diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ext/POW.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ext/POW.c | 88 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 48 deletions
@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ #include <openssl/pem.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/err.h> -#include <openssl/md5.h> #include <openssl/sha.h> #include <openssl/cms.h> @@ -118,8 +117,6 @@ define GCC_UNUSED #define HASH_SHA256_LEN 32 /* Digests */ -#define MD5_DIGEST 2 -#define SHA_DIGEST 3 #define SHA1_DIGEST 4 #define SHA256_DIGEST 6 #define SHA384_DIGEST 7 @@ -305,12 +302,6 @@ static PyObject static PyObject *custom_datetime; /* - * Tuple mapping C validation status codes (C enum) to equivalent Python objects. - */ - -static PyObject *status_codes; - -/* * "ex_data" index for pointer we want to attach to X509_STORE_CTX so * we can extract it in callbacks. */ @@ -533,8 +524,6 @@ static const EVP_MD * evp_digest_factory(int digest_type) { switch (digest_type) { - case MD5_DIGEST: return EVP_md5(); - case SHA_DIGEST: return EVP_sha(); case SHA1_DIGEST: return EVP_sha1(); case SHA256_DIGEST: return EVP_sha256(); case SHA384_DIGEST: return EVP_sha384(); @@ -1301,14 +1290,6 @@ validation_status_x509_verify_cert_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, PyObject *sta * status set object. */ -typedef enum { - check_object_type_cer, - check_object_type_crl, - check_object_type_mft, - check_object_type_roa, - check_object_type_gbr -} check_object_type_t; - /* * Check whether a Distinguished Name conforms to the rescert profile. * The profile is very restrictive: it only allows one mandatory @@ -1425,7 +1406,6 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, X509 *issuer, PyObject *status, const int is_ta, - const check_object_type_t object_type, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey = NULL, *subject_pkey = NULL; @@ -1496,9 +1476,21 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, if ((crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) ex_count--; +#warning Too many things need to know whether we are looking at a router cert, need a signaling mechanism + /* + * We used to do this using the URI, but that doesn't fly here. + * We tried an enumerated type, but that didn't work out. + * + * May just need an explicit parameter all the way from the Python + * level. Simplest might just be an explicit EKU OID, which, if + * provided, must match the certificate and correspond to a set of + * rules we know how to apply (currently just router certs). Python + * API default of None, obviously, which again is a good match. + */ + if ((eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { ex_count--; - if (crit || is_ca || object_type != check_object_type_cer || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku) == 0) + if (crit || is_ca || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku) == 0) lose_validation_error_from_code(status, INAPPROPRIATE_EKU_EXTENSION); for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) routercert |= OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i)) == NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router; @@ -1631,6 +1623,14 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, if (ex_count > 0) lose_validation_error_from_code(status, DISALLOWED_X509V3_EXTENSION); +#warning Move policy stuff to optional OID in base X509.verify() + /* + * It seems that the only reason we have for needing the + * verification context here is to set these flags, which is silly. + * Instead, we should add an optional argument to the X509.verify(), + * either an explicit OID which enables the policy check for that + * policy, or a simple boolean to enable check for the RPKI policy. + */ if (ctx != NULL) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(ctx->param, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber)); @@ -3467,8 +3467,6 @@ static char x509_object_sign__doc__[] = "The optional \"digest\" parameter indicates which digest to compute and\n" "sign, and should be one of the following:\n" "\n" - "* MD5_DIGEST\n" - "* SHA_DIGEST\n" "* SHA1_DIGEST\n" "* SHA256_DIGEST\n" "* SHA384_DIGEST\n" @@ -3572,7 +3570,8 @@ x509_object_verify(x509_object *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwds) * For the moment, keep options open, clean up later. */ -#if 1 +#warning Do we need to do something about picking issuer out of trusted_stack? +#if 0 int i; for (i = 0; issuer == NULL && i < sk_X509_num(trusted_stack); i++) @@ -3588,7 +3587,6 @@ x509_object_verify(x509_object *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwds) X509_cmp(issuer, self->x509) == 0); #else -#warning Do we need to do something about picking issuer out of trusted_stack? is_ta = (sk_X509_num(trusted_stack) == 1 && sk_X509_num(untrusted_stack) == 0 && @@ -3601,23 +3599,9 @@ x509_object_verify(x509_object *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwds) issuer = sk_X509_value(trusted_stack, 0); } -#warning Need to do something about check_object_type_* mess - /* - * Original concept was reasonable, but now that we're making the - * Python caller responsible for validation of embedded - * certificates, we don't have a handle on the CMS object for the - * encapsulated cases. So either we need to do the - * signed-object-type-specific checks at the Python level, or we - * need the caller to tell us what kind of certificate this is - * supposed to be, whether by passing us a filename extension or - * some other means. - */ - - if (status != Py_None && !check_x509(self->x509, issuer, status, is_ta, check_object_type_cer, ctx->ctx)) + if (status != Py_None && !check_x509(self->x509, issuer, status, is_ta, ctx->ctx)) goto error; -#warning Not sure about reference counts in this version. Might be safest to stuff PyObject* for all inputs into ctx so that everything mentioned here is protected until user releases ctx. - Py_XINCREF(trusted); Py_XINCREF(untrusted); Py_XINCREF(crl); @@ -5727,6 +5711,21 @@ crl_object_get_revoked(crl_object *self) return NULL; } +static char crl_object_is_revoked__doc__[] = + "Check whether a particular certificate has been revoked.\n" + ; + +static PyObject * +crl_object_is_revoked(crl_object *self, PyObject *args) +{ + x509_object *x = NULL; + + if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O!", &POW_X509_Type, &x)) + return NULL; + + return PyBool_FromLong(X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(self->crl, NULL, x->x509)); +} + static char crl_object_clear_extensions__doc__[] = "Clear all extensions attached to this CRL.\n" ; @@ -5753,8 +5752,6 @@ static char crl_object_sign__doc__[] = "The optional \"digest\" parameter indicates which digest to compute and\n" "sign, and should be one of the following:\n" "\n" - "* MD5_DIGEST\n" - "* SHA_DIGEST\n" "* SHA1_DIGEST\n" "* SHA256_DIGEST\n" "* SHA384_DIGEST\n" @@ -5970,6 +5967,7 @@ static struct PyMethodDef crl_object_methods[] = { Define_Method(getNextUpdate, crl_object_get_next_update, METH_NOARGS), Define_Method(setNextUpdate, crl_object_set_next_update, METH_VARARGS), Define_Method(getRevoked, crl_object_get_revoked, METH_NOARGS), + Define_Method(isRevoked, crl_object_is_revoked, METH_VARARGS), Define_Method(addRevocations, crl_object_add_revocations, METH_VARARGS), Define_Method(clearExtensions, crl_object_clear_extensions, METH_NOARGS), Define_Method(pemWrite, crl_object_pem_write, METH_NOARGS), @@ -7085,8 +7083,6 @@ static char POW_Digest_Type__doc__[] = "The constructor takes one parameter, the kind of Digest object to create.\n" "This should be one of the following:\n" "\n" - " * MD5_DIGEST\n" - " * SHA_DIGEST\n" " * SHA1_DIGEST\n" " * SHA256_DIGEST\n" " * SHA384_DIGEST\n" @@ -9450,8 +9446,6 @@ static char pkcs10_object_sign__doc__[] = "The optional \"digest\" parameter indicates which digest to compute and\n" "sign, and should be one of the following:\n" "\n" - "* MD5_DIGEST\n" - "* SHA_DIGEST\n" "* SHA1_DIGEST\n" "* SHA256_DIGEST\n" "* SHA384_DIGEST\n" @@ -10266,8 +10260,6 @@ init_POW(void) Define_Integer_Constant(OIDNAME_FORMAT); /* Message digests */ - Define_Integer_Constant(MD5_DIGEST); - Define_Integer_Constant(SHA_DIGEST); Define_Integer_Constant(SHA1_DIGEST); Define_Integer_Constant(SHA256_DIGEST); Define_Integer_Constant(SHA384_DIGEST); |