X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x)); - - switch (OBJ_obj2nid(algorithm)) { - - case NID_rsaEncryption: - ok = (EVP_PKEY_type(subject_pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA && - BN_get_word(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->e) == 65537 && - BN_num_bits(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->n) == 2048); - break; - - case NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey: - if (routercert) - ok = (EVP_PKEY_type(subject_pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_EC && - EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(subject_pkey->pkey.ec)) == NID_X9_62_prime256v1); - else - ok = 0; - break; - - default: - ok = 0; - } - } - if (!ok) - record_validation_status(status, BAD_PUBLIC_KEY); - - if ((issuer_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer)) == NULL || X509_verify(x, issuer_pkey) <= 0) - record_validation_status(status, CERTIFICATE_BAD_SIGNATURE); - -#warning Move policy stuff to optional OID in base X509.verify() - /* - * It seems that the only reason we have for needing the - * verification context here is to set these flags, which is silly. - * Instead, we should add an optional argument to the X509.verify(), - * either an explicit OID which enables the policy check for that - * policy, or a simple boolean to enable check for the RPKI policy. - */ - if (ctx != NULL) { - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY); - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(ctx->param, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber)); - } - - ret = 1; - - error: - EVP_PKEY_free(issuer_pkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(subject_pkey); - BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bc); - sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(sia, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free); - sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(aia, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free); - sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free); - sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(policies, POLICYINFO_free); - sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(eku, ASN1_OBJECT_free); - - return ret; -} - -/* * Check a lot of pesky low-level things about RPKI CRLs. */ @@ -3411,21 +3098,19 @@ static char x509_object_verify__doc__[] = static PyObject * x509_object_verify(x509_object *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwds) { - static char *kwlist[] = {"trusted", "untrusted", "crl", "status", "context_class", NULL}; + static char *kwlist[] = {"trusted", "untrusted", "crl", "policy", "context_class", NULL}; PyObject *ctxclass = (PyObject *) &POW_X509StoreCTX_Type; - STACK_OF(X509) *trusted_stack = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *trusted_stack = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted_stack = NULL; - STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crl_stack = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crl_stack = NULL; x509_store_ctx_object *ctx = NULL; PyObject *trusted = Py_None; PyObject *untrusted = Py_None; PyObject *crl = Py_None; - PyObject *status = Py_None; - X509 *issuer = NULL; - int ok = 0, is_ta = 0; + PyObject *policy = Py_None; + int ok = 0; - if (!PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "|OOOO!O", kwlist, - &trusted, &untrusted, &crl, &PySet_Type, &status, &ctxclass)) + if (!PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "|OOOOO", kwlist, &trusted, &untrusted, &crl, &policy, &ctxclass)) goto error; if ((trusted_stack = x509_helper_iterable_to_stack(trusted)) == NULL) @@ -3456,41 +3141,37 @@ x509_object_verify(x509_object *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwds) if (crl != Py_None) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->ctx->param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); - if (status != Py_None) { + if (policy != Py_None) { + const char *oid_txt = NULL; + ASN1_OBJECT *oid_obj = NULL; - is_ta = (sk_X509_num(trusted_stack) == 1 && - sk_X509_num(untrusted_stack) == 0 && - X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(trusted_stack, 0), self->x509) == 0 && - X509_check_issued(self->x509, self->x509) == 0); + if ((oid_txt = PyString_AsString(policy)) == NULL) + goto error; - if ((issuer = sk_X509_value(trusted_stack, 0)) == NULL) - lose("Couldn't find issuer for RPKI detail checks"); + if ((oid_obj = OBJ_txt2obj(oid_txt, 1)) == NULL) + lose("Couldn't parse policy OID"); - if (!check_x509(self->x509, issuer, status, is_ta, ctx->ctx)) - goto error; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->ctx->param, X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY); + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(ctx->ctx->param, oid_obj); } Py_XINCREF(trusted); Py_XINCREF(untrusted); Py_XINCREF(crl); - Py_XINCREF(status); X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(ctx->ctx, self->x509); X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx->ctx, trusted_stack); X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx->ctx, untrusted_stack); X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx->ctx, crl_stack); - ctx->status = status; X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx->ctx, x509_store_ctx_object_verify_cb); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->ctx->param, X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT); ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx->ctx) >= 0; - ctx->status = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx->ctx, NULL); X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx->ctx, NULL); X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx->ctx, NULL); X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(ctx->ctx, NULL); - Py_XDECREF(status); Py_XDECREF(crl); Py_XDECREF(untrusted); Py_XDECREF(trusted); @@ -3514,6 +3195,303 @@ x509_object_verify(x509_object *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwds) } +static char x509_object_check_rpki_conformance__doc__[] = + "Check a certificate for conformance to the RPKI profile.\n" + ; + +#warning Write real x509_object_check_rpki_conformance__doc__[] once API is stable. + +static PyObject * +x509_object_check_rpki_conformance(x509_object *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwds) +{ + static char *kwlist[] = {"status", "eku", NULL}; + PyObject *status = Py_None; + PyObject *ekuarg = Py_None; + EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey = NULL, *subject_pkey = NULL; + AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *sia = NULL, *aia = NULL; + STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *policies = NULL; + ASN1_BIT_STRING *ski_pubkey = NULL; + STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp = NULL; + EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku = NULL; + BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bc = NULL; + unsigned char ski_hashbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned ski_hashlen, afi; + int i, ok, crit, loc, ex_count, is_ca = 0, ekunid = NID_undef, ret = 0; + + if (!PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "O!O", kwlist, &PySet_Type, &status, &ekuarg)) + goto error; + + if (ekuarg != Py_None) { + const char *ekutxt = PyString_AsString(ekuarg); + if (ekutxt == NULL) + goto error; + ekunid = OBJ_txt2nid(ekutxt); + } + + /* + * We don't use X509_check_ca() to check whether the certificate is + * a CA, because it's not paranoid enough to enforce the RPKI + * certificate profile, but we still call it because we need it (or + * something) to invoke x509v3_cache_extensions() for us. + */ + + (void) X509_check_ca(self->x509); + + if (!check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notBefore(self->x509)) || + !check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notAfter(self->x509))) + record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_ASN1_TIME_VALUE); + + if (self->x509->cert_info == NULL || + self->x509->cert_info->signature == NULL || + self->x509->cert_info->signature->algorithm == NULL || + OBJ_obj2nid(self->x509->cert_info->signature->algorithm) != NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption) + record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + + if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_get_subject_name(self->x509))) + record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_SUBJECT_NAME); + + if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_get_issuer_name(self->x509))) + record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_ISSUER_NAME); + + /* + * Apparently nothing ever looks at these fields, so there are no + * API functions for them. We wouldn't bother either if they + * weren't forbidden by the RPKI certificate profile. + */ + + if (!self->x509->cert_info || self->x509->cert_info->issuerUID || self->x509->cert_info->subjectUID) + record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_CERTIFICATE_UID); + + /* + * Public key checks postponed until we've checked extensions (in + * particular, until we've checked Basic Constraints and know + * whether to apply the CA or EE rules). + */ + + /* + * Keep track of allowed extensions we've seen. Once we've + * processed all the ones we expect, anything left is an error. + */ + + ex_count = X509_get_ext_count(self->x509); + + /* Critical */ + if ((bc = X509_get_ext_d2i(self->x509, NID_basic_constraints, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + ex_count--; + if (!crit || bc->ca <= 0 || bc->pathlen != NULL) + record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS); + } + + is_ca = bc != NULL; + + /* + * Check for presence of AIA, SIA, and CRLDP, and make sure that + * they're in the correct format, but leave checking of the URIs + * themselves for Python code to handle. + */ + + /* Non-criticial */ + if ((aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(self->x509, NID_info_access, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + ex_count--; + if (crit) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + ok = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia) > 0; + for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia); i++) { + ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, i); + ok = (a != NULL && a->location->type == GEN_URI && + OBJ_obj2nid(a->method) == NID_ad_ca_issuers); + } + if (!ok) + record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_AIA_EXTENSION); + } + + /* Non-criticial */ + if ((sia = X509_get_ext_d2i(self->x509, NID_sinfo_access, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + ex_count--; + if (crit) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + ok = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia) > 0; + for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia); i++) { + ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(sia, i); + int nid = a == NULL ? NID_undef : OBJ_obj2nid(a->method); + ok = (a != NULL && a->location->type == GEN_URI && + (nid == NID_caRepository || nid == NID_ad_rpkiManifest || + nid == NID_ad_signedObject || nid == NID_ad_rpkiNotify)); + } + if (!ok) + record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_SIA_EXTENSION); + } + + /* Non-critical */ + if ((crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(self->x509, NID_crl_distribution_points, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, 0); + ex_count--; + if (crit) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + ok = (sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp) == 1 && + dp->reasons == NULL && dp->CRLissuer == NULL && + dp->distpoint != NULL && dp->distpoint->type == 0); + for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname); i++) { + GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, i); + ok = gn != NULL && gn->type == GEN_URI; + } + if (!ok) + record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_CRLDP_EXTENSION); + } + + /* Non-critical */ + if ((eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(self->x509, NID_ext_key_usage, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + ex_count--; + ok = 0; + if (!crit && !is_ca && sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku) > 0 && ekunid != NID_undef) + for (i = 0; !ok && i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) + ok = OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i)) == ekunid; + if (!ok) + record_validation_status(status, INAPPROPRIATE_EKU_EXTENSION); + } + + /* Critical */ + if ((policies = X509_get_ext_d2i(self->x509, NID_certificate_policies, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + POLICYQUALINFO *qualifier = NULL; + POLICYINFO *policy = NULL; + ex_count--; + if (!crit || sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) != 1 || + (policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, 0)) == NULL || + OBJ_obj2nid(policy->policyid) != NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber || + sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(policy->qualifiers) > 1 || + (sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(policy->qualifiers) == 1 && + ((qualifier = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(policy->qualifiers, 0)) == NULL || + OBJ_obj2nid(qualifier->pqualid) != NID_id_qt_cps))) + record_validation_status(status, BAD_CERTIFICATE_POLICY); + else if (qualifier != NULL) + record_validation_status(status, POLICY_QUALIFIER_CPS); + } + + /* Critical */ + if ((self->x509->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0) + record_validation_status(status, KEY_USAGE_MISSING); + else { + ex_count--; + if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(self->x509, X509_get_ext_by_NID(self->x509, NID_key_usage, -1))) || + self->x509->ex_kusage != (is_ca ? KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | KU_CRL_SIGN : KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) + record_validation_status(status, BAD_KEY_USAGE); + } + + /* Critical */ + if (self->x509->rfc3779_addr) { + ex_count--; + if (ekunid == NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router || + (loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(self->x509, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, -1)) < 0 || + !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(self->x509, loc)) || + !v3_addr_is_canonical(self->x509->rfc3779_addr) || + sk_IPAddressFamily_num(self->x509->rfc3779_addr) == 0) + record_validation_status(status, BAD_IPADDRBLOCKS); + else + for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(self->x509->rfc3779_addr); i++) { + IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(self->x509->rfc3779_addr, i); + afi = v3_addr_get_afi(f); + if (afi != IANA_AFI_IPV4 && afi != IANA_AFI_IPV6) + record_validation_status(status, UNKNOWN_AFI); + else if (f->addressFamily->length != 2) + record_validation_status(status, SAFI_NOT_ALLOWED); + } + } + + /* Critical */ + if (self->x509->rfc3779_asid) { + ex_count--; + if ((loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(self->x509, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, -1)) < 0 || + !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(self->x509, loc)) || + !v3_asid_is_canonical(self->x509->rfc3779_asid) || + self->x509->rfc3779_asid->asnum == NULL || + self->x509->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL || + (ekunid == NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router && self->x509->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)) + record_validation_status(status, BAD_ASIDENTIFIERS); + } + + if (!self->x509->rfc3779_addr && !self->x509->rfc3779_asid) + record_validation_status(status, MISSING_RESOURCES); + + /* Non-critical */ + if (!self->x509->skid) + record_validation_status(status, SKI_EXTENSION_MISSING); + else { + ex_count--; + if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(self->x509, X509_get_ext_by_NID(self->x509, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1)))) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + if ((ski_pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(self->x509)) == NULL || + !EVP_Digest(ski_pubkey->data, ski_pubkey->length, + ski_hashbuf, &ski_hashlen, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || + ski_hashlen != 20 || + ski_hashlen != self->x509->skid->length || + memcmp(ski_hashbuf, self->x509->skid->data, ski_hashlen)) + record_validation_status(status, SKI_PUBLIC_KEY_MISMATCH); + } + + /* Non-critical */ + if (self->x509->akid) { + ex_count--; + if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(self->x509, X509_get_ext_by_NID(self->x509, NID_authority_key_identifier, -1)))) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + if (!self->x509->akid->keyid || self->x509->akid->serial || self->x509->akid->issuer) + record_validation_status(status, AKI_EXTENSION_WRONG_FORMAT); + } + + if (ex_count > 0) + record_validation_status(status, DISALLOWED_X509V3_EXTENSION); + + /* + * Public key checks. + */ + + subject_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(self->x509); + ok = subject_pkey != NULL; + if (ok) { + ASN1_OBJECT *algorithm; + + (void) X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&algorithm, NULL, NULL, NULL, X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(self->x509)); + + switch (OBJ_obj2nid(algorithm)) { + + case NID_rsaEncryption: + ok = (EVP_PKEY_type(subject_pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA && + BN_get_word(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->e) == 65537 && + BN_num_bits(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->n) == 2048); + break; + + case NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey: + if (ekunid == NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router) + ok = (EVP_PKEY_type(subject_pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_EC && + EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(subject_pkey->pkey.ec)) == NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + else + ok = 0; + break; + + default: + ok = 0; + } + } + if (!ok) + record_validation_status(status, BAD_PUBLIC_KEY); + + ret = 1; + + error: + EVP_PKEY_free(issuer_pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(subject_pkey); + BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bc); + sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(sia, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free); + sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(aia, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free); + sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free); + sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(policies, POLICYINFO_free); + sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(eku, ASN1_OBJECT_free); + + if (ret) + Py_RETURN_NONE; + else + return NULL; +} + static char x509_object_get_version__doc__[] = "Return version number of this certificate.\n" ; @@ -4775,6 +4753,7 @@ static struct PyMethodDef x509_object_methods[] = { Define_Method(derWrite, x509_object_der_write, METH_NOARGS), Define_Method(sign, x509_object_sign, METH_VARARGS), Define_Method(verify, x509_object_verify, METH_KEYWORDS), + Define_Method(checkRPKIConformance, x509_object_check_rpki_conformance, METH_KEYWORDS), Define_Method(getPublicKey, x509_object_get_public_key, METH_NOARGS), Define_Method(setPublicKey, x509_object_set_public_key, METH_VARARGS), Define_Method(getVersion, x509_object_get_version, METH_NOARGS), @@ -4905,7 +4884,6 @@ x509_store_ctx_object_new(PyTypeObject *type, GCC_UNUSED PyObject *args, GCC_UNU self->ctx = NULL; self->store = NULL; - self->status = NULL; return (PyObject *) self; error: @@ -5026,13 +5004,6 @@ x509_store_ctx_object_get_chain (x509_store_ctx_object *self) } /* - * Do we need an access method to let Python callbacks fiddle with the - * validation status set? Maybe. Skip for now, add later if needed. - * May need to pay closer attention to initialization and reference - * count management of the status field if we exposing it. - */ - -/* * See (omnibus) man page for X509_STORE_CTX_get_error() for other * query methods we might want to expose. Someday we might want to * support X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME too. |