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-rw-r--r--rcynic/rcynic.c6070
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diff --git a/rcynic/rcynic.c b/rcynic/rcynic.c
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--- a/rcynic/rcynic.c
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@@ -1,6070 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2013--2014 Dragon Research Labs ("DRL")
- * Portions copyright (C) 2009--2012 Internet Systems Consortium ("ISC")
- * Portions copyright (C) 2006--2008 American Registry for Internet Numbers ("ARIN")
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notices and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DRL, ISC, AND ARIN DISCLAIM ALL
- * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DRL,
- * ISC, OR ARIN BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS
- * OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
- * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
- * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* $Id$ */
-
-/**
- * @mainpage
- *
- * "Cynical rsync": Recursively walk RPKI tree using rsync to pull
- * data from remote sites, validating certificates and CRLs as we go.
- *
- * Doxygen doesn't quite know what to make of a one-file C program,
- * and ends up putting most of the interesting data @link rcynic.c
- * here. @endlink
- */
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <sys/file.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <sys/signal.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <utime.h>
-#include <glob.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <getopt.h>
-
-#define SYSLOG_NAMES /* defines CODE prioritynames[], facilitynames[] */
-#include <syslog.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/safestack.h>
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/cms.h>
-
-#include <rpki/roa.h>
-#include <rpki/manifest.h>
-
-#include "bio_f_linebreak.h"
-
-#include "defstack.h"
-
-#if !defined(FILENAME_MAX) && defined(PATH_MAX) && PATH_MAX > 1024
-#define FILENAME_MAX PATH_MAX
-#elif !defined(FILENAME_MAX)
-#define FILENAME_MAX 1024
-#endif
-
-#define SCHEME_RSYNC ("rsync://")
-#define SIZEOF_RSYNC (sizeof(SCHEME_RSYNC) - 1)
-
-/**
- * Maximum length of a hostname.
- */
-#ifndef HOSTNAME_MAX
-#define HOSTNAME_MAX 256
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Maximum length of an URI.
- */
-#define URI_MAX (SIZEOF_RSYNC + HOSTNAME_MAX + 1 + FILENAME_MAX)
-
-/**
- * Maximum number of times we try to kill an inferior process before
- * giving up.
- */
-#define KILL_MAX 10
-
-/**
- * Version number of XML summary output.
- */
-#define XML_SUMMARY_VERSION 1
-
-/**
- * How much buffer space do we need for a raw address?
- */
-#define ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN 16
-
-/**
- * How many bytes is a SHA256 digest?
- */
-#define HASH_SHA256_LEN 32
-
-/**
- * Logging levels. Same general idea as syslog(), but our own
- * catagories based on what makes sense for this program. Default
- * mappings to syslog() priorities are here because it's the easiest
- * way to make sure that we assign a syslog level to each of ours.
- */
-
-#define LOG_LEVELS \
- QQ(log_sys_err, LOG_ERR) /* Error from OS or library */ \
- QQ(log_usage_err, LOG_ERR) /* Bad usage (local error) */ \
- QQ(log_data_err, LOG_NOTICE) /* Bad data, no biscuit */ \
- QQ(log_telemetry, LOG_INFO) /* Normal progress chatter */ \
- QQ(log_verbose, LOG_INFO) /* Extra chatter */ \
- QQ(log_debug, LOG_DEBUG) /* Only useful when debugging */
-
-#define QQ(x,y) x ,
-typedef enum log_level { LOG_LEVELS LOG_LEVEL_T_MAX } log_level_t;
-#undef QQ
-
-#define QQ(x,y) { #x , x },
-static const struct {
- const char *name;
- log_level_t value;
-} log_levels[] = {
- LOG_LEVELS
-};
-#undef QQ
-
-/**
- * MIB counters derived from OpenSSL. Long list of validation failure
- * codes from OpenSSL (crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h).
- */
-
-#define MIB_COUNTERS_FROM_OPENSSL \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY) \
- QV(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE)
-
-/**
- * MIB counters specific to rcynic.
- */
-
-#define MIB_COUNTERS \
- MIB_COUNTERS_FROM_OPENSSL \
- QB(aia_extension_missing, "AIA extension missing") \
- QB(aia_extension_forbidden, "AIA extension forbidden") \
- QB(aia_uri_missing, "AIA URI missing") \
- QB(aki_extension_issuer_mismatch, "AKI extension issuer mismatch") \
- QB(aki_extension_missing, "AKI extension missing") \
- QB(aki_extension_wrong_format, "AKI extension is wrong format") \
- QB(bad_asidentifiers, "Bad ASIdentifiers extension") \
- QB(bad_certificate_policy, "Bad certificate policy") \
- QB(bad_cms_econtenttype, "Bad CMS eContentType") \
- QB(bad_cms_si_contenttype, "Bad CMS SI ContentType") \
- QB(bad_cms_signer, "Bad CMS signer") \
- QB(bad_cms_signer_infos, "Bad CMS signerInfos") \
- QB(bad_crl, "Bad CRL") \
- QB(bad_ipaddrblocks, "Bad IPAddrBlocks extension") \
- QB(bad_key_usage, "Bad keyUsage") \
- QB(bad_manifest_digest_length, "Bad manifest digest length") \
- QB(bad_public_key, "Bad public key") \
- QB(bad_roa_asID, "Bad ROA asID") \
- QB(bad_certificate_serial_number, "Bad certificate serialNumber") \
- QB(bad_manifest_number, "Bad manifestNumber") \
- QB(certificate_bad_signature, "Bad certificate signature") \
- QB(certificate_failed_validation, "Certificate failed validation") \
- QB(cms_econtent_decode_error, "CMS eContent decode error") \
- QB(cms_includes_crls, "CMS includes CRLs") \
- QB(cms_signer_missing, "CMS signer missing") \
- QB(cms_ski_mismatch, "CMS SKI mismatch") \
- QB(cms_validation_failure, "CMS validation failure") \
- QB(crl_issuer_name_mismatch, "CRL issuer name mismatch") \
- QB(crl_not_in_manifest, "CRL not listed in manifest") \
- QB(crl_not_yet_valid, "CRL not yet valid") \
- QB(crl_number_extension_missing, "CRL number extension missing") \
- QB(crl_number_is_negative, "CRL number is negative") \
- QB(crl_number_out_of_range, "CRL number out of range") \
- QB(crldp_doesnt_match_issuer_sia, "CRLDP doesn't match issuer's SIA") \
- QB(crldp_uri_missing, "CRLDP URI missing") \
- QB(disallowed_x509v3_extension, "Disallowed X.509v3 extension") \
- QB(duplicate_name_in_manifest, "Duplicate name in manifest") \
- QB(inappropriate_eku_extension, "Inappropriate EKU extension") \
- QB(malformed_aia_extension, "Malformed AIA extension") \
- QB(malformed_sia_extension, "Malformed SIA extension") \
- QB(malformed_basic_constraints, "Malformed basicConstraints") \
- QB(malformed_trust_anchor, "Malformed trust anchor") \
- QB(malformed_cadirectory_uri, "Malformed caDirectory URI") \
- QB(malformed_crldp_extension, "Malformed CRDLP extension") \
- QB(malformed_crldp_uri, "Malformed CRDLP URI") \
- QB(malformed_roa_addressfamily, "Malformed ROA addressFamily") \
- QB(malformed_tal_uri, "Malformed TAL URI") \
- QB(manifest_carepository_mismatch, "Manifest caRepository mismatch") \
- QB(manifest_interval_overruns_cert, "Manifest interval overruns certificate") \
- QB(manifest_lists_missing_object, "Manifest lists missing object") \
- QB(manifest_not_yet_valid, "Manifest not yet valid") \
- QB(missing_resources, "Missing resources") \
- QB(nonconformant_asn1_time_value, "Nonconformant ASN.1 time value") \
- QB(nonconformant_public_key_algorithm,"Nonconformant public key algorithm")\
- QB(nonconformant_signature_algorithm, "Nonconformant signature algorithm")\
- QB(nonconformant_digest_algorithm, "Nonconformant digest algorithm") \
- QB(nonconformant_certificate_uid, "Nonconformant certificate UID") \
- QB(object_rejected, "Object rejected") \
- QB(rfc3779_inheritance_required, "RFC 3779 inheritance required") \
- QB(roa_contains_bad_afi_value, "ROA contains bad AFI value") \
- QB(roa_max_prefixlen_too_short, "ROA maxPrefixlen too short") \
- QB(roa_resource_not_in_ee, "ROA resource not in EE") \
- QB(roa_resources_malformed, "ROA resources malformed") \
- QB(rsync_transfer_failed, "rsync transfer failed") \
- QB(rsync_transfer_timed_out, "rsync transfer timed out") \
- QB(safi_not_allowed, "SAFI not allowed") \
- QB(sia_cadirectory_uri_missing, "SIA caDirectory URI missing") \
- QB(sia_extension_missing, "SIA extension missing") \
- QB(sia_manifest_uri_missing, "SIA manifest URI missing") \
- QB(ski_extension_missing, "SKI extension missing") \
- QB(ski_public_key_mismatch, "SKI public key mismatch") \
- QB(trust_anchor_key_mismatch, "Trust anchor key mismatch") \
- QB(trust_anchor_with_crldp, "Trust anchor can't have CRLDP") \
- QB(unknown_afi, "Unknown AFI") \
- QB(unknown_openssl_verify_error, "Unknown OpenSSL verify error") \
- QB(unreadable_trust_anchor, "Unreadable trust anchor") \
- QB(unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, "Unreadable trust anchor locator") \
- QB(wrong_object_version, "Wrong object version") \
- QW(aia_doesnt_match_issuer, "AIA doesn't match issuer") \
- QW(backup_thisupdate_newer_than_current, "Backup thisUpdate newer than current") \
- QW(backup_number_higher_than_current, "Backup number higher than current") \
- QW(bad_thisupdate, "Bad CRL thisUpdate") \
- QW(bad_cms_si_signed_attributes, "Bad CMS SI signed attributes") \
- QW(bad_signed_object_uri, "Bad signedObject URI") \
- QW(crldp_names_newer_crl, "CRLDP names newer CRL") \
- QW(digest_mismatch, "Digest mismatch") \
- QW(ee_certificate_with_1024_bit_key, "EE certificate with 1024 bit key") \
- QW(issuer_uses_multiple_crldp_values, "Issuer uses multiple CRLDP values")\
- QW(multiple_rsync_uris_in_extension, "Multiple rsync URIs in extension") \
- QW(nonconformant_issuer_name, "Nonconformant X.509 issuer name") \
- QW(nonconformant_subject_name, "Nonconformant X.509 subject name") \
- QW(policy_qualifier_cps, "Policy Qualifier CPS") \
- QW(rsync_partial_transfer, "rsync partial transfer") \
- QW(rsync_transfer_skipped, "rsync transfer skipped") \
- QW(sia_extension_missing_from_ee, "SIA extension missing from EE") \
- QW(skipped_because_not_in_manifest, "Skipped because not in manifest") \
- QW(stale_crl_or_manifest, "Stale CRL or manifest") \
- QW(tainted_by_stale_crl, "Tainted by stale CRL") \
- QW(tainted_by_stale_manifest, "Tainted by stale manifest") \
- QW(tainted_by_not_being_in_manifest, "Tainted by not being in manifest") \
- QW(trust_anchor_not_self_signed, "Trust anchor not self-signed") \
- QW(trust_anchor_skipped, "Trust anchor skipped") \
- QW(unknown_object_type_skipped, "Unknown object type skipped") \
- QW(uri_too_long, "URI too long") \
- QW(wrong_cms_si_signature_algorithm, "Wrong CMS SI signature algorithm") \
- QW(wrong_cms_si_digest_algorithm, "Wrong CMS SI digest algorithm") \
- QG(non_rsync_uri_in_extension, "Non-rsync URI in extension") \
- QG(object_accepted, "Object accepted") \
- QG(rechecking_object, "Rechecking object") \
- QG(rsync_transfer_succeeded, "rsync transfer succeeded") \
- QG(validation_ok, "OK")
-
-#define QV(x) QB(mib_openssl_##x, 0)
-
-static const char
- mib_counter_kind_good[] = "good",
- mib_counter_kind_warn[] = "warn",
- mib_counter_kind_bad[] = "bad";
-
-#define QG(x,y) mib_counter_kind_good ,
-#define QW(x,y) mib_counter_kind_warn ,
-#define QB(x,y) mib_counter_kind_bad ,
-static const char * const mib_counter_kind[] = { MIB_COUNTERS NULL };
-#undef QB
-#undef QW
-#undef QG
-
-#define QG(x,y) QQ(x,y)
-#define QW(x,y) QQ(x,y)
-#define QB(x,y) QQ(x,y)
-
-#define QQ(x,y) x ,
-typedef enum mib_counter { MIB_COUNTERS MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX } mib_counter_t;
-#undef QQ
-
-#define QQ(x,y) y ,
-static const char * const mib_counter_desc[] = { MIB_COUNTERS NULL };
-#undef QQ
-
-#define QQ(x,y) #x ,
-static const char * const mib_counter_label[] = { MIB_COUNTERS NULL };
-#undef QQ
-
-#undef QV
-
-#define QQ(x,y) 0 ,
-#define QV(x) x ,
-static const long mib_counter_openssl[] = { MIB_COUNTERS 0 };
-#undef QV
-#undef QQ
-
-/**
- * Object sources. We always try to get fresh copies of objects using
- * rsync, but if that fails we try using backup copies from what
- * worked the last time we were run. This means that a URI
- * potentially represents two different objects, so we need to
- * distinguish them for tracking purposes in our validation log.
- */
-
-#define OBJECT_GENERATIONS \
- QQ(null) \
- QQ(current) \
- QQ(backup)
-
-#define QQ(x) object_generation_##x ,
-typedef enum object_generation { OBJECT_GENERATIONS OBJECT_GENERATION_MAX } object_generation_t;
-#undef QQ
-
-#define QQ(x) #x ,
-static const char * const object_generation_label[] = { OBJECT_GENERATIONS NULL };
-#undef QQ
-
-/**
- * Type-safe string wrapper for URIs.
- */
-typedef struct { char s[URI_MAX]; } uri_t;
-
-/**
- * Type-safe string wrapper for filename paths.
- */
-typedef struct { char s[FILENAME_MAX]; } path_t;
-
-/**
- * Type-safe wrapper for hash buffers.
- */
-typedef struct { unsigned char h[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; } hashbuf_t;
-
-/**
- * Type-safe wrapper for timestamp strings.
- */
-typedef struct { char s[sizeof("2001-01-01T00:00:00Z") + 1]; } timestamp_t;
-
-/**
- * Per-URI validation status object.
- * uri must be first element.
- */
-typedef struct validation_status {
- uri_t uri;
- object_generation_t generation;
- time_t timestamp;
- unsigned char events[(MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX + 7) / 8];
- short balance;
- struct validation_status *left_child;
- struct validation_status *right_child;
-} validation_status_t;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(validation_status_t)
-
-/**
- * Structure to hold data parsed out of a certificate.
- */
-typedef struct certinfo {
- int ca, ta;
- object_generation_t generation;
- uri_t uri, sia, aia, crldp, manifest, signedobject;
-} certinfo_t;
-
-typedef struct rcynic_ctx rcynic_ctx_t;
-
-/**
- * States that a walk_ctx_t can be in.
- */
-typedef enum {
- walk_state_initial, /**< Initial state */
- walk_state_rsync, /**< rsyncing certinfo.sia */
- walk_state_ready, /**< Ready to traverse outputs */
- walk_state_current, /**< prefix = rc->unauthenticated */
- walk_state_backup, /**< prefix = rc->old_authenticated */
- walk_state_done /**< Done walking this cert's outputs */
-} walk_state_t;
-
-/**
- * Context for certificate tree walks. This includes all the stuff
- * that we would keep as automatic variables on the call stack if we
- * didn't have to use callbacks to support multiple rsync processes.
- */
-typedef struct walk_ctx {
- unsigned refcount;
- certinfo_t certinfo;
- X509 *cert;
- Manifest *manifest;
- object_generation_t manifest_generation;
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *filenames;
- int manifest_iteration, filename_iteration, stale_manifest;
- walk_state_t state;
- uri_t crldp;
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
-} walk_ctx_t;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t)
-
-/**
- * Return codes from rsync functions.
- */
-typedef enum {
- rsync_status_done, /* Request completed */
- rsync_status_failed, /* Request failed */
- rsync_status_timed_out, /* Request timed out */
- rsync_status_pending, /* Request in progress */
- rsync_status_skipped /* Request not attempted */
-} rsync_status_t;
-
-/**
- * States for asynchronous rsync.
- * "initial" must be first.
- */
-
-#define RSYNC_STATES \
- QQ(initial) \
- QQ(running) \
- QQ(conflict_wait) \
- QQ(retry_wait) \
- QQ(closed) \
- QQ(terminating)
-
-#define QQ(x) rsync_state_##x,
-typedef enum { RSYNC_STATES RSYNC_STATE_T_MAX } rsync_state_t;
-#undef QQ
-
-#define QQ(x) #x ,
-static const char * const rsync_state_label[] = { RSYNC_STATES NULL };
-#undef QQ
-
-/**
- * Context for asyncronous rsync.
- */
-typedef struct rsync_ctx {
- uri_t uri;
- void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, const struct rsync_ctx *, const rsync_status_t, const uri_t *, void *);
- void *cookie;
- rsync_state_t state;
- enum {
- rsync_problem_none, /* Must be first */
- rsync_problem_timed_out,
- rsync_problem_refused
- } problem;
- unsigned tries;
- pid_t pid;
- int fd;
- time_t started, deadline;
- char buffer[URI_MAX * 4];
- size_t buflen;
-} rsync_ctx_t;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(rsync_ctx_t)
-
-/**
- * Record of rsync attempts.
- */
-typedef struct rsync_history {
- uri_t uri;
- time_t started, finished;
- rsync_status_t status;
- int final_slash;
-} rsync_history_t;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(rsync_history_t)
-
-/**
- * Deferred task.
- */
-typedef struct task {
- void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, void *);
- void *cookie;
-} task_t;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(task_t)
-
-/**
- * Trust anchor locator (TAL) fetch context.
- */
-typedef struct tal_ctx {
- uri_t uri;
- path_t path;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-} tal_ctx_t;
-
-/**
- * Extended context for verify callbacks. This is a wrapper around
- * OpenSSL's X509_STORE_CTX, and the embedded X509_STORE_CTX @em must be
- * the first element of this structure in order for the evil cast to
- * do the right thing. This is ugly but safe, as the C language
- * promises us that the address of the first element of a structure is
- * the same as the address of the structure.
- */
-typedef struct rcynic_x509_store_ctx {
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx; /* Must be first */
- rcynic_ctx_t *rc;
- const certinfo_t *subject;
-} rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t;
-
-/**
- * Program context that would otherwise be a mess of global variables.
- */
-struct rcynic_ctx {
- path_t authenticated, old_authenticated, new_authenticated, unauthenticated;
- char *jane, *rsync_program;
- STACK_OF(validation_status_t) *validation_status;
- STACK_OF(rsync_history_t) *rsync_history;
- STACK_OF(rsync_ctx_t) *rsync_queue;
- STACK_OF(task_t) *task_queue;
- int use_syslog, allow_stale_crl, allow_stale_manifest, use_links;
- int require_crl_in_manifest, rsync_timeout, priority[LOG_LEVEL_T_MAX];
- int allow_non_self_signed_trust_anchor, allow_object_not_in_manifest;
- int max_parallel_fetches, max_retries, retry_wait_min, run_rsync;
- int allow_digest_mismatch, allow_crl_digest_mismatch;
- int allow_nonconformant_name, allow_ee_without_signedObject;
- int allow_1024_bit_ee_key, allow_wrong_cms_si_attributes;
- int rsync_early;
- unsigned max_select_time;
- validation_status_t *validation_status_in_waiting;
- validation_status_t *validation_status_root;
- log_level_t log_level;
- X509_STORE *x509_store;
-};
-
-
-
-/*
- * Handle NIDs we wish OpenSSL knew about. This is carefully (we
- * hope) written to do nothing at all for any NID that OpenSSL knows
- * about; the intent is just to add definitions for things OpenSSL
- * doesn't know about yet. Of necessity, this is a bit gross, since
- * it confounds runtime static variables with predefined macro names,
- * but we try to put all the magic associated with this in one place.
- *
- * In the long run it might be cleaner to generate this with a trivial
- * script and put the result in a shared .h file, but this will do for
- * the moment.
- */
-
-#ifndef NID_ad_rpkiManifest
-static int NID_ad_rpkiManifest;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_ad_signedObject
-static int NID_ad_signedObject;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_ct_ROA
-static int NID_ct_ROA;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_ct_rpkiManifest
-static int NID_ct_rpkiManifest;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters
-static int NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber
-static int NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router
-static int NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router;
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Missing NIDs, if any.
- */
-static const struct {
- int *nid;
- const char *oid;
- const char *sn;
- const char *ln;
-} missing_nids[] = {
-
-#ifndef NID_ad_rpkiManifest
- {&NID_ad_rpkiManifest, "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.10", "id-ad-rpkiManifest", "RPKI Manifest"},
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_ad_signedObject
- {&NID_ad_signedObject, "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.11", "id-ad-signedObject", "Signed Object"},
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_ct_ROA
- {&NID_ct_ROA, "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24", "id-ct-routeOriginAttestation", "ROA eContent"},
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_ct_rpkiManifest
- {&NID_ct_rpkiManifest, "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26", "id-ct-rpkiManifest", "RPKI Manifest eContent"},
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters
- {&NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters, "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35", "id-ct-rpkiGhostbusters", "RPKI Ghostbusters eContent"},
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber
- {&NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber, "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2", "id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber", "RPKI Certificate Policy"},
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router
- {&NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router, "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30", "id-kp-bgpsec-router", "BGPSEC Router Certificate"},
-#endif
-
-};
-
-
-
-/**
- * Subversion ID data.
- */
-static const char svn_id[] = "$Id$";
-
-/**
- * Suffix we use temporarily during the symlink shuffle. Could be
- * almost anything, but we want to do the length check early, before
- * we waste a lot of work we'll just have to throw away, so we just
- * wire in something short and obvious.
- */
-static const char authenticated_symlink_suffix[] = ".new";
-
-/**
- * Constants for comparisions. We can't build these at compile time,
- * so they can't be const, but treat them as if they were once
- * allocated.
- *
- * We probably need both a better scheme for naming NID_ replacements
- * and a more comprehensive rewrite of how we handle OIDs OpenSSL
- * doesn't know about, so that we neither conflict with defined
- * symbols nor duplicate effort nor explode if and when OpenSSL adds
- * new OIDs (with or without the names we would have used).
- */
-
-static const ASN1_INTEGER *asn1_zero, *asn1_four_octets, *asn1_twenty_octets;
-static int NID_binary_signing_time;
-
-
-
-/**
- * Handle missing NIDs.
- */
-static int
-create_missing_nids(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < (int) (sizeof(missing_nids) / sizeof(*missing_nids)); i++)
- if ((*missing_nids[i].nid = OBJ_txt2nid(missing_nids[i].oid)) == NID_undef &&
- (*missing_nids[i].nid = OBJ_create(missing_nids[i].oid,
- missing_nids[i].sn,
- missing_nids[i].ln)) == NID_undef)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Type-safe wrapper around free() to keep safestack macros happy.
- */
-static void OPENSSL_STRING_free(OPENSSL_STRING s)
-{
- if (s)
- free(s);
-}
-
-/**
- * Wrapper around an idiom we use with OPENSSL_STRING stacks. There's
- * a bug in the current sk_OPENSSL_STRING_delete() macro that casts
- * the return value to the wrong type, so we cast it to something
- * innocuous here and avoid using that macro elsewhere.
- */
-static void sk_OPENSSL_STRING_remove(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk, const char *str)
-{
- OPENSSL_STRING_free((void *) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_delete(sk, sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(sk, str)));
-}
-
-/**
- * Allocate a new validation_status_t object.
- */
-static validation_status_t *validation_status_t_new(void)
-{
- validation_status_t *v = malloc(sizeof(*v));
- if (v)
- memset(v, 0, sizeof(*v));
- return v;
-}
-
-/**
- * Type-safe wrapper around free() to keep safestack macros happy.
- */
-static void validation_status_t_free(validation_status_t *v)
-{
- if (v)
- free(v);
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Allocate a new rsync_history_t object.
- */
-static rsync_history_t *rsync_history_t_new(void)
-{
- rsync_history_t *h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
- if (h)
- memset(h, 0, sizeof(*h));
- return h;
-}
-
-/**
- * Type-safe wrapper around free() to keep safestack macros happy.
- */
-static void rsync_history_t_free(rsync_history_t *h)
-{
- if (h)
- free(h);
-}
-
-/**
- * Compare two rsync_history_t objects.
- */
-static int rsync_history_cmp(const rsync_history_t * const *a, const rsync_history_t * const *b)
-{
- return strcmp((*a)->uri.s, (*b)->uri.s);
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Convert a time_t to a printable string in UTC format.
- */
-static const char *time_to_string(timestamp_t *ts, const time_t *t)
-{
- time_t now;
- size_t n;
-
- assert(ts != NULL);
-
- if (t == NULL) {
- now = time(0);
- t = &now;
- }
-
- n = strftime(ts->s, sizeof(ts->s), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", gmtime(t));
- assert(n > 0);
-
- return ts->s;
-}
-
-/*
- * GCC attributes to help catch format string errors.
- */
-
-#ifdef __GNUC__
-
-static void logmsg(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const log_level_t level,
- const char *fmt, ...)
- __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4)));
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Logging.
- */
-static void vlogmsg(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const log_level_t level,
- const char *fmt,
- va_list ap)
-{
- assert(rc && fmt);
-
- if (rc->log_level < level)
- return;
-
- if (rc->use_syslog) {
- vsyslog(rc->priority[level], fmt, ap);
- } else {
- char ts[sizeof("00:00:00")+1];
- time_t t = time(0);
- strftime(ts, sizeof(ts), "%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t));
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", ts);
- if (rc->jane)
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", rc->jane);
- vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
- putc('\n', stderr);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Logging.
- */
-static void logmsg(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const log_level_t level,
- const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- vlogmsg(rc, level, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
-}
-
-/**
- * Print OpenSSL library errors.
- */
-static void log_openssl_errors(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc)
-{
- const char *data, *file;
- unsigned long code;
- char error[256];
- int flags, line;
-
- if (!rc->log_level < log_verbose)
- return;
-
- while ((code = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags))) {
- ERR_error_string_n(code, error, sizeof(error));
- if (data && (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING))
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "OpenSSL error %s:%d: %s: %s", file, line, error, data);
- else
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "OpenSSL error %s:%d: %s", file, line, error);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Configure logging.
- */
-static int configure_logmsg(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const char *name)
-{
- int i;
-
- assert(rc && name);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(log_levels)/sizeof(*log_levels); i++) {
- if (!strcmp(name, log_levels[i].name)) {
- rc->log_level = log_levels[i].value;
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad log level %s", name);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Configure syslog.
- */
-static int configure_syslog(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- int *result,
- const CODE *table,
- const char *name)
-{
- assert(result && table && name);
-
- while (table->c_name && strcmp(table->c_name, name))
- table++;
-
- if (table->c_name) {
- *result = table->c_val;
- return 1;
- } else {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad syslog code %s", name);
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Configure boolean variable.
- */
-static int configure_boolean(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- int *result,
- const char *val)
-{
- assert(rc && result && val);
-
- switch (*val) {
- case 'y': case 'Y': case 't': case 'T': case '1':
- *result = 1;
- return 1;
- case 'n': case 'N': case 'f': case 'F': case '0':
- *result = 0;
- return 1;
- default:
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad boolean value %s", val);
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Configure integer variable.
- */
-static int configure_integer(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- int *result,
- const char *val)
-{
- long res;
- char *p;
-
- assert(rc && result && val);
-
- res = strtol(val, &p, 10);
-
- if (*val != '\0' && *p == '\0') {
- *result = (int) res;
- return 1;
- } else {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad integer value %s", val);
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Configure unsigned integer variable.
- */
-static int configure_unsigned_integer(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- unsigned *result,
- const char *val)
-{
- unsigned long res;
- char *p;
-
- assert(rc && result && val);
-
- res = strtoul(val, &p, 10);
-
- if (*val != '\0' && *p == '\0') {
- *result = (unsigned) res;
- return 1;
- } else {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad integer value %s", val);
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Make a directory if it doesn't already exist.
- */
-static int mkdir_maybe(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const path_t *name)
-{
- path_t path;
- char *s;
-
- assert(name != NULL);
- if (strlen(name->s) >= sizeof(path.s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Pathname %s too long", name->s);
- return 0;
- }
- strcpy(path.s, name->s);
- s = path.s[0] == '/' ? path.s + 1 : path.s;
- if ((s = strrchr(s, '/')) == NULL)
- return 1;
- *s = '\0';
- if (!mkdir_maybe(rc, &path)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Failed to make directory %s", path.s);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!access(path.s, F_OK))
- return 1;
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Creating directory %s", path.s);
- return mkdir(path.s, 0777) == 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * strdup() a string and push it onto a stack.
- */
-static int sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push_strdup(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk, const char *str)
-{
- OPENSSL_STRING s = strdup(str);
-
- if (s && sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sk, s))
- return 1;
- if (s)
- free(s);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Compare two URI strings, for OpenSSL STACK operations.
- */
-
-static int uri_cmp(const char * const *a, const char * const *b)
-{
- return strcmp(*a, *b);
-}
-
-/**
- * Is string an rsync URI?
- */
-static int is_rsync(const char *uri)
-{
- return uri && !strncmp(uri, SCHEME_RSYNC, SIZEOF_RSYNC);
-}
-
-/**
- * Convert an rsync URI to a filename, checking for evil character
- * sequences. NB: This routine can't call mib_increment(), because
- * mib_increment() calls it, so errors detected here only go into
- * the log, not the MIB.
- */
-static int uri_to_filename(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- path_t *path,
- const path_t *prefix)
-{
- const char *u;
- size_t n;
-
- path->s[0] = '\0';
-
- if (!is_rsync(uri->s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "%s is not an rsync URI, not converting to filename", uri->s);
- return 0;
- }
-
- u = uri->s + SIZEOF_RSYNC;
- n = strlen(u);
-
- if (u[0] == '/' || u[0] == '.' || strstr(u, "/../") ||
- (n >= 3 && !strcmp(u + n - 3, "/.."))) {
- logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Dangerous URI %s, not converting to filename", uri->s);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (prefix)
- n += strlen(prefix->s);
-
- if (n >= sizeof(path->s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "URI %s too long, not converting to filename", uri->s);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (prefix) {
- strcpy(path->s, prefix->s);
- strcat(path->s, u);
- } else {
- strcpy(path->s, u);
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * Compare filename fields of two FileAndHash structures.
- */
-static int FileAndHash_name_cmp(const FileAndHash * const *a, const FileAndHash * const *b)
-{
- return strcmp((char *) (*a)->file->data, (char *) (*b)->file->data);
-}
-
-/**
- * Get value of code in a validation_status_t.
- */
-static int validation_status_get_code(const validation_status_t *v,
- const mib_counter_t code)
-{
- assert(v && code < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX);
- return (v->events[code / 8] & (1 << (code % 8))) != 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Set value of code in a validation_status_t.
- */
-static void validation_status_set_code(validation_status_t *v,
- const mib_counter_t code,
- int value)
-{
- assert(v && code < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX);
- if (value)
- v->events[code / 8] |= (1 << (code % 8));
- else
- v->events[code / 8] &= ~(1 << (code % 8));
-}
-
-/**
- * validation_status object comparison, for AVL tree rather than
- * OpenSSL stacks.
- */
-static int
-validation_status_cmp(const validation_status_t *node,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- int cmp = ((int) node->generation) - ((int) generation);
- if (cmp)
- return cmp;
- else
- return strcmp(uri->s, node->uri.s);
-}
-
-/**
- * validation_status AVL tree insertion. Adapted from code written by
- * Paul Vixie and explictly placed in the public domain using examples
- * from the book: "Algorithms & Data Structures," Niklaus Wirth,
- * Prentice-Hall, 1986, ISBN 0-13-022005-1. Thanks, Paul!
- */
-static validation_status_t *
-validation_status_sprout(validation_status_t **node,
- int *needs_balancing,
- validation_status_t *new_node)
-{
-#ifdef AVL_DEBUG
-#define AVL_MSG(msg) sprintf(stderr, "AVL_DEBUG: '%s'\n", msg)
-#else
-#define AVL_MSG(msg)
-#endif
-
- validation_status_t *p1, *p2, *result;
- int cmp;
-
- /*
- * Are we grounded? If so, add the node "here" and set the
- * rebalance flag, then exit.
- */
- if (*node == NULL) {
- AVL_MSG("Grounded, adding new node");
- new_node->left_child = NULL;
- new_node->right_child = NULL;
- new_node->balance = 0;
- *node = new_node;
- *needs_balancing = 1;
- return *node;
- }
-
- /*
- * Compare the data.
- */
- cmp = validation_status_cmp(*node, &new_node->uri, new_node->generation);
-
- /*
- * If LESS, prepare to move to the left.
- */
- if (cmp < 0) {
-
- AVL_MSG("LESS. sprouting left.");
- result = validation_status_sprout(&(*node)->left_child, needs_balancing, new_node);
-
- if (*needs_balancing) {
- AVL_MSG("LESS: left branch has grown longer");
-
- switch ((*node)->balance) {
-
- case 1:
- /*
- * Right branch WAS longer; balance is ok now.
- */
- AVL_MSG("LESS: case 1.. balance restored implicitly");
- (*node)->balance = 0;
- *needs_balancing = 0;
- break;
-
- case 0:
- /*
- * Balance WAS okay; now left branch longer.
- */
- AVL_MSG("LESS: case 0.. balnce bad but still ok");
- (*node)->balance = -1;
- break;
-
- case -1:
- /*
- * Left branch was already too long. Rebalance.
- */
- AVL_MSG("LESS: case -1: rebalancing");
- p1 = (*node)->left_child;
-
- if (p1->balance == -1) {
- AVL_MSG("LESS: single LL");
- (*node)->left_child = p1->right_child;
- p1->right_child = *node;
- (*node)->balance = 0;
- *node = p1;
- }
-
- else {
- AVL_MSG("LESS: double LR");
-
- p2 = p1->right_child;
- p1->right_child = p2->left_child;
- p2->left_child = p1;
-
- (*node)->left_child = p2->right_child;
- p2->right_child = *node;
-
- if (p2->balance == -1)
- (*node)->balance = 1;
- else
- (*node)->balance = 0;
-
- if (p2->balance == 1)
- p1->balance = -1;
- else
- p1->balance = 0;
- *node = p2;
- }
-
- (*node)->balance = 0;
- *needs_balancing = 0;
- }
- }
- return result;
- }
-
- /*
- * If MORE, prepare to move to the right.
- */
- if (cmp > 0) {
-
- AVL_MSG("MORE: sprouting to the right");
- result = validation_status_sprout(&(*node)->right_child, needs_balancing, new_node);
-
- if (*needs_balancing) {
- AVL_MSG("MORE: right branch has grown longer");
-
- switch ((*node)->balance) {
-
- case -1:AVL_MSG("MORE: balance was off, fixed implicitly");
- (*node)->balance = 0;
- *needs_balancing = 0;
- break;
-
- case 0: AVL_MSG("MORE: balance was okay, now off but ok");
- (*node)->balance = 1;
- break;
-
- case 1: AVL_MSG("MORE: balance was off, need to rebalance");
- p1 = (*node)->right_child;
-
- if (p1->balance == 1) {
- AVL_MSG("MORE: single RR");
- (*node)->right_child = p1->left_child;
- p1->left_child = *node;
- (*node)->balance = 0;
- *node = p1;
- }
-
- else {
- AVL_MSG("MORE: double RL");
-
- p2 = p1->left_child;
- p1->left_child = p2->right_child;
- p2->right_child = p1;
-
- (*node)->right_child = p2->left_child;
- p2->left_child = *node;
-
- if (p2->balance == 1)
- (*node)->balance = -1;
- else
- (*node)->balance = 0;
-
- if (p2->balance == -1)
- p1->balance = 1;
- else
- p1->balance = 0;
-
- *node = p2;
- } /*else*/
- (*node)->balance = 0;
- *needs_balancing = 0;
- }
- }
- return result;
- }
-
- /*
- * Neither more nor less, found existing node matching key, return it.
- */
- AVL_MSG("I found it!");
- *needs_balancing = 0;
- return *node;
-
-#undef AVL_MSG
-}
-
-/**
- * Add a validation status entry to internal log.
- */
-static void log_validation_status(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const mib_counter_t code,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- validation_status_t *v = NULL;
- int needs_balancing = 0;
-
- assert(rc && uri && code < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX && generation < OBJECT_GENERATION_MAX);
-
- if (!rc->validation_status)
- return;
-
- if (code == rsync_transfer_skipped && !rc->run_rsync)
- return;
-
- if (rc->validation_status_in_waiting == NULL &&
- (rc->validation_status_in_waiting = validation_status_t_new()) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate validation status entry for %s", uri->s);
- return;
- }
-
- v = rc->validation_status_in_waiting;
- memset(v, 0, sizeof(*v));
- v->uri = *uri;
- v->generation = generation;
-
- v = validation_status_sprout(&rc->validation_status_root, &needs_balancing, v);
- if (v == rc->validation_status_in_waiting)
- rc->validation_status_in_waiting = NULL;
-
- if (rc->validation_status_in_waiting == NULL &&
- !sk_validation_status_t_push(rc->validation_status, v)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't store validation status entry for %s", uri->s);
- return;
- }
-
- v->timestamp = time(0);
-
- if (validation_status_get_code(v, code))
- return;
-
- validation_status_set_code(v, code, 1);
-
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Recording \"%s\" for %s%s%s",
- (mib_counter_desc[code]
- ? mib_counter_desc[code]
- : X509_verify_cert_error_string(mib_counter_openssl[code])),
- (generation != object_generation_null ? object_generation_label[generation] : ""),
- (generation != object_generation_null ? " " : ""),
- uri->s);
-}
-
-/**
- * Copy or link a file, as the case may be.
- */
-static int cp_ln(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const path_t *source, const path_t *target)
-{
- struct stat statbuf;
- struct utimbuf utimebuf;
- FILE *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
- int c, ok = 0;
-
- if (rc->use_links) {
- (void) unlink(target->s);
- ok = link(source->s, target->s) == 0;
- if (!ok)
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't link %s to %s: %s",
- source->s, target->s, strerror(errno));
- return ok;
- }
-
- if ((in = fopen(source->s, "rb")) == NULL ||
- (out = fopen(target->s, "wb")) == NULL)
- goto done;
-
- while ((c = getc(in)) != EOF)
- if (putc(c, out) == EOF)
- goto done;
-
- ok = 1;
-
- done:
- ok &= !(in != NULL && fclose(in) == EOF);
- ok &= !(out != NULL && fclose(out) == EOF);
-
- if (!ok) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't copy %s to %s: %s",
- source->s, target->s, strerror(errno));
- return ok;
- }
-
- /*
- * Perserve the file modification time to allow for detection of
- * changed objects in the authenticated directory. Failure to reset
- * the times is not optimal, but is also not critical, thus no
- * failure return.
- */
- if (stat(source->s, &statbuf) < 0 ||
- (utimebuf.actime = statbuf.st_atime,
- utimebuf.modtime = statbuf.st_mtime,
- utime(target->s, &utimebuf) < 0))
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't copy inode timestamp from %s to %s: %s",
- source->s, target->s, strerror(errno));
-
- return ok;
-}
-
-/**
- * Install an object.
- */
-static int install_object(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const path_t *source,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- path_t target;
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &target, &rc->new_authenticated)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Couldn't generate installation name for %s", uri->s);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!mkdir_maybe(rc, &target)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't create directory for %s", target.s);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!cp_ln(rc, source, &target))
- return 0;
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_accepted, generation);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * AVL tree lookup for validation status objects.
- */
-static validation_status_t *
-validation_status_find(validation_status_t *node,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- int cmp;
-
- while (node != NULL && (cmp = validation_status_cmp(node, uri, generation)) != 0)
- node = cmp < 0 ? node->left_child : node->right_child;
-
- return node;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether we have a validation status entry corresponding to a
- * given filename. This is intended for use during pruning the
- * unauthenticated tree, so it only checks the current generation.
- */
-static int
-validation_status_find_filename(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const char *filename)
-{
- uri_t uri;
-
- if (strlen(filename) + SIZEOF_RSYNC >= sizeof(uri.s))
- return 0;
-
- strcpy(uri.s, SCHEME_RSYNC);
- strcat(uri.s, filename);
-
- return validation_status_find(rc->validation_status_root, &uri, object_generation_current) != NULL;
-}
-
-/**
- * Figure out whether we already have a good copy of an object. This
- * is a little more complicated than it sounds, because we might have
- * failed the current generation and accepted the backup due to having
- * followed the old CA certificate chain first during a key rollover.
- * So if this check is of the current object and we have not already
- * accepted the current object for this URI, we need to recheck.
- *
- * We also handle logging when we decide that we do need to check, so
- * that the caller doesn't need to concern itself with why we thought
- * the check was necessary.
- */
-static int skip_checking_this_object(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- validation_status_t *v = NULL;
- path_t path;
-
- assert(rc && uri && rc->validation_status);
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &path, &rc->new_authenticated))
- return 1;
-
- if (access(path.s, R_OK)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking %s", uri->s);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (generation != object_generation_current)
- return 1;
-
- v = validation_status_find(rc->validation_status_root, uri, generation);
-
- if (v != NULL && validation_status_get_code(v, object_accepted))
- return 1;
-
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, rechecking_object, generation);
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Rechecking %s", uri->s);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Check str for a suffix.
- */
-static int endswith(const char *str, const char *suffix)
-{
- size_t len_str, len_suffix;
- assert(str != NULL && suffix != NULL);
- len_str = strlen(str);
- len_suffix = strlen(suffix);
- return len_str >= len_suffix && !strcmp(str + len_str - len_suffix, suffix);
-}
-
-/**
- * Check str for a prefix.
- */
-static int startswith(const char *str, const char *prefix)
-{
- size_t len_str, len_prefix;
- assert(str != NULL && prefix != NULL);
- len_str = strlen(str);
- len_prefix = strlen(prefix);
- return len_str >= len_prefix && !strncmp(str, prefix, len_prefix);
-}
-
-/**
- * Convert a filename to a file:// URI, for logging.
- */
-static void filename_to_uri(uri_t *uri,
- const char *fn)
-{
- assert(sizeof("file://") < sizeof(uri->s));
- strcpy(uri->s, "file://");
- if (*fn != '/') {
- if (getcwd(uri->s + strlen(uri->s), sizeof(uri->s) - strlen(uri->s)) == NULL ||
- (!endswith(uri->s, "/") && strlen(uri->s) >= sizeof(uri->s) - 1))
- uri->s[0] = '\0';
- else
- strcat(uri->s, "/");
- }
- if (uri->s[0] != '\0' && strlen(uri->s) + strlen(fn) < sizeof(uri->s))
- strcat(uri->s, fn);
- else
- uri->s[0] = '\0';
-}
-
-/**
- * Set a directory name, adding or stripping trailing slash as needed.
- */
-static int set_directory(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, path_t *out, const char *in, const int want_slash)
-{
- int has_slash, need_slash;
- size_t n;
-
- assert(rc && in && out);
-
- n = strlen(in);
-
- if (n == 0) {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Empty path");
- return 0;
- }
-
- has_slash = in[n - 1] == '/';
-
- need_slash = want_slash && !has_slash;
-
- if (n + need_slash + 1 > sizeof(out->s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Path \"%s\" too long", in);
- return 0;
- }
-
- strcpy(out->s, in);
- if (need_slash)
- strcat(out->s, "/");
- else if (has_slash && !want_slash)
- out->s[n - 1] = '\0';
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * Test whether a filesystem path points to a directory.
- */
-static int is_directory(const path_t *name)
-{
- struct stat st;
-
- assert(name);
- return lstat(name->s, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
-}
-
-/**
- * Remove a directory tree, like rm -rf.
- */
-static int rm_rf(const path_t *name)
-{
- path_t path;
- struct dirent *d;
- DIR *dir;
- int ret = 0;
-
- assert(name);
-
- if (!is_directory(name))
- return unlink(name->s) == 0;
-
- if ((dir = opendir(name->s)) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
- if (!strcmp(d->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(d->d_name, ".."))
- continue;
- if (snprintf(path.s, sizeof(path.s), "%s/%s", name->s, d->d_name) >= sizeof(path.s))
- goto done;
- if (unlink(path.s) == 0)
- continue;
- else if (rm_rf(&path))
- continue;
- else
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = rmdir(name->s) == 0;
-
- done:
- closedir(dir);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * Construct names for the directories not directly settable by the
- * user.
- *
- * This function also checks for an old-style rc->authenticated
- * directory, to simplify upgrade from older versions of rcynic.
- */
-static int construct_directory_names(rcynic_ctx_t *rc)
-{
- struct stat st;
- ssize_t n;
- path_t p;
- time_t t = time(0);
-
- p = rc->authenticated;
-
- n = strlen(p.s);
-
- if (n + sizeof(authenticated_symlink_suffix) >= sizeof(p.s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Symlink name would be too long");
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (strftime(p.s + n, sizeof(p.s) - n - 1, ".%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", gmtime(&t)) == 0) {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Generated path with timestamp would be too long");
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!set_directory(rc, &rc->new_authenticated, p.s, 1))
- return 0;
-
- if (!set_directory(rc, &rc->old_authenticated, rc->authenticated.s, 1))
- return 0;
-
- if (lstat(rc->authenticated.s, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR((st.st_mode)) &&
- strlen(rc->authenticated.s) + sizeof(".old") < sizeof(p.s)) {
- p = rc->authenticated;
- strcat(p.s, ".old");
- rm_rf(&p);
- (void) rename(rc->authenticated.s, p.s);
- }
-
- if (lstat(rc->authenticated.s, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err,
- "Existing %s directory is in the way, please remove it",
- rc->authenticated.s);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * Do final symlink shuffle and cleanup of output directories.
- */
-static int finalize_directories(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc)
-{
- path_t path, real_old, real_new;
- const char *dir;
- glob_t g;
- int i;
-
- if (!realpath(rc->old_authenticated.s, real_old.s))
- real_old.s[0] = '\0';
-
- if (!realpath(rc->new_authenticated.s, real_new.s))
- real_new.s[0] = '\0';
-
- assert(real_new.s[0] && real_new.s[strlen(real_new.s) - 1] != '/');
-
- if ((dir = strrchr(real_new.s, '/')) == NULL)
- dir = real_new.s;
- else
- dir++;
-
- path = rc->authenticated;
-
- if (strlen(path.s) + sizeof(authenticated_symlink_suffix) >= sizeof(path.s))
- return 0;
- strcat(path.s, authenticated_symlink_suffix);
-
- (void) unlink(path.s);
-
- if (symlink(dir, path.s) < 0) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't link %s to %s: %s",
- path.s, dir, strerror(errno));
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (rename(path.s, rc->authenticated.s) < 0) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't rename %s to %s: %s",
- path.s, rc->authenticated.s, strerror(errno));
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (real_old.s[0] && strlen(rc->authenticated.s) + sizeof(".old") < sizeof(path.s)) {
- assert(real_old.s[strlen(real_old.s) - 1] != '/');
-
- path = rc->authenticated;
- strcat(path.s, ".old");
-
- (void) unlink(path.s);
-
- if ((dir = strrchr(real_old.s, '/')) == NULL)
- dir = real_old.s;
- else
- dir++;
-
- (void) symlink(dir, path.s);
- }
-
- path = rc->authenticated;
- assert(strlen(path.s) + sizeof(".*") < sizeof(path.s));
- strcat(path.s, ".*");
-
- memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
-
- if (real_new.s[0] && glob(path.s, 0, 0, &g) == 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < g.gl_pathc; i++)
- if (realpath(g.gl_pathv[i], path.s) &&
- strcmp(path.s, real_old.s) &&
- strcmp(path.s, real_new.s))
- rm_rf(&path);
- globfree(&g);
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Test whether a pair of URIs "conflict", that is, whether attempting
- * to rsync both of them at the same time in parallel might cause
- * unpredictable behavior. Might need a better name for this test.
- *
- * Returns non-zero iff the two URIs "conflict".
- */
-static int conflicting_uris(const uri_t *a, const uri_t *b)
-{
- size_t len_a, len_b;
-
- assert(a && is_rsync(a->s) && b && is_rsync(b->s));
-
- len_a = strlen(a->s);
- len_b = strlen(b->s);
-
- assert(len_a < sizeof(a->s) && len_b < sizeof(b->s));
-
- return !strncmp(a->s, b->s, len_a < len_b ? len_a : len_b);
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Read non-directory filenames from a directory, so we can check to
- * see what's missing from a manifest.
- */
-static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *directory_filenames(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const walk_state_t state,
- const uri_t *uri)
-{
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *result = NULL;
- path_t dpath, fpath;
- const path_t *prefix = NULL;
- DIR *dir = NULL;
- struct dirent *d;
- int ok = 0;
-
- assert(rc && uri);
-
- switch (state) {
- case walk_state_current:
- prefix = &rc->unauthenticated;
- break;
- case walk_state_backup:
- prefix = &rc->old_authenticated;
- break;
- default:
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &dpath, prefix) ||
- (dir = opendir(dpath.s)) == NULL ||
- (result = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(uri_cmp)) == NULL)
- goto done;
-
- while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL)
- if (snprintf(fpath.s, sizeof(fpath.s), "%s/%s", dpath.s, d->d_name) >= sizeof(fpath.s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Local path name %s/%s too long", dpath.s, d->d_name);
- goto done;
- }
- else if (!is_directory(&fpath) && !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push_strdup(result, d->d_name)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push_strdup() failed, probably memory exhaustion");
- goto done;
- }
-
- ok = 1;
-
- done:
- if (dir != NULL)
- closedir(dir);
-
- if (ok)
- return result;
-
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(result, OPENSSL_STRING_free);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Increment walk context reference count.
- */
-static void walk_ctx_attach(walk_ctx_t *w)
-{
- if (w != NULL) {
- w->refcount++;
- assert(w->refcount != 0);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Decrement walk context reference count; freeing the context if the
- * reference count is now zero.
- */
-static void walk_ctx_detach(walk_ctx_t *w)
-{
- if (w != NULL && --(w->refcount) == 0) {
- assert(w->refcount == 0);
- X509_free(w->cert);
- Manifest_free(w->manifest);
- sk_X509_free(w->certs);
- sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(w->crls, X509_CRL_free);
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(w->filenames, OPENSSL_STRING_free);
- free(w);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Return top context of a walk context stack.
- */
-static walk_ctx_t *walk_ctx_stack_head(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk)
-{
- return sk_walk_ctx_t_value(wsk, sk_walk_ctx_t_num(wsk) - 1);
-}
-
-/**
- * Whether we're done iterating over a walk context. Think of this as
- * the thing you call (negated) in the second clause of a conceptual
- * "for" loop.
- */
-static int walk_ctx_loop_done(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
- return wsk == NULL || w == NULL || w->state >= walk_state_done;
-}
-
-/**
- * Walk context iterator. Think of this as the thing you call in the
- * third clause of a conceptual "for" loop: this reinitializes as
- * necessary for the next pass through the loop.
- *
- * General idea here is that we have several state variables in a walk
- * context which collectively define the current pass, product URI,
- * etc, and we want to be able to iterate through this sequence via
- * the event system. So this function steps to the next state.
- *
- * Conceptually, w->manifest->fileList and w->filenames form a single
- * array with index w->manifest_iteration + w->filename_iteration.
- * Beware of fencepost errors, I've gotten this wrong once already.
- * Slightly odd coding here is to make it easier to check this.
- */
-static void walk_ctx_loop_next(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
- int n_manifest, n_filenames;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && w);
-
- assert(w->manifest_iteration >= 0 && w->filename_iteration >= 0);
-
- n_manifest = w->manifest ? sk_FileAndHash_num(w->manifest->fileList) : 0;
- n_filenames = w->filenames ? sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(w->filenames) : 0;
-
- if (w->manifest_iteration + w->filename_iteration < n_manifest + n_filenames) {
- if (w->manifest_iteration < n_manifest)
- w->manifest_iteration++;
- else
- w->filename_iteration++;
- }
-
- assert(w->manifest_iteration <= n_manifest && w->filename_iteration <= n_filenames);
-
- if (w->manifest_iteration + w->filename_iteration < n_manifest + n_filenames)
- return;
-
- while (!walk_ctx_loop_done(wsk)) {
- w->state++;
- w->manifest_iteration = 0;
- w->filename_iteration = 0;
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(w->filenames, OPENSSL_STRING_free);
- w->filenames = directory_filenames(rc, w->state, &w->certinfo.sia);
- if (w->manifest != NULL || w->filenames != NULL)
- return;
- }
-}
-
-static int check_manifest(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk);
-
-/**
- * Loop initializer for walk context. Think of this as the thing you
- * call in the first clause of a conceptual "for" loop.
- */
-static void walk_ctx_loop_init(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
-
- assert(rc && wsk && w && w->state == walk_state_ready);
-
- if (!w->manifest && !check_manifest(rc, wsk)) {
- /*
- * Simple failure to find a manifest doesn't get here. This is
- * for manifest failures that cause us to reject all of this
- * certificate's products due to policy knob settings.
- */
- w->state = walk_state_done;
- return;
- }
-
- if (!w->manifest)
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Couldn't get manifest %s, blundering onward", w->certinfo.manifest.s);
-
- w->manifest_iteration = 0;
- w->filename_iteration = 0;
- w->state++;
- assert(w->state == walk_state_current);
-
- assert(w->filenames == NULL);
- w->filenames = directory_filenames(rc, w->state, &w->certinfo.sia);
-
- w->stale_manifest = w->manifest != NULL && X509_cmp_current_time(w->manifest->nextUpdate) < 0;
-
- while (!walk_ctx_loop_done(wsk) &&
- (w->manifest == NULL || w->manifest_iteration >= sk_FileAndHash_num(w->manifest->fileList)) &&
- (w->filenames == NULL || w->filename_iteration >= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(w->filenames)))
- walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk);
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract URI and hash values from walk context.
- */
-static int walk_ctx_loop_this(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- uri_t *uri,
- const unsigned char **hash,
- size_t *hashlen)
-{
- const walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
- const char *name = NULL;
- FileAndHash *fah = NULL;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && w && uri && hash && hashlen);
-
- if (w->manifest != NULL && w->manifest_iteration < sk_FileAndHash_num(w->manifest->fileList)) {
- fah = sk_FileAndHash_value(w->manifest->fileList, w->manifest_iteration);
- name = (const char *) fah->file->data;
- } else if (w->filenames != NULL && w->filename_iteration < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(w->filenames)) {
- name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(w->filenames, w->filename_iteration);
- }
-
- if (name == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Can't find a URI in walk context, this shouldn't happen: state %d, manifest_iteration %d, filename_iteration %d",
- (int) w->state, w->manifest_iteration, w->filename_iteration);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (strlen(w->certinfo.sia.s) + strlen(name) >= sizeof(uri->s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "URI %s%s too long, skipping", w->certinfo.sia.s, uri->s);
- return 0;
- }
-
- strcpy(uri->s, w->certinfo.sia.s);
- strcat(uri->s, name);
-
- if (fah != NULL) {
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_remove(w->filenames, name);
- *hash = fah->hash->data;
- *hashlen = fah->hash->length;
- } else {
- *hash = NULL;
- *hashlen = 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * Create a new walk context stack.
- */
-static STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *walk_ctx_stack_new(void)
-{
- return sk_walk_ctx_t_new_null();
-}
-
-/**
- * Push a walk context onto a walk context stack, return the new context.
- */
-static walk_ctx_t *walk_ctx_stack_push(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- X509 *x,
- const certinfo_t *certinfo)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w;
-
- if (x == NULL ||
- (certinfo == NULL) != (sk_walk_ctx_t_num(wsk) == 0) ||
- (w = malloc(sizeof(*w))) == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- memset(w, 0, sizeof(*w));
- w->cert = x;
- if (certinfo != NULL)
- w->certinfo = *certinfo;
- else
- memset(&w->certinfo, 0, sizeof(w->certinfo));
-
- if (!sk_walk_ctx_t_push(wsk, w)) {
- free(w);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- walk_ctx_attach(w);
- return w;
-}
-
-/**
- * Pop and discard a walk context from a walk context stack.
- */
-static void walk_ctx_stack_pop(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk)
-{
- walk_ctx_detach(sk_walk_ctx_t_pop(wsk));
-}
-
-/**
- * Clone a stack of walk contexts.
- */
-static STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *walk_ctx_stack_clone(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *old_wsk)
-{
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *new_wsk;
- int i;
- if (old_wsk == NULL || (new_wsk = sk_walk_ctx_t_dup(old_wsk)) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_walk_ctx_t_num(new_wsk); i++)
- walk_ctx_attach(sk_walk_ctx_t_value(new_wsk, i));
- return new_wsk;
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract certificate stack from walk context stack. Returns a newly
- * created STACK_OF(X509) pointing to the existing cert objects.
- *
- * NB: This is a shallow copy, so use sk_X509_free() to free it, not
- * sk_X509_pop_free().
- */
-static STACK_OF(X509) *walk_ctx_stack_certs(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk)
-{
- STACK_OF(X509) *xsk = sk_X509_new_null();
- walk_ctx_t *w;
- int i;
-
- assert(rc);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_walk_ctx_t_num(wsk); i++)
- if ((w = sk_walk_ctx_t_value(wsk, i)) == NULL ||
- (w->cert != NULL && !sk_X509_push(xsk, w->cert)))
- goto fail;
-
- return xsk;
-
- fail:
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't clone walk_ctx_stack, memory exhausted?");
- sk_X509_free(xsk);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/**
- * Free a walk context stack, decrementing reference counts of each
- * frame on it.
- */
-static void walk_ctx_stack_free(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk)
-{
- sk_walk_ctx_t_pop_free(wsk, walk_ctx_detach);
-}
-
-
-
-static int rsync_count_running(const rcynic_ctx_t *);
-
-/**
- * Add a task to the task queue.
- */
-static int task_add(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, void *),
- void *cookie)
-{
- task_t *t = malloc(sizeof(*t));
-
- assert(rc && rc->task_queue && handler);
-
- assert(rsync_count_running(rc) <= rc->max_parallel_fetches);
-
- if (!t)
- return 0;
-
- t->handler = handler;
- t->cookie = cookie;
-
- if (sk_task_t_push(rc->task_queue, t))
- return 1;
-
- free(t);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Run tasks until queue is empty.
- */
-static void task_run_q(rcynic_ctx_t *rc)
-{
- task_t *t;
- assert(rc && rc->task_queue);
- while ((t = sk_task_t_shift(rc->task_queue)) != NULL) {
- t->handler(rc, t->cookie);
- free(t);
- }
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Check cache of whether we've already fetched a particular URI.
- */
-static rsync_history_t *rsync_history_uri(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri)
-{
- rsync_history_t h;
- char *s;
- int i;
-
- assert(rc && uri && rc->rsync_history);
-
- if (!is_rsync(uri->s))
- return NULL;
-
- h.uri = *uri;
-
- while ((s = strrchr(h.uri.s, '/')) != NULL && s[1] == '\0')
- *s = '\0';
-
- while ((i = sk_rsync_history_t_find(rc->rsync_history, &h)) < 0) {
- if ((s = strrchr(h.uri.s, '/')) == NULL ||
- (s - h.uri.s) < SIZEOF_RSYNC)
- return NULL;
- *s = '\0';
- }
-
- return sk_rsync_history_t_value(rc->rsync_history, i);
-}
-
-/**
- * Record that we've already attempted to synchronize a particular
- * rsync URI.
- */
-static void rsync_history_add(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const rsync_ctx_t *ctx,
- const rsync_status_t status)
-{
- int final_slash = 0;
- rsync_history_t *h;
- uri_t uri;
- size_t n;
- char *s;
-
- assert(rc && ctx && rc->rsync_history && is_rsync(ctx->uri.s));
-
- uri = ctx->uri;
-
- while ((s = strrchr(uri.s, '/')) != NULL && s[1] == '\0') {
- final_slash = 1;
- *s = '\0';
- }
-
- if (status != rsync_status_done) {
-
- n = SIZEOF_RSYNC + strcspn(uri.s + SIZEOF_RSYNC, "/");
- assert(n < sizeof(uri.s));
- uri.s[n] = '\0';
- final_slash = 1;
-
- if ((h = rsync_history_uri(rc, &uri)) != NULL) {
- assert(h->status != rsync_status_done);
- return;
- }
- }
-
- if ((h = rsync_history_t_new()) != NULL) {
- h->uri = uri;
- h->status = status;
- h->started = ctx->started;
- h->finished = time(0);
- h->final_slash = final_slash;
- }
-
- if (h == NULL || !sk_rsync_history_t_push(rc->rsync_history, h)) {
- rsync_history_t_free(h);
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err,
- "Couldn't add %s to rsync_history, blundering onwards", uri.s);
- }
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Return count of how many rsync contexts are in running.
- */
-static int rsync_count_running(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc)
-{
- const rsync_ctx_t *ctx;
- int i, n = 0;
-
- assert(rc && rc->rsync_queue);
-
- for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) {
- switch (ctx->state) {
- case rsync_state_running:
- case rsync_state_closed:
- case rsync_state_terminating:
- n++;
- default:
- continue;
- }
- }
-
- return n;
-}
-
-/**
- * Test whether an rsync context conflicts with anything that's
- * currently runable.
- */
-static int rsync_conflicts(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const rsync_ctx_t *ctx)
-{
- const rsync_ctx_t *c;
- int i;
-
- assert(rc && ctx && rc->rsync_queue);
-
- for (i = 0; (c = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i)
- if (c != ctx &&
- (c->state == rsync_state_initial ||
- c->state == rsync_state_running) &&
- conflicting_uris(&c->uri, &ctx->uri))
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Test whether a rsync context is runable at this time.
- */
-static int rsync_runable(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const rsync_ctx_t *ctx)
-{
- assert(rc && ctx);
-
- switch (ctx->state) {
-
- case rsync_state_initial:
- case rsync_state_running:
- return 1;
-
- case rsync_state_retry_wait:
- return ctx->deadline <= time(0);
-
- case rsync_state_closed:
- case rsync_state_terminating:
- return 0;
-
- case rsync_state_conflict_wait:
- return !rsync_conflicts(rc, ctx);
-
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Return count of runable rsync contexts.
- */
-static int rsync_count_runable(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc)
-{
- const rsync_ctx_t *ctx;
- int i, n = 0;
-
- assert(rc && rc->rsync_queue);
-
- for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i)
- if (rsync_runable(rc, ctx))
- n++;
-
- return n;
-}
-
-/**
- * Call rsync context handler, if one is set.
- */
-static void rsync_call_handler(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- rsync_ctx_t *ctx,
- const rsync_status_t status)
-{
- if (!ctx)
- return;
-
- switch (status) {
-
- case rsync_status_pending:
- case rsync_status_done:
- break;
-
- case rsync_status_failed:
- log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri, rsync_transfer_failed, object_generation_null);
- break;
-
- case rsync_status_timed_out:
- log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri, rsync_transfer_timed_out, object_generation_null);
- break;
-
- case rsync_status_skipped:
- log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri, rsync_transfer_skipped, object_generation_null);
- break;
- }
-
- if (ctx->handler)
- ctx->handler(rc, ctx, status, &ctx->uri, ctx->cookie);
-}
-
-/**
- * Run an rsync process.
- */
-static void rsync_run(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- rsync_ctx_t *ctx)
-{
- static const char * const rsync_cmd[] = {
- "rsync", "--update", "--times", "--copy-links", "--itemize-changes"
- };
- static const char * const rsync_tree_args[] = {
- "--recursive", "--delete"
- };
-
- const char *argv[10];
- path_t path;
- int i, argc = 0, flags, pipe_fds[2];
-
- pipe_fds[0] = pipe_fds[1] = -1;
-
- assert(rc && ctx && ctx->pid == 0 && ctx->state != rsync_state_running && rsync_runable(rc, ctx));
-
- if (rsync_history_uri(rc, &ctx->uri)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Late rsync cache hit for %s", ctx->uri.s);
- rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status_done);
- (void) sk_rsync_ctx_t_delete_ptr(rc->rsync_queue, ctx);
- free(ctx);
- return;
- }
-
- assert(rsync_count_running(rc) < rc->max_parallel_fetches);
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Fetching %s", ctx->uri.s);
-
- memset(argv, 0, sizeof(argv));
-
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rsync_cmd)/sizeof(*rsync_cmd); i++) {
- assert(argc < sizeof(argv)/sizeof(*argv));
- argv[argc++] = rsync_cmd[i];
- }
- if (endswith(ctx->uri.s, "/")) {
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rsync_tree_args)/sizeof(*rsync_tree_args); i++) {
- assert(argc < sizeof(argv)/sizeof(*argv));
- argv[argc++] = rsync_tree_args[i];
- }
- }
-
- if (rc->rsync_program)
- argv[0] = rc->rsync_program;
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, &ctx->uri, &path, &rc->unauthenticated)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Couldn't extract filename from URI: %s", ctx->uri.s);
- goto lose;
- }
-
- assert(argc < sizeof(argv)/sizeof(*argv));
- argv[argc++] = ctx->uri.s;
-
- assert(argc < sizeof(argv)/sizeof(*argv));
- argv[argc++] = path.s;
-
- if (!mkdir_maybe(rc, &path)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't make target directory: %s", path.s);
- goto lose;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
- logmsg(rc, log_debug, "rsync argv[%d]: %s", i, argv[i]);
-
- if (pipe(pipe_fds) < 0) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "pipe() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
- goto lose;
- }
-
- switch ((ctx->pid = vfork())) {
-
- case -1:
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "vfork() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
- goto lose;
-
- case 0:
- /*
- * Child
- */
-#define whine(msg) ((void) write(2, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1))
- if (close(pipe_fds[0]) < 0)
- whine("close(pipe_fds[0]) failed\n");
- else if (dup2(pipe_fds[1], 1) < 0)
- whine("dup2(pipe_fds[1], 1) failed\n");
- else if (dup2(pipe_fds[1], 2) < 0)
- whine("dup2(pipe_fds[1], 2) failed\n");
- else if (close(pipe_fds[1]) < 0)
- whine("close(pipe_fds[1]) failed\n");
- else if (execvp(argv[0], (char * const *) argv) < 0)
- whine("execvp(argv[0], (char * const *) argv) failed\n");
- whine("last system error: ");
- write(2, strerror(errno), strlen(strerror(errno)));
- whine("\n");
- _exit(1);
-#undef whine
-
- default:
- /*
- * Parent
- */
- ctx->fd = pipe_fds[0];
- if ((flags = fcntl(ctx->fd, F_GETFL, 0)) == -1 ||
- fcntl(ctx->fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "fcntl(ctx->fd, F_[GS]ETFL, O_NONBLOCK) failed: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- goto lose;
- }
- (void) close(pipe_fds[1]);
- ctx->state = rsync_state_running;
- ctx->problem = rsync_problem_none;
- if (!ctx->started)
- ctx->started = time(0);
- if (rc->rsync_timeout)
- ctx->deadline = time(0) + rc->rsync_timeout;
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Subprocess %u started, queued %d, runable %d, running %d, max %d, URI %s",
- (unsigned) ctx->pid, sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue), rsync_count_runable(rc), rsync_count_running(rc), rc->max_parallel_fetches, ctx->uri.s);
- rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status_pending);
- return;
-
- }
-
- lose:
- if (pipe_fds[0] != -1)
- (void) close(pipe_fds[0]);
- if (pipe_fds[1] != -1)
- (void) close(pipe_fds[1]);
- if (rc->rsync_queue && ctx)
- (void) sk_rsync_ctx_t_delete_ptr(rc->rsync_queue, ctx);
- rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status_failed);
- if (ctx->pid > 0) {
- (void) kill(ctx->pid, SIGKILL);
- ctx->pid = 0;
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Process one line of rsync's output. This is a separate function
- * primarily to centralize scraping for magic error strings.
- */
-static void do_one_rsync_log_line(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- rsync_ctx_t *ctx)
-{
- unsigned u;
- char *s;
-
- /*
- * Send line to our log unless it's empty.
- */
- if (ctx->buffer[strspn(ctx->buffer, " \t\n\r")] != '\0')
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "rsync[%u]: %s", ctx->pid, ctx->buffer);
-
- /*
- * Check for magic error strings
- */
- if ((s = strstr(ctx->buffer, "@ERROR: max connections")) != NULL) {
- ctx->problem = rsync_problem_refused;
- if (sscanf(s, "@ERROR: max connections (%u) reached -- try again later", &u) == 1)
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Subprocess %u reported limit of %u for %s", ctx->pid, u, ctx->uri.s);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Construct select() arguments.
- */
-static int rsync_construct_select(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const time_t now,
- fd_set *rfds,
- struct timeval *tv)
-{
- rsync_ctx_t *ctx;
- time_t when = 0;
- int i, n = 0;
-
- assert(rc && rc->rsync_queue && rfds && tv && rc->max_select_time >= 0);
-
- FD_ZERO(rfds);
-
- for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) {
-
-#if 0
- logmsg(rc, log_debug, "+++ ctx[%d] pid %d fd %d state %s started %lu deadline %lu",
- i, ctx->pid, ctx->fd, rsync_state_label[ctx->state],
- (unsigned long) ctx->started, (unsigned long) ctx->deadline);
-#endif
-
- switch (ctx->state) {
-
- case rsync_state_running:
- assert(ctx->fd >= 0);
- FD_SET(ctx->fd, rfds);
- if (ctx->fd > n)
- n = ctx->fd;
- if (!rc->rsync_timeout)
- continue;
- /* Fall through */
-
- case rsync_state_retry_wait:
- if (when == 0 || ctx->deadline < when)
- when = ctx->deadline;
- /* Fall through */
-
- default:
- continue;
- }
- }
-
- if (!when)
- tv->tv_sec = rc->max_select_time;
- else if (when < now)
- tv->tv_sec = 0;
- else if (when < now + rc->max_select_time)
- tv->tv_sec = when - now;
- else
- tv->tv_sec = rc->max_select_time;
- tv->tv_usec = 0;
- return n;
-}
-
-/**
- * Convert rsync_status_t to mib_counter_t.
- *
- * Maybe some day this will go away and we won't be carrying
- * essentially the same information in two different databases, but
- * for now I'll settle for cleaning up the duplicate code logic.
- */
-static mib_counter_t rsync_status_to_mib_counter(rsync_status_t status)
-{
- switch (status) {
- case rsync_status_done: return rsync_transfer_succeeded;
- case rsync_status_timed_out: return rsync_transfer_timed_out;
- case rsync_status_failed: return rsync_transfer_failed;
- case rsync_status_skipped: return rsync_transfer_skipped;
- default:
- /*
- * Keep GCC from whining about untested cases.
- */
- assert(status == rsync_status_done ||
- status == rsync_status_timed_out ||
- status == rsync_status_failed ||
- status == rsync_status_skipped);
- return rsync_transfer_failed;
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Manager for queue of rsync tasks in progress.
- *
- * General plan here is to process one completed child, or output
- * accumulated from children, or block if there is absolutely nothing
- * to do, on the theory that caller had nothing to do either or would
- * not have called us. Once we've done something allegedly useful, we
- * return, because this is not the event loop; if and when the event
- * loop has nothing more important to do, we'll be called again.
- *
- * So this is the only place where the program blocks waiting for
- * children, but we only do it when we know there's nothing else
- * useful that we could be doing while we wait.
- */
-static void rsync_mgr(rcynic_ctx_t *rc)
-{
- rsync_status_t rsync_status;
- int i, n, pid_status = -1;
- rsync_ctx_t *ctx = NULL;
- time_t now = time(0);
- struct timeval tv;
- fd_set rfds;
- pid_t pid;
- char *s;
-
- assert(rc && rc->rsync_queue);
-
- /*
- * Check for exited subprocesses.
- */
-
- while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &pid_status, WNOHANG)) > 0) {
-
- /*
- * Child exited, handle it.
- */
-
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Subprocess %u exited with status %d",
- (unsigned) pid, WEXITSTATUS(pid_status));
-
- for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i)
- if (ctx->pid == pid)
- break;
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- assert(i == sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue));
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't find rsync context for pid %d", pid);
- continue;
- }
-
- close(ctx->fd);
- ctx->fd = -1;
-
- if (ctx->buflen > 0) {
- assert(ctx->buflen < sizeof(ctx->buffer));
- ctx->buffer[ctx->buflen] = '\0';
- do_one_rsync_log_line(rc, ctx);
- ctx->buflen = 0;
- }
-
- switch (WEXITSTATUS(pid_status)) {
-
- case 0:
- rsync_status = rsync_status_done;
- break;
-
- case 5: /* "Error starting client-server protocol" */
- /*
- * Handle remote rsyncd refusing to talk to us because we've
- * exceeded its connection limit. Back off for a short
- * interval, then retry.
- */
- if (ctx->problem == rsync_problem_refused && ctx->tries < rc->max_retries) {
- unsigned char r;
- if (!RAND_bytes(&r, sizeof(r)))
- r = 60;
- ctx->deadline = time(0) + rc->retry_wait_min + r;
- ctx->state = rsync_state_retry_wait;
- ctx->problem = rsync_problem_none;
- ctx->pid = 0;
- ctx->tries++;
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Scheduling retry for %s", ctx->uri.s);
- continue;
- }
- goto failure;
-
- case 23: /* "Partial transfer due to error" */
- /*
- * This appears to be a catch-all for "something bad happened
- * trying to do what you asked me to do". In the cases I've
- * seen to date, this is things like "the directory you
- * requested isn't there" or "NFS exploded when I tried to touch
- * the directory". These aren't network layer failures, so we
- * (probably) shouldn't give up on the repository host.
- */
- rsync_status = rsync_status_done;
- log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri, rsync_partial_transfer, object_generation_null);
- break;
-
- default:
- failure:
- rsync_status = rsync_status_failed;
- logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "rsync %u exited with status %d fetching %s",
- (unsigned) pid, WEXITSTATUS(pid_status), ctx->uri.s);
- break;
- }
-
- if (rc->rsync_timeout && now >= ctx->deadline)
- rsync_status = rsync_status_timed_out;
- log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri,
- rsync_status_to_mib_counter(rsync_status),
- object_generation_null);
- rsync_history_add(rc, ctx, rsync_status);
- rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status);
- (void) sk_rsync_ctx_t_delete_ptr(rc->rsync_queue, ctx);
- free(ctx);
- ctx = NULL;
- }
-
- if (pid == -1 && errno != EINTR && errno != ECHILD)
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "waitpid() returned error: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- assert(rsync_count_running(rc) <= rc->max_parallel_fetches);
-
- /*
- * Look for rsync contexts that have become runable. Odd loop
- * structure is because rsync_run() might decide to remove the
- * specified rsync task from the queue instead of running it.
- */
- for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; i++) {
- n = sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue);
- if (ctx->state != rsync_state_running &&
- rsync_runable(rc, ctx) &&
- rsync_count_running(rc) < rc->max_parallel_fetches)
- rsync_run(rc, ctx);
- if (n > sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue))
- i--;
- }
-
- assert(rsync_count_running(rc) <= rc->max_parallel_fetches);
-
- /*
- * Check for log text from subprocesses.
- */
-
- n = rsync_construct_select(rc, now, &rfds, &tv);
-
- if (n > 0 && tv.tv_sec)
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Waiting up to %u seconds for rsync, queued %d, runable %d, running %d, max %d",
- (unsigned) tv.tv_sec, sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue), rsync_count_runable(rc),
- rsync_count_running(rc), rc->max_parallel_fetches);
-
- if (n > 0) {
-#if 0
- logmsg(rc, log_debug, "++ select(%d, %u)", n, tv.tv_sec);
-#endif
- n = select(n + 1, &rfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
- }
-
- if (n > 0) {
-
- for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) {
- if (ctx->fd <= 0 || !FD_ISSET(ctx->fd, &rfds))
- continue;
-
- assert(ctx->buflen < sizeof(ctx->buffer) - 1);
-
- while ((n = read(ctx->fd, ctx->buffer + ctx->buflen, sizeof(ctx->buffer) - 1 - ctx->buflen)) > 0) {
- ctx->buflen += n;
- assert(ctx->buflen < sizeof(ctx->buffer));
- ctx->buffer[ctx->buflen] = '\0';
-
- while ((s = strchr(ctx->buffer, '\n')) != NULL) {
- *s++ = '\0';
- do_one_rsync_log_line(rc, ctx);
- assert(s > ctx->buffer && s < ctx->buffer + sizeof(ctx->buffer));
- ctx->buflen -= s - ctx->buffer;
- assert(ctx->buflen < sizeof(ctx->buffer));
- if (ctx->buflen > 0)
- memmove(ctx->buffer, s, ctx->buflen);
- ctx->buffer[ctx->buflen] = '\0';
- }
-
- if (ctx->buflen == sizeof(ctx->buffer) - 1) {
- ctx->buffer[sizeof(ctx->buffer) - 1] = '\0';
- do_one_rsync_log_line(rc, ctx);
- ctx->buflen = 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (n == 0) {
- (void) close(ctx->fd);
- ctx->fd = -1;
- ctx->state = rsync_state_closed;
- }
- }
- }
-
- assert(rsync_count_running(rc) <= rc->max_parallel_fetches);
-
- /*
- * Deal with children that have been running too long.
- */
- if (rc->rsync_timeout) {
- for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) {
- int sig;
- if (ctx->pid <= 0 || now < ctx->deadline)
- continue;
- sig = ctx->tries++ < KILL_MAX ? SIGTERM : SIGKILL;
- if (ctx->state != rsync_state_terminating) {
- ctx->problem = rsync_problem_timed_out;
- ctx->state = rsync_state_terminating;
- ctx->tries = 0;
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Subprocess %u is taking too long fetching %s, whacking it", (unsigned) ctx->pid, ctx->uri.s);
- rsync_history_add(rc, ctx, rsync_status_timed_out);
- } else if (sig == SIGTERM) {
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Whacking subprocess %u again", (unsigned) ctx->pid);
- } else {
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Whacking subprocess %u with big hammer", (unsigned) ctx->pid);
- }
- (void) kill(ctx->pid, sig);
- ctx->deadline = now + 1;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Set up rsync context and attempt to start it.
- */
-static void rsync_init(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- void *cookie,
- void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, const rsync_ctx_t *, const rsync_status_t, const uri_t *, void *))
-{
- rsync_ctx_t *ctx = NULL;
-
- assert(rc && uri && strlen(uri->s) > SIZEOF_RSYNC);
-
- if (!rc->run_rsync) {
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "rsync disabled, skipping %s", uri->s);
- if (handler)
- handler(rc, NULL, rsync_status_skipped, uri, cookie);
- return;
- }
-
- if (rsync_history_uri(rc, uri)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "rsync cache hit for %s", uri->s);
- if (handler)
- handler(rc, NULL, rsync_status_done, uri, cookie);
- return;
- }
-
- if ((ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "malloc(rsync_ctxt_t) failed");
- if (handler)
- handler(rc, NULL, rsync_status_failed, uri, cookie);
- return;
- }
-
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
- ctx->uri = *uri;
- ctx->handler = handler;
- ctx->cookie = cookie;
- ctx->fd = -1;
-
- if (!sk_rsync_ctx_t_push(rc->rsync_queue, ctx)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't push rsync state object onto queue, punting %s", ctx->uri.s);
- rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status_failed);
- free(ctx);
- return;
- }
-
- if (rsync_conflicts(rc, ctx)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_debug, "New rsync context %s is feeling conflicted", ctx->uri.s);
- ctx->state = rsync_state_conflict_wait;
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * rsync a trust anchor.
- */
-static void rsync_ta(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- tal_ctx_t *tctx,
- void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, const rsync_ctx_t *,
- const rsync_status_t, const uri_t *, void *))
-{
- assert(endswith(uri->s, ".cer"));
- rsync_init(rc, uri, tctx, handler);
-}
-
-/**
- * rsync an entire subtree, generally rooted at a SIA collection.
- */
-static void rsync_tree(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, const rsync_ctx_t *,
- const rsync_status_t, const uri_t *, void *))
-{
- assert(endswith(uri->s, "/"));
- rsync_init(rc, uri, wsk, handler);
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Clean up old stuff from previous rsync runs. --delete doesn't help
- * if the URI changes and we never visit the old URI again.
- */
-static int prune_unauthenticated(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const path_t *name,
- const size_t baselen)
-{
- path_t path;
- struct dirent *d;
- DIR *dir;
- const char *slash;
-
- assert(rc && name && baselen > 0 && strlen(name->s) >= baselen);
-
- if (!is_directory(name)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "prune: %s is not a directory", name->s);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((dir = opendir(name->s)) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "prune: opendir() failed on %s: %s", name->s, strerror(errno));
- return 0;
- }
-
- slash = endswith(name->s, "/") ? "" : "/";
-
- while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
- if (!strcmp(d->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(d->d_name, ".."))
- continue;
-
- if (snprintf(path.s, sizeof(path.s), "%s%s%s", name->s, slash, d->d_name) >= sizeof(path.s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_debug, "prune: %s%s%s too long", name->s, slash, d->d_name);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (validation_status_find_filename(rc, path.s + baselen)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_debug, "prune: cache hit %s", path.s);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (unlink(path.s) == 0) {
- logmsg(rc, log_debug, "prune: removed %s", path.s);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (prune_unauthenticated(rc, &path, baselen))
- continue;
-
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "prune: removing %s failed: %s", path.s, strerror(errno));
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (rmdir(name->s) == 0)
- logmsg(rc, log_debug, "prune: removed %s", name->s);
- else if (errno != ENOTEMPTY)
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "prune: couldn't remove %s: %s", name->s, strerror(errno));
-
- done:
- closedir(dir);
- return !d;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Read a DER object using a BIO pipeline that hashes the file content
- * as we read it. Returns the internal form of the parsed DER object,
- * sets the hash buffer (if specified) as a side effect. The default
- * hash algorithm is SHA-256.
- */
-static void *read_file_with_hash(const path_t *filename,
- const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- const EVP_MD *md,
- hashbuf_t *hash)
-{
- void *result = NULL;
- BIO *b;
-
- if ((b = BIO_new_file(filename->s, "rb")) == NULL)
- goto error;
-
- if (hash != NULL) {
- BIO *b2 = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
- if (b2 == NULL)
- goto error;
- if (md == NULL)
- md = EVP_sha256();
- if (!BIO_set_md(b2, md)) {
- BIO_free(b2);
- goto error;
- }
- BIO_push(b2, b);
- b = b2;
- }
-
- if ((result = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(it, b, NULL)) == NULL)
- goto error;
-
- if (hash != NULL) {
- memset(hash, 0, sizeof(*hash));
- BIO_gets(b, (char *) hash, sizeof(hash->h));
- }
-
- error:
- BIO_free_all(b);
- return result;
-}
-
-/**
- * Read and hash a certificate.
- */
-static X509 *read_cert(const path_t *filename, hashbuf_t *hash)
-{
- return read_file_with_hash(filename, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), NULL, hash);
-}
-
-/**
- * Read and hash a CRL.
- */
-static X509_CRL *read_crl(const path_t *filename, hashbuf_t *hash)
-{
- return read_file_with_hash(filename, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), NULL, hash);
-}
-
-/**
- * Read and hash a CMS message.
- */
-static CMS_ContentInfo *read_cms(const path_t *filename, hashbuf_t *hash)
-{
- return read_file_with_hash(filename, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo), NULL, hash);
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Extract CRLDP data from a certificate. Stops looking after finding
- * the first rsync URI.
- */
-static int extract_crldp_uri(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const object_generation_t generation,
- const STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp,
- uri_t *result)
-{
- DIST_POINT *d;
- int i;
-
- assert(rc && uri && crldp && result);
-
- if (sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp) != 1)
- goto bad;
-
- d = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, 0);
-
- if (d->reasons || d->CRLissuer || !d->distpoint || d->distpoint->type != 0)
- goto bad;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(d->distpoint->name.fullname); i++) {
- GENERAL_NAME *n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(d->distpoint->name.fullname, i);
- if (n == NULL || n->type != GEN_URI)
- goto bad;
- if (!is_rsync((char *) n->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->data))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, non_rsync_uri_in_extension, generation);
- else if (sizeof(result->s) <= n->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->length)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, uri_too_long, generation);
- else if (result->s[0])
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, multiple_rsync_uris_in_extension, generation);
- else
- strcpy(result->s, (char *) n->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->data);
- }
-
- return result->s[0];
-
- bad:
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_crldp_extension, generation);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract SIA or AIA data from a certificate.
- */
-static int extract_access_uri(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const object_generation_t generation,
- const AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *xia,
- const int nid,
- uri_t *result,
- int *count)
-{
- int i;
-
- assert(rc && uri && xia && result && count);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(xia); i++) {
- ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(xia, i);
- if (a == NULL || a->location->type != GEN_URI)
- return 0;
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(a->method) != nid)
- continue;
- ++*count;
- if (!is_rsync((char *) a->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->data))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, non_rsync_uri_in_extension, generation);
- else if (sizeof(result->s) <= a->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->length)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, uri_too_long, generation);
- else if (result->s[0])
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, multiple_rsync_uris_in_extension, generation);
- else
- strcpy(result->s, (char *) a->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->data);
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Check to see whether an AKI extension is present, is of the right
- * form, and matches the issuer.
- */
-static int check_aki(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const X509 *issuer,
- const AUTHORITY_KEYID *aki,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- assert(rc && uri && issuer && issuer->skid);
-
- if (aki == NULL) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, aki_extension_missing, generation);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!aki->keyid || aki->serial || aki->issuer) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, aki_extension_wrong_format, generation);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(aki->keyid, issuer->skid)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, aki_extension_issuer_mismatch, generation);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Check whether a Distinguished Name conforms to the rescert profile.
- * The profile is very restrictive: it only allows one mandatory
- * CommonName field and one optional SerialNumber field, both of which
- * must be of type PrintableString.
- */
-static int check_allowed_dn(X509_NAME *dn)
-{
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
- ASN1_STRING *s;
- int loc;
-
- if (dn == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- switch (X509_NAME_entry_count(dn)) {
-
- case 2:
- if ((loc = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn, NID_serialNumber, -1)) < 0 ||
- (ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn, loc)) == NULL ||
- (s = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne)) == NULL ||
- ASN1_STRING_type(s) != V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
- return 0;
-
- /* Fall through */
-
- case 1:
- if ((loc = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn, NID_commonName, -1)) < 0 ||
- (ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn, loc)) == NULL ||
- (s = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne)) == NULL ||
- ASN1_STRING_type(s) != V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether an ASN.1 TIME value conforms to RFC 5280 4.1.2.5.
- */
-static int check_allowed_time_encoding(ASN1_TIME *t)
-{
- switch (t->type) {
-
- case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
- return t->length == sizeof("yymmddHHMMSSZ") - 1;
-
- case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
- return (t->length == sizeof("yyyymmddHHMMSSZ") - 1 &&
- strcmp("205", (char *) t->data) <= 0);
-
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Compare ASN1_TIME values.
- */
-static int asn1_time_cmp(ASN1_TIME *t1, ASN1_TIME *t2)
-{
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *g1 = ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(t1, NULL);
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *g2 = ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(t2, NULL);
-
- int cmp = ASN1_STRING_cmp(g1, g2);
-
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(g1);
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(g2);
-
- return cmp;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Attempt to read and check one CRL from disk.
- */
-
-static X509_CRL *check_crl_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- path_t *path,
- const path_t *prefix,
- X509 *issuer,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked;
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- int i, ret;
-
- assert(uri && path && issuer);
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, path, prefix) ||
- (crl = read_crl(path, NULL)) == NULL)
- goto punt;
-
- if (X509_CRL_get_version(crl) != 1) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_object_version, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (!crl->crl || !crl->crl->sig_alg || !crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm ||
- OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm) != NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_signature_algorithm, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (!check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) ||
- !check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_asn1_time_value, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) > 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_not_yet_valid, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) < 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, stale_crl_or_manifest, generation);
- if (!rc->allow_stale_crl)
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (!check_aki(rc, uri, issuer, crl->akid, generation))
- goto punt;
-
- if (crl->crl_number == NULL) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_number_extension_missing, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(crl->crl_number, asn1_zero) < 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_number_is_negative, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(crl->crl_number, asn1_twenty_octets) > 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_number_out_of_range, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (X509_CRL_get_ext_count(crl) != 2) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, disallowed_x509v3_extension, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), X509_get_subject_name(issuer))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_issuer_name_mismatch, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_issuer_name, generation);
- if (!rc->allow_nonconformant_name)
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if ((revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl)) != NULL) {
- for (i = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked) - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
- if (X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i)) > 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, disallowed_x509v3_extension, generation);
- goto punt;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer)) == NULL)
- goto punt;
- ret = X509_CRL_verify(crl, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
- if (ret > 0)
- return crl;
-
- punt:
- X509_CRL_free(crl);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether we already have a particular CRL, attempt to fetch it
- * and check issuer's signature if we don't.
- *
- * General plan here is to do basic checks on both current and backup
- * generation CRLs, then, if both generations pass all of our other
- * tests, pick the generation with the highest CRL number, to protect
- * against replay attacks.
- */
-static X509_CRL *check_crl(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- X509 *issuer)
-{
- X509_CRL *old_crl, *new_crl, *result = NULL;
- path_t old_path, new_path;
-
- if (uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &new_path, &rc->new_authenticated) &&
- (new_crl = read_crl(&new_path, NULL)) != NULL)
- return new_crl;
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking CRL %s", uri->s);
-
- new_crl = check_crl_1(rc, uri, &new_path, &rc->unauthenticated,
- issuer, object_generation_current);
-
- old_crl = check_crl_1(rc, uri, &old_path, &rc->old_authenticated,
- issuer, object_generation_backup);
-
- if (!new_crl)
- result = old_crl;
-
- else if (!old_crl)
- result = new_crl;
-
- else {
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *g_old = ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(old_crl), NULL);
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *g_new = ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(new_crl), NULL);
- int num_cmp = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(old_crl->crl_number, new_crl->crl_number);
- int date_cmp = (!g_old || !g_new) ? 0 : ASN1_STRING_cmp(g_old, g_new);
-
- if (!g_old)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_thisupdate, object_generation_backup);
- if (!g_new)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_thisupdate, object_generation_current);
- if (num_cmp > 0)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, backup_number_higher_than_current, object_generation_current);
- if (g_old && g_new && date_cmp > 0)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, backup_thisupdate_newer_than_current, object_generation_current);
-
- if (num_cmp > 0 && (!g_old || !g_new || date_cmp > 0))
- result = old_crl;
- else
- result = new_crl;
-
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(g_old);
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(g_new);
- }
-
- if (result && result == new_crl)
- install_object(rc, uri, &new_path, object_generation_current);
- else if (!access(new_path.s, F_OK))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_current);
-
- if (result && result == old_crl)
- install_object(rc, uri, &old_path, object_generation_backup);
- else if (!result && !access(old_path.s, F_OK))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_backup);
-
- if (result != new_crl)
- X509_CRL_free(new_crl);
-
- if (result != old_crl)
- X509_CRL_free(old_crl);
-
- return result;
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Check digest of a CRL we've already accepted.
- */
-static int check_crl_digest(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const size_t hashlen)
-{
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
- hashbuf_t hashbuf;
- path_t path;
- int result;
-
- assert(rc && uri && hash);
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &path, &rc->new_authenticated) ||
- (crl = read_crl(&path, &hashbuf)) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- result = hashlen <= sizeof(hashbuf.h) && !memcmp(hashbuf.h, hash, hashlen);
-
- X509_CRL_free(crl);
-
- return result;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Validation callback function for use with x509_verify_cert().
- */
-static int check_x509_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t *rctx = (rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t *) ctx;
- mib_counter_t code;
-
- assert(rctx != NULL);
-
- switch (ctx->error) {
- case X509_V_OK:
- return ok;
-
- case X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH:
- /*
- * Informational events, not really errors. ctx->check_issued()
- * is called in many places where failure to find an issuer is not
- * a failure for the calling function. Just leave these alone.
- */
- return ok;
-
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
- /*
- * This isn't really an error, exactly. CRLs don't really
- * "expire". What OpenSSL really means by this error is just
- * "it's now later than the issuer said it intended to publish a
- * new CRL". Whether we treat this as an error or not is
- * configurable, see the allow_stale_crl parameter.
- *
- * Deciding whether to allow stale CRLs is check_crl_1()'s job,
- * not ours. By the time this callback occurs, we've already
- * accepted the CRL; this callback is just notifying us that the
- * object being checked is tainted by a stale CRL. So we mark the
- * object as tainted and carry on.
- */
- log_validation_status(rctx->rc, &rctx->subject->uri, tainted_by_stale_crl, rctx->subject->generation);
- ok = 1;
- return ok;
-
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
- /*
- * This is another error that's only an error in the strange world
- * of OpenSSL, but a more serious one. By default, OpenSSL
- * expects all trust anchors to be self-signed. This is not a
- * PKIX requirement, it's just an OpenSSL thing, but one violates
- * it at one's peril, because the only way to convince OpenSSL to
- * allow a non-self-signed trust anchor is to intercept this
- * "error" in the verify callback handler.
- *
- * So this program supports non-self-signed trust anchors, but be
- * warned that enabling this feature may cause this program's
- * output not to work with other OpenSSL-based applications.
- */
- if (rctx->rc->allow_non_self_signed_trust_anchor)
- ok = 1;
- log_validation_status(rctx->rc, &rctx->subject->uri, trust_anchor_not_self_signed, rctx->subject->generation);
- return ok;
-
- /*
- * Select correct MIB counter for every known OpenSSL verify errors
- * except the ones we handle explicitly above, then fall through to
- * common handling for all of these.
- */
-#define QV(x) \
- case x: \
- code = mib_openssl_##x; \
- break;
- MIB_COUNTERS_FROM_OPENSSL;
-#undef QV
-
- default:
- code = unknown_openssl_verify_error;
- break;
- }
-
- log_validation_status(rctx->rc, &rctx->subject->uri, code, rctx->subject->generation);
- return ok;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check crypto aspects of a certificate, policy OID, RFC 3779 path
- * validation, and conformance to the RPKI certificate profile.
- */
-static int check_x509(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- const uri_t *uri,
- X509 *x,
- certinfo_t *certinfo,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
- rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t rctx;
- EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey = NULL, *subject_pkey = NULL;
- unsigned long flags = (X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY | X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT);
- AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *sia = NULL, *aia = NULL;
- STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *policies = NULL;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *ski_pubkey = NULL;
- STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp = NULL;
- EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku = NULL;
- BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bc = NULL;
- hashbuf_t ski_hashbuf;
- unsigned ski_hashlen, afi;
- int i, ok, crit, loc, ex_count, routercert = 0, ret = 0;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && w && uri && x && w->cert);
-
- /*
- * Cleanup logic will explode if rctx.ctx hasn't been initialized,
- * so we need to do this before running any test that can fail.
- */
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&rctx.ctx, rc->x509_store, x, NULL))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * certinfo == NULL means x is a self-signed trust anchor.
- */
- if (certinfo == NULL)
- certinfo = &w->certinfo;
-
- memset(certinfo, 0, sizeof(*certinfo));
-
- certinfo->uri = *uri;
- certinfo->generation = generation;
-
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(x), asn1_zero) <= 0 ||
- ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(x), asn1_twenty_octets) > 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_certificate_serial_number, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notBefore(x)) ||
- !check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notAfter(x))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_asn1_time_value, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- /*
- * Apparently nothing ever looks at these fields, so there are no
- * API functions for them. We wouldn't bother either if they
- * weren't forbidden by the RPKI certificate profile.
- */
- if (!x->cert_info || x->cert_info->issuerUID || x->cert_info->subjectUID) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_certificate_uid, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- /*
- * Keep track of allowed extensions we've seen. Once we've
- * processed all the ones we expect, anything left is an error.
- */
- ex_count = X509_get_ext_count(x);
-
- /*
- * We don't use X509_check_ca() to set certinfo->ca anymore, because
- * it's not paranoid enough to enforce the RPKI certificate profile,
- * but we still call it because we need it (or something) to invoke
- * x509v3_cache_extensions() for us.
- */
- (void) X509_check_ca(x);
-
- if ((bc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) {
- ex_count--;
- if (!crit || bc->ca <= 0 || bc->pathlen != NULL) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_basic_constraints, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- certinfo->ca = bc != NULL;
-
- if (certinfo == &w->certinfo) {
- certinfo->ta = 1;
- if (!certinfo->ca) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_trust_anchor, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- if ((aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
- int n_caIssuers = 0;
- ex_count--;
- if (!extract_access_uri(rc, uri, generation, aia, NID_ad_ca_issuers,
- &certinfo->aia, &n_caIssuers) ||
- !certinfo->aia.s[0] ||
- sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia) != n_caIssuers) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_aia_extension, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- if (certinfo->ta && aia) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, aia_extension_forbidden, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!certinfo->ta && !aia) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, aia_extension_missing, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) {
- ex_count--;
- if (crit || certinfo->ca || !endswith(uri->s, ".cer") || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku) == 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, inappropriate_eku_extension, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++)
- routercert |= OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i)) == NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router;
- }
-
- if ((sia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sinfo_access, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
- int got_caDirectory, got_rpkiManifest, got_signedObject;
- int n_caDirectory = 0, n_rpkiManifest = 0, n_signedObject = 0;
- ex_count--;
- ok = (extract_access_uri(rc, uri, generation, sia, NID_caRepository,
- &certinfo->sia, &n_caDirectory) &&
- extract_access_uri(rc, uri, generation, sia, NID_ad_rpkiManifest,
- &certinfo->manifest, &n_rpkiManifest) &&
- extract_access_uri(rc, uri, generation, sia, NID_ad_signedObject,
- &certinfo->signedobject, &n_signedObject));
- got_caDirectory = certinfo->sia.s[0] != '\0';
- got_rpkiManifest = certinfo->manifest.s[0] != '\0';
- got_signedObject = certinfo->signedobject.s[0] != '\0';
- ok &= sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia) == n_caDirectory + n_rpkiManifest + n_signedObject;
- if (certinfo->ca)
- ok &= got_caDirectory && got_rpkiManifest && !got_signedObject;
- else if (rc->allow_ee_without_signedObject)
- ok &= !got_caDirectory && !got_rpkiManifest;
- else
- ok &= !got_caDirectory && !got_rpkiManifest && got_signedObject;
- if (!ok) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_sia_extension, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- } else if (certinfo->ca || !rc->allow_ee_without_signedObject) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, sia_extension_missing, generation);
- goto done;
- } else if (!routercert) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, sia_extension_missing_from_ee, generation);
- }
-
- if (certinfo->signedobject.s[0] && strcmp(uri->s, certinfo->signedobject.s))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_signed_object_uri, generation);
-
- if ((crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
- ex_count--;
- if (!extract_crldp_uri(rc, uri, generation, crldp, &certinfo->crldp))
- goto done;
- }
-
- rctx.rc = rc;
- rctx.subject = certinfo;
-
- if (w->certs == NULL && (w->certs = walk_ctx_stack_certs(rc, wsk)) == NULL)
- goto done;
-
- if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_object_version, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!x->cert_info || !x->cert_info->signature || !x->cert_info->signature->algorithm ||
- OBJ_obj2nid(x->cert_info->signature->algorithm) != NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_signature_algorithm, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (certinfo->sia.s[0] && certinfo->sia.s[strlen(certinfo->sia.s) - 1] != '/') {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_cadirectory_uri, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!w->certinfo.ta && strcmp(w->certinfo.uri.s, certinfo->aia.s))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, aia_doesnt_match_issuer, generation);
-
- if (certinfo->ca && !certinfo->sia.s[0]) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, sia_cadirectory_uri_missing, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (certinfo->ca && !certinfo->manifest.s[0]) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, sia_manifest_uri_missing, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (certinfo->ca && !startswith(certinfo->manifest.s, certinfo->sia.s)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_carepository_mismatch, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (x->skid) {
- ex_count--;
- } else {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, ski_extension_missing, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_get_subject_name(x))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_subject_name, generation);
- if (!rc->allow_nonconformant_name)
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_issuer_name, generation);
- if (!rc->allow_nonconformant_name)
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((policies = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_certificate_policies, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) {
- POLICYQUALINFO *qualifier = NULL;
- POLICYINFO *policy = NULL;
- ex_count--;
- if (!crit || sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) != 1 ||
- (policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, 0)) == NULL ||
- OBJ_obj2nid(policy->policyid) != NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber ||
- sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(policy->qualifiers) > 1 ||
- (sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(policy->qualifiers) == 1 &&
- ((qualifier = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(policy->qualifiers, 0)) == NULL ||
- OBJ_obj2nid(qualifier->pqualid) != NID_id_qt_cps))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_certificate_policy, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- if (qualifier)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, policy_qualifier_cps, generation);
- }
-
- if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_key_usage, -1))) ||
- (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0 ||
- x->ex_kusage != (certinfo->ca ? KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | KU_CRL_SIGN : KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_key_usage, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- ex_count--;
-
- if (x->rfc3779_addr) {
- ex_count--;
- if (routercert ||
- (loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, -1)) < 0 ||
- !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, loc)) ||
- !v3_addr_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_addr) ||
- sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr) == 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_ipaddrblocks, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr); i++) {
- IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, i);
- afi = v3_addr_get_afi(f);
- if (afi != IANA_AFI_IPV4 && afi != IANA_AFI_IPV6) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, unknown_afi, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- if (f->addressFamily->length != 2) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, safi_not_allowed, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (x->rfc3779_asid) {
- ex_count--;
- if ((loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, -1)) < 0 ||
- !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, loc)) ||
- !v3_asid_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_asid) ||
- x->rfc3779_asid->asnum == NULL ||
- x->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL ||
- (routercert && x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_asidentifiers, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- if (!x->rfc3779_addr && !x->rfc3779_asid) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, missing_resources, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- subject_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- ok = subject_pkey != NULL;
- if (ok) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *algorithm;
-
- (void) X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&algorithm, NULL, NULL, NULL, X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x));
-
- switch (OBJ_obj2nid(algorithm)) {
-
- case NID_rsaEncryption:
- ok = (EVP_PKEY_type(subject_pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
- BN_get_word(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->e) == 65537);
- if (!ok)
- break;
- if (!certinfo->ca && rc->allow_1024_bit_ee_key &&
- BN_num_bits(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->n) == 1024)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, ee_certificate_with_1024_bit_key, generation);
- else
- ok = BN_num_bits(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->n) == 2048;
- break;
-
- case NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey:
- ok = !certinfo->ca && routercert;
- break;
-
- default:
- ok = 0;
- }
- }
- if (!ok) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_public_key, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (x->skid == NULL ||
- (ski_pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(x)) == NULL ||
- !EVP_Digest(ski_pubkey->data, ski_pubkey->length,
- ski_hashbuf.h, &ski_hashlen, EVP_sha1(), NULL) ||
- ski_hashlen != 20 ||
- ski_hashlen != x->skid->length ||
- memcmp(ski_hashbuf.h, x->skid->data, ski_hashlen)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, ski_public_key_mismatch, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (x->akid) {
- ex_count--;
- if (!check_aki(rc, uri, w->cert, x->akid, generation))
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!x->akid && !certinfo->ta) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, aki_extension_missing, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((issuer_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(w->cert)) == NULL || X509_verify(x, issuer_pkey) <= 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, certificate_bad_signature, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (certinfo->ta) {
-
- if (certinfo->crldp.s[0]) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, trust_anchor_with_crldp, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- } else {
-
- if (!certinfo->crldp.s[0]) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, crldp_uri_missing, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!certinfo->ca && !startswith(certinfo->crldp.s, w->certinfo.sia.s)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, crldp_doesnt_match_issuer_sia, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (w->crls == NULL && ((w->crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null()) == NULL ||
- !sk_X509_CRL_push(w->crls, NULL))) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Internal allocation error setting up CRL for validation");
- goto done;
- }
-
- assert(sk_X509_CRL_num(w->crls) == 1);
- assert((w->crldp.s[0] == '\0') == (sk_X509_CRL_value(w->crls, 0) == NULL));
-
- if (strcmp(w->crldp.s, certinfo->crldp.s)) {
- X509_CRL *old_crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(w->crls, 0);
- X509_CRL *new_crl = check_crl(rc, &certinfo->crldp, w->cert);
-
- if (w->crldp.s[0])
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, issuer_uses_multiple_crldp_values, generation);
-
- if (new_crl == NULL) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_crl, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (old_crl && new_crl && ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(old_crl->crl_number, new_crl->crl_number) < 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, crldp_names_newer_crl, generation);
- X509_CRL_free(old_crl);
- old_crl = NULL;
- }
-
- if (old_crl == NULL) {
- sk_X509_CRL_set(w->crls, 0, new_crl);
- w->crldp = certinfo->crldp;
- } else {
- X509_CRL_free(new_crl);
- }
- }
-
- assert(sk_X509_CRL_value(w->crls, 0));
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK;
- X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&rctx.ctx, w->crls);
- }
-
- if (ex_count > 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, disallowed_x509v3_extension, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- assert(w->certs != NULL);
- X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&rctx.ctx, w->certs);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&rctx.ctx, check_x509_cb);
-
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(rctx.ctx.param, flags);
-
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(rctx.ctx.param, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber));
-
- if (X509_verify_cert(&rctx.ctx) <= 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, certificate_failed_validation, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- done:
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&rctx.ctx);
- EVP_PKEY_free(issuer_pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(subject_pkey);
- BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bc);
- sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(sia, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free);
- sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(aia, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free);
- sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free);
- sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(policies, POLICYINFO_free);
- sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(eku, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract one datum from a CMS_SignerInfo.
- */
-static void *extract_si_datum(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
- int *n,
- const int optional,
- const int nid,
- const int asn1_type)
-{
- int i = CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(si, nid, -1);
- void *result = NULL;
- X509_ATTRIBUTE *a;
-
- assert(si && n);
-
- if (i < 0 && optional)
- return NULL;
-
- if (i >= 0 &&
- CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(si, nid, i) < 0 &&
- (a = CMS_signed_get_attr(si, i)) != NULL &&
- X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(a) == 1 &&
- (result = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(a, 0, asn1_type, NULL)) != NULL)
- --*n;
- else
- *n = -1;
-
- return result;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check a signed CMS object.
- */
-static int check_cms(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- const uri_t *uri,
- path_t *path,
- const path_t *prefix,
- CMS_ContentInfo **pcms,
- X509 **px,
- certinfo_t *certinfo,
- BIO *bio,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const size_t hashlen,
- const int expected_eContentType_nid,
- const int require_inheritance,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *signer_infos = NULL;
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
- CMS_SignerInfo *si = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sid = NULL;
- X509_NAME *si_issuer = NULL;
- ASN1_INTEGER *si_serial = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR *signature_alg = NULL, *digest_alg = NULL;
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
- hashbuf_t hashbuf;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- certinfo_t certinfo_;
- int i, result = 0;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && uri && path && prefix);
-
- if (!certinfo)
- certinfo = &certinfo_;
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, path, prefix))
- goto error;
-
- if (hash)
- cms = read_cms(path, &hashbuf);
- else
- cms = read_cms(path, NULL);
-
- if (!cms)
- goto error;
-
- if (hash && (hashlen > sizeof(hashbuf.h) ||
- memcmp(hashbuf.h, hash, hashlen))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, digest_mismatch, generation);
- if (!rc->allow_digest_mismatch)
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_eContentType(cms)) != expected_eContentType_nid) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_econtenttype, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (CMS_verify(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, bio, CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY) <= 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_validation_failure, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if ((crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms)) != NULL) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_includes_crls, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if ((signer_infos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms)) == NULL ||
- sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(signer_infos) != 1 ||
- (si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(signer_infos, 0)) == NULL ||
- !CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id(si, &sid, &si_issuer, &si_serial) ||
- sid == NULL || si_issuer != NULL || si_serial != NULL ||
- CMS_unsigned_get_attr_count(si) != -1) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_signer_infos, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &x, &digest_alg, &signature_alg);
-
- if (x == NULL) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_signer_missing, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if ((certs = CMS_get1_certs(cms)) == NULL ||
- sk_X509_num(certs) != 1 ||
- X509_cmp(x, sk_X509_value(certs, 0))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_signer, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- X509_ALGOR_get0(&oid, NULL, NULL, signature_alg);
- i = OBJ_obj2nid(oid);
- if (i != NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption && i != NID_rsaEncryption) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_cms_si_signature_algorithm, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- X509_ALGOR_get0(&oid, NULL, NULL, digest_alg);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) != NID_sha256) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_cms_si_digest_algorithm, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- i = CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si);
-
- (void) extract_si_datum(si, &i, 1, NID_pkcs9_signingTime, V_ASN1_UTCTIME);
- (void) extract_si_datum(si, &i, 1, NID_binary_signing_time, V_ASN1_INTEGER);
- oid = extract_si_datum(si, &i, 0, NID_pkcs9_contentType, V_ASN1_OBJECT);
- (void) extract_si_datum(si, &i, 0, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-
- if (i != 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_si_signed_attributes, generation);
- if (!rc->allow_wrong_cms_si_attributes)
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) != expected_eContentType_nid) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_si_contenttype, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(si, x)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_ski_mismatch, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (!check_x509(rc, wsk, uri, x, certinfo, generation))
- goto error;
-
- if (require_inheritance && x->rfc3779_addr) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr); i++) {
- IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, i);
- if (f->ipAddressChoice->type != IPAddressChoice_inherit) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, rfc3779_inheritance_required, generation);
- goto error;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (require_inheritance && x->rfc3779_asid && x->rfc3779_asid->asnum &&
- x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type != ASIdentifierChoice_inherit) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, rfc3779_inheritance_required, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (pcms) {
- *pcms = cms;
- cms = NULL;
- }
-
- if (px)
- *px = x;
-
- result = 1;
-
- error:
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
- sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
- sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
-
- return result;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Load certificate, check against manifest, then run it through all
- * the check_x509() tests.
- */
-static X509 *check_cert_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- const uri_t *uri,
- path_t *path,
- const path_t *prefix,
- certinfo_t *certinfo,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const size_t hashlen,
- object_generation_t generation)
-{
- hashbuf_t hashbuf;
- X509 *x = NULL;
-
- assert(uri && path && wsk && certinfo);
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, path, prefix))
- return NULL;
-
- if (access(path->s, R_OK))
- return NULL;
-
- if (hash)
- x = read_cert(path, &hashbuf);
- else
- x = read_cert(path, NULL);
-
- if (!x) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Can't read certificate %s", path->s);
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (hash && (hashlen > sizeof(hashbuf.h) ||
- memcmp(hashbuf.h, hash, hashlen))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, digest_mismatch, generation);
- if (!rc->allow_digest_mismatch)
- goto punt;
- }
-
- if (check_x509(rc, wsk, uri, x, certinfo, generation))
- return x;
-
- punt:
- X509_free(x);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/**
- * Try to find a good copy of a certificate either in fresh data or in
- * backup data from a previous run of this program.
- */
-static X509 *check_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- uri_t *uri,
- certinfo_t *certinfo,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const size_t hashlen)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
- object_generation_t generation;
- const path_t *prefix = NULL;
- path_t path;
- X509 *x;
-
- assert(rc && uri && wsk && w && certinfo);
-
- switch (w->state) {
- case walk_state_current:
- prefix = &rc->unauthenticated;
- generation = object_generation_current;
- break;
- case walk_state_backup:
- prefix = &rc->old_authenticated;
- generation = object_generation_backup;
- break;
- default:
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (skip_checking_this_object(rc, uri, generation))
- return NULL;
-
- if ((x = check_cert_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, prefix, certinfo,
- hash, hashlen, generation)) != NULL)
- install_object(rc, uri, &path, generation);
- else if (!access(path.s, F_OK))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, generation);
- else if (hash && generation == w->manifest_generation)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, generation);
-
- return x;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Read and check one manifest from disk.
- */
-static Manifest *check_manifest_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- const uri_t *uri,
- path_t *path,
- const path_t *prefix,
- certinfo_t *certinfo,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- STACK_OF(FileAndHash) *sorted_fileList = NULL;
- Manifest *manifest = NULL, *result = NULL;
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
- FileAndHash *fah = NULL, *fah2 = NULL;
- BIO *bio = NULL;
- X509 *x;
- int i;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && uri && path && prefix);
-
- if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate BIO for manifest %s", uri->s);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!check_cms(rc, wsk, uri, path, prefix, &cms, &x, certinfo, bio, NULL, 0,
- NID_ct_rpkiManifest, 1, generation))
- goto done;
-
- if ((manifest = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(Manifest), bio, NULL)) == NULL) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_econtent_decode_error, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (manifest->version) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_object_version, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (X509_cmp_current_time(manifest->thisUpdate) > 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_not_yet_valid, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (X509_cmp_current_time(manifest->nextUpdate) < 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, stale_crl_or_manifest, generation);
- if (!rc->allow_stale_manifest)
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (asn1_time_cmp(manifest->thisUpdate, X509_get_notBefore(x)) < 0 ||
- asn1_time_cmp(manifest->nextUpdate, X509_get_notAfter(x)) > 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_interval_overruns_cert, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(manifest->manifestNumber, asn1_zero) < 0 ||
- ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(manifest->manifestNumber, asn1_twenty_octets) > 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_manifest_number, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(manifest->fileHashAlg) != NID_sha256) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_digest_algorithm, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((sorted_fileList = sk_FileAndHash_dup(manifest->fileList)) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate shallow copy of fileList for manifest %s", uri->s);
- goto done;
- }
-
- (void) sk_FileAndHash_set_cmp_func(sorted_fileList, FileAndHash_name_cmp);
- sk_FileAndHash_sort(sorted_fileList);
-
- for (i = 0; (fah = sk_FileAndHash_value(sorted_fileList, i)) != NULL && (fah2 = sk_FileAndHash_value(sorted_fileList, i + 1)) != NULL; i++) {
- if (!strcmp((char *) fah->file->data, (char *) fah2->file->data)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, duplicate_name_in_manifest, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 0; (fah = sk_FileAndHash_value(manifest->fileList, i)) != NULL; i++) {
- if (fah->hash->length != HASH_SHA256_LEN ||
- (fah->hash->flags & (ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 7)) > ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_manifest_digest_length, generation);
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- result = manifest;
- manifest = NULL;
-
- done:
- BIO_free(bio);
- Manifest_free(manifest);
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
- sk_FileAndHash_free(sorted_fileList);
- return result;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether we already have a particular manifest, attempt to fetch it
- * and check issuer's signature if we don't.
- *
- * General plan here is to do basic checks on both current and backup
- * generation manifests, then, if both generations pass all of our
- * other tests, pick the generation with the highest manifest number,
- * to protect against replay attacks.
- *
- * Once we've picked the manifest we're going to use, we need to check
- * it against the CRL we've chosen. Not much we can do if they don't
- * match besides whine about it, but we do need to whine in this case.
- */
-static int check_manifest(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
- Manifest *old_manifest, *new_manifest, *result = NULL;
- certinfo_t old_certinfo, new_certinfo;
- const uri_t *uri, *crldp = NULL;
- object_generation_t generation = object_generation_null;
- path_t old_path, new_path;
- FileAndHash *fah = NULL;
- const char *crl_tail;
- int i, ok = 1;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && w && !w->manifest);
-
- uri = &w->certinfo.manifest;
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking manifest %s", uri->s);
-
- new_manifest = check_manifest_1(rc, wsk, uri, &new_path,
- &rc->unauthenticated, &new_certinfo,
- object_generation_current);
-
- old_manifest = check_manifest_1(rc, wsk, uri, &old_path,
- &rc->old_authenticated, &old_certinfo,
- object_generation_backup);
-
- if (!new_manifest)
- result = old_manifest;
-
- else if (!old_manifest)
- result = new_manifest;
-
- else {
- int num_cmp = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(old_manifest->manifestNumber, new_manifest->manifestNumber);
- int date_cmp = ASN1_STRING_cmp(old_manifest->thisUpdate, new_manifest->thisUpdate);
-
- if (num_cmp > 0)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, backup_number_higher_than_current, object_generation_current);
- if (date_cmp > 0)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, backup_thisupdate_newer_than_current, object_generation_current);
-
- if (num_cmp > 0 && date_cmp > 0)
- result = old_manifest;
- else
- result = new_manifest;
- }
-
- if (result && result == new_manifest) {
- generation = object_generation_current;
- install_object(rc, uri, &new_path, generation);
- crldp = &new_certinfo.crldp;
- }
-
- if (result && result == old_manifest) {
- generation = object_generation_backup;
- install_object(rc, uri, &old_path, generation);
- crldp = &old_certinfo.crldp;
- }
-
- if (result) {
- crl_tail = strrchr(crldp->s, '/');
- assert(crl_tail != NULL);
- crl_tail++;
-
- for (i = 0; (fah = sk_FileAndHash_value(result->fileList, i)) != NULL; i++)
- if (!strcmp((char *) fah->file->data, crl_tail))
- break;
-
- if (!fah) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_not_in_manifest, generation);
- if (rc->require_crl_in_manifest)
- ok = 0;
- }
-
- else if (!check_crl_digest(rc, crldp, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, digest_mismatch, generation);
- if (!rc->allow_crl_digest_mismatch)
- ok = 0;
- }
- }
-
- if ((!result || result != new_manifest) && !access(new_path.s, F_OK))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_current);
-
- if (!result && !access(old_path.s, F_OK))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_backup);
-
- if (result != new_manifest)
- Manifest_free(new_manifest);
-
- if (result != old_manifest)
- Manifest_free(old_manifest);
-
- w->manifest = result;
- if (crldp)
- w->crldp = *crldp;
- w->manifest_generation = generation;
-
- return ok;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Mark CRL or manifest that we're rechecking so XML report makes more sense.
- */
-static void rsync_needed_mark_recheck(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const uri_t *uri)
-{
- validation_status_t *v = NULL;
-
- if (uri->s[0] != '\0')
- v = validation_status_find(rc->validation_status_root,
- uri, object_generation_current);
-
- if (v) {
- validation_status_set_code(v, stale_crl_or_manifest, 0);
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, rechecking_object,
- object_generation_current);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether we need to rsync a particular tree. This depends on
- * the setting of rc->rsync_early, whether we have a valid manifest on
- * file, and whether that manifest is stale yet.
- */
-static int rsync_needed(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
- int needed;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && w);
-
- needed = (rc->rsync_early ||
- !check_manifest(rc, wsk) ||
- w->manifest == NULL ||
- X509_cmp_current_time(w->manifest->nextUpdate) < 0);
-
- if (needed && w->manifest != NULL) {
- rsync_needed_mark_recheck(rc, &w->certinfo.manifest);
- rsync_needed_mark_recheck(rc, &w->certinfo.crldp);
- Manifest_free(w->manifest);
- w->manifest = NULL;
- }
-
- return needed;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Extract a ROA prefix from the ASN.1 bitstring encoding.
- */
-static int extract_roa_prefix(const ROAIPAddress *ra,
- const unsigned afi,
- unsigned char *addr,
- unsigned *prefixlen,
- unsigned *max_prefixlen)
-{
- unsigned length;
- long maxlen;
-
- assert(ra && addr && prefixlen && max_prefixlen);
-
- maxlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ra->maxLength);
-
- switch (afi) {
- case IANA_AFI_IPV4: length = 4; break;
- case IANA_AFI_IPV6: length = 16; break;
- default: return 0;
- }
-
- if (ra->IPAddress->length < 0 || ra->IPAddress->length > length ||
- maxlen < 0 || maxlen > (long) length * 8)
- return 0;
-
- if (ra->IPAddress->length > 0) {
- memcpy(addr, ra->IPAddress->data, ra->IPAddress->length);
- if ((ra->IPAddress->flags & 7) != 0) {
- unsigned char mask = 0xFF >> (8 - (ra->IPAddress->flags & 7));
- addr[ra->IPAddress->length - 1] &= ~mask;
- }
- }
-
- memset(addr + ra->IPAddress->length, 0, length - ra->IPAddress->length);
- *prefixlen = (ra->IPAddress->length * 8) - (ra->IPAddress->flags & 7);
- *max_prefixlen = ra->maxLength ? (unsigned) maxlen : *prefixlen;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * Read and check one ROA from disk.
- */
-static int check_roa_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- const uri_t *uri,
- path_t *path,
- const path_t *prefix,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const size_t hashlen,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) *roa_resources = NULL, *ee_resources = NULL;
- unsigned char addrbuf[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
- BIO *bio = NULL;
- ROA *roa = NULL;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- int i, j, result = 0;
- unsigned afi, *safi = NULL, safi_, prefixlen, max_prefixlen;
- ROAIPAddressFamily *rf;
- ROAIPAddress *ra;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && uri && path && prefix);
-
- if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate BIO for ROA %s", uri->s);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (!check_cms(rc, wsk, uri, path, prefix, &cms, &x, NULL, bio, NULL, 0,
- NID_ct_ROA, 0, generation))
- goto error;
-
- if (!(roa = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ROA), bio, NULL))) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_econtent_decode_error, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (roa->version) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_object_version, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(roa->asID, asn1_zero) < 0 ||
- ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(roa->asID, asn1_four_octets) > 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_roa_asID, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- ee_resources = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL);
-
- /*
- * Extract prefixes from ROA and convert them into a resource set.
- */
-
- if (!(roa_resources = sk_IPAddressFamily_new_null()))
- goto error;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ROAIPAddressFamily_num(roa->ipAddrBlocks); i++) {
- rf = sk_ROAIPAddressFamily_value(roa->ipAddrBlocks, i);
- if (!rf || !rf->addressFamily || rf->addressFamily->length < 2 || rf->addressFamily->length > 3) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_roa_addressfamily, generation);
- goto error;
- }
- afi = (rf->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | (rf->addressFamily->data[1]);
- if (rf->addressFamily->length == 3)
- *(safi = &safi_) = rf->addressFamily->data[2];
- for (j = 0; j < sk_ROAIPAddress_num(rf->addresses); j++) {
- ra = sk_ROAIPAddress_value(rf->addresses, j);
- if (!ra ||
- !extract_roa_prefix(ra, afi, addrbuf, &prefixlen, &max_prefixlen) ||
- !v3_addr_add_prefix(roa_resources, afi, safi, addrbuf, prefixlen)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_resources_malformed, generation);
- goto error;
- }
- if (max_prefixlen < prefixlen) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_max_prefixlen_too_short, generation);
- goto error;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * ROAs can include nested prefixes, so direct translation to
- * resource sets could include overlapping ranges, which is illegal.
- * So we have to remove nested stuff before whacking into canonical
- * form. Fortunately, this is relatively easy, since we know these
- * are just prefixes, not ranges: in a list of prefixes sorted by
- * the RFC 3779 rules, the first element of a set of nested prefixes
- * will always be the least specific.
- */
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(roa_resources); i++) {
- IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(roa_resources, i);
-
- if ((afi = v3_addr_get_afi(f)) == 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_contains_bad_afi_value, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges) {
- IPAddressOrRanges *aors = f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges;
-
- sk_IPAddressOrRange_sort(aors);
-
- for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; j++) {
- IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
- IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1);
- unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
- unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
- int length;
-
- if ((length = v3_addr_get_range(a, afi, a_min, a_max, ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN)) == 0 ||
- (length = v3_addr_get_range(b, afi, b_min, b_max, ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN)) == 0) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_resources_malformed, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (memcmp(a_max, b_max, length) >= 0) {
- (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, j + 1);
- IPAddressOrRange_free(b);
- --j;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (!v3_addr_canonize(roa_resources)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_resources_malformed, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (!v3_addr_subset(roa_resources, ee_resources)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_resource_not_in_ee, generation);
- goto error;
- }
-
- result = 1;
-
- error:
- BIO_free(bio);
- ROA_free(roa);
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
- sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(roa_resources, IPAddressFamily_free);
- sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ee_resources, IPAddressFamily_free);
-
- return result;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether we already have a particular ROA, attempt to fetch it
- * and check issuer's signature if we don't.
- */
-static void check_roa(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const size_t hashlen)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
- path_t path;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && w && uri);
-
- if (uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &path, &rc->new_authenticated) &&
- !access(path.s, F_OK))
- return;
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking ROA %s", uri->s);
-
- if (check_roa_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, &rc->unauthenticated,
- hash, hashlen, object_generation_current)) {
- install_object(rc, uri, &path, object_generation_current);
- return;
- }
-
- if (!access(path.s, F_OK))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_current);
- else if (hash)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, object_generation_current);
-
- if (check_roa_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, &rc->old_authenticated,
- hash, hashlen, object_generation_backup)) {
- install_object(rc, uri, &path, object_generation_backup);
- return;
- }
-
- if (!access(path.s, F_OK))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_backup);
- else if (hash && w->manifest_generation == object_generation_backup)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, object_generation_backup);
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Read and check one Ghostbuster record from disk.
- */
-static int check_ghostbuster_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- const uri_t *uri,
- path_t *path,
- const path_t *prefix,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const size_t hashlen,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
- BIO *bio = NULL;
- X509 *x;
- int result = 0;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && uri && path && prefix);
-
-#if 0
- /*
- * May want this later if we're going to inspect the VCard. For now,
- * just leave this NULL and the right thing should happen.
- */
- if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate BIO for Ghostbuster record %s", uri->s);
- goto error;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!check_cms(rc, wsk, uri, path, prefix, &cms, &x, NULL, bio, NULL, 0,
- NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters, 1, generation))
- goto error;
-
-#if 0
- /*
- * Here is where we would read the VCard from the bio returned by
- * CMS_verify() so that we could check the VCard.
- */
-#endif
-
- result = 1;
-
- error:
- BIO_free(bio);
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
-
- return result;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether we already have a particular Ghostbuster record,
- * attempt to fetch it and check issuer's signature if we don't.
- */
-static void check_ghostbuster(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk,
- const uri_t *uri,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const size_t hashlen)
-{
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
- path_t path;
-
- assert(rc && wsk && w && uri);
-
- if (uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &path, &rc->new_authenticated) &&
- !access(path.s, F_OK))
- return;
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking Ghostbuster record %s", uri->s);
-
- if (check_ghostbuster_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, &rc->unauthenticated,
- hash, hashlen, object_generation_current)) {
- install_object(rc, uri, &path, object_generation_current);
- return;
- }
-
- if (!access(path.s, F_OK))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_current);
- else if (hash)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, object_generation_current);
-
- if (check_ghostbuster_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, &rc->old_authenticated,
- hash, hashlen, object_generation_backup)) {
- install_object(rc, uri, &path, object_generation_backup);
- return;
- }
-
- if (!access(path.s, F_OK))
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_backup);
- else if (hash && w->manifest_generation == object_generation_backup)
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, object_generation_backup);
-}
-
-
-
-static void walk_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *, void *);
-
-/**
- * rsync callback for fetching SIA tree.
- */
-static void rsync_sia_callback(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const rsync_ctx_t *ctx,
- const rsync_status_t status,
- const uri_t *uri,
- void *cookie)
-{
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk = cookie;
- walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk);
-
- assert(rc && wsk);
-
- if (status != rsync_status_pending) {
- w->state++;
- task_add(rc, walk_cert, wsk);
- return;
- }
-
- if (rsync_count_runable(rc) >= rc->max_parallel_fetches)
- return;
-
- if ((wsk = walk_ctx_stack_clone(wsk)) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err,
- "walk_ctx_stack_clone() failed, probably memory exhaustion, blundering onwards without forking stack");
- return;
- }
-
- walk_ctx_stack_pop(wsk);
- task_add(rc, walk_cert, wsk);
-}
-
-/**
- * Recursive walk of certificate hierarchy (core of the program).
- *
- * Walk all products of the current certificate, starting with the
- * ones named in the manifest and continuing with any that we find in
- * the publication directory but which are not named in the manifest.
- *
- * Dispatch to correct checking code for the object named by URI,
- * based on the filename extension in the uri. CRLs are a special
- * case because we've already checked them by the time we get here, so
- * we just ignore them. Other objects are either certificates or
- * CMS-signed objects of one kind or another.
- */
-static void walk_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, void *cookie)
-{
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk = cookie;
- const unsigned char *hash = NULL;
- object_generation_t generation;
- size_t hashlen;
- walk_ctx_t *w;
- uri_t uri;
-
- assert(rc && wsk);
-
- while ((w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk)) != NULL) {
-
- switch (w->state) {
- case walk_state_current:
- generation = object_generation_current;
- break;
- case walk_state_backup:
- generation = object_generation_backup;
- break;
- default:
- generation = object_generation_null;
- break;
- }
-
- switch (w->state) {
-
- case walk_state_initial:
-
- if (!w->certinfo.sia.s[0] || !w->certinfo.ca) {
- w->state = walk_state_done;
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!w->certinfo.manifest.s[0]) {
- log_validation_status(rc, &w->certinfo.uri, sia_manifest_uri_missing, w->certinfo.generation);
- w->state = walk_state_done;
- continue;
- }
-
- w->state++;
- continue;
-
- case walk_state_rsync:
-
- if (rsync_needed(rc, wsk)) {
- rsync_tree(rc, &w->certinfo.sia, wsk, rsync_sia_callback);
- return;
- }
- log_validation_status(rc, &w->certinfo.sia, rsync_transfer_skipped, object_generation_null);
- w->state++;
- continue;
-
- case walk_state_ready:
-
- walk_ctx_loop_init(rc, wsk); /* sets w->state */
- continue;
-
- case walk_state_current:
- case walk_state_backup:
-
- if (!walk_ctx_loop_this(rc, wsk, &uri, &hash, &hashlen)) {
- walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (endswith(uri.s, ".crl") || endswith(uri.s, ".mft") || endswith(uri.s, ".mnf")) {
- walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk);
- continue; /* CRLs and manifests checked elsewhere */
- }
-
- if (hash == NULL && !rc->allow_object_not_in_manifest) {
- log_validation_status(rc, &uri, skipped_because_not_in_manifest, generation);
- walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (hash == NULL)
- log_validation_status(rc, &uri, tainted_by_not_being_in_manifest, generation);
- else if (w->stale_manifest)
- log_validation_status(rc, &uri, tainted_by_stale_manifest, generation);
-
- if (endswith(uri.s, ".roa")) {
- check_roa(rc, wsk, &uri, hash, hashlen);
- walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (endswith(uri.s, ".gbr")) {
- check_ghostbuster(rc, wsk, &uri, hash, hashlen);
- walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (endswith(uri.s, ".cer")) {
- certinfo_t certinfo;
- X509 *x = check_cert(rc, wsk, &uri, &certinfo, hash, hashlen);
- if (!walk_ctx_stack_push(wsk, x, &certinfo))
- walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk);
- continue;
- }
-
- log_validation_status(rc, &uri, unknown_object_type_skipped, object_generation_null);
- walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk);
- continue;
-
- case walk_state_done:
-
- walk_ctx_stack_pop(wsk); /* Resume our issuer's state */
- continue;
-
- }
- }
-
- assert(walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk) == NULL);
- walk_ctx_stack_free(wsk);
-}
-
-/**
- * Check a trust anchor. Yes, we trust it, by definition, but it
- * still needs to conform to the certificate profile, the
- * self-signature must be correct, etcetera.
- *
- * Ownership of the TA certificate object passes to this function when
- * called (ie, freeing "x" is our responsibility).
- */
-static int check_ta(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, X509 *x, const uri_t *uri,
- const path_t *path1, const path_t *path2,
- const object_generation_t generation)
-{
- STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk = NULL;
- walk_ctx_t *w = NULL;
-
- assert(rc && x && uri && path1 && path2);
-
- if (x == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- if ((wsk = walk_ctx_stack_new()) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate walk context stack");
- X509_free(x);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((w = walk_ctx_stack_push(wsk, x, NULL)) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't push walk context stack");
- walk_ctx_stack_free(wsk);
- X509_free(x);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!check_x509(rc, wsk, uri, x, NULL, generation)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, generation);
- walk_ctx_stack_free(wsk);
- return 1;
- }
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Copying trust anchor %s to %s", path1->s, path2->s);
-
- if (!mkdir_maybe(rc, path2) || !cp_ln(rc, path1, path2)) {
- walk_ctx_stack_free(wsk);
- return 0;
- }
-
- log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_accepted, generation);
- task_add(rc, walk_cert, wsk);
- return 1;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Check a trust anchor read from a local file.
- */
-static int check_ta_cer(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const char *fn)
-
-{
- path_t path1, path2;
- unsigned long hash;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- uri_t uri;
- int i;
-
- assert(rc && fn);
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Processing trust anchor from file %s", fn);
-
- if (strlen(fn) >= sizeof(path1.s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Trust anchor path name too long %s", fn);
- return 0;
- }
- strcpy(path1.s, fn);
- filename_to_uri(&uri, path1.s);
-
- if ((x = read_cert(&path1, NULL)) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Couldn't read trust anchor from file %s", fn);
- log_validation_status(rc, &uri, unreadable_trust_anchor, object_generation_null);
- goto lose;
- }
-
- hash = X509_subject_name_hash(x);
-
- for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX; i++) {
- if (snprintf(path2.s, sizeof(path2.s), "%s%lx.%d.cer",
- rc->new_authenticated.s, hash, i) >= sizeof(path2.s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err,
- "Couldn't construct path name for trust anchor %s", path1.s);
- goto lose;
- }
- if (access(path2.s, F_OK))
- break;
- }
- if (i == INT_MAX) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't find a free name for trust anchor %s", path1.s);
- goto lose;
- }
-
- return check_ta(rc, x, &uri, &path1, &path2, object_generation_null);
-
- lose:
- log_validation_status(rc, &uri, trust_anchor_skipped, object_generation_null);
- X509_free(x);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Allocate a new tal_ctx_t.
- */
-static tal_ctx_t *tal_ctx_t_new(void)
-{
- tal_ctx_t *tctx = malloc(sizeof(*tctx));
- if (tctx)
- memset(tctx, 0, sizeof(*tctx));
- return tctx;
-}
-
-/**
- * Free a tal_ctx_t.
- */
-static void tal_ctx_t_free(tal_ctx_t *tctx)
-{
- if (tctx) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(tctx->pkey);
- free(tctx);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Read a trust anchor from disk and compare with known public key.
- *
- * NB: EVP_PKEY_cmp() returns 1 for match, not 0 like every other
- * xyz_cmp() function in the entire OpenSSL library. Go figure.
- */
-static int check_ta_tal_callback_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const tal_ctx_t *tctx,
- object_generation_t generation)
-
-{
- const path_t *prefix = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- path_t path;
- int ret = 0;
-
- switch (generation) {
- case object_generation_current:
- prefix = &rc->unauthenticated;
- break;
- case object_generation_backup:
- prefix = &rc->old_authenticated;
- break;
- default:
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, &tctx->uri, &path, prefix)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((x = read_cert(&path, NULL)) == NULL || (pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x)) == NULL) {
- log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, unreadable_trust_anchor, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_cmp(tctx->pkey, pkey) != 1) {
- log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, trust_anchor_key_mismatch, generation);
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = check_ta(rc, x, &tctx->uri, &path, &tctx->path, generation);
- x = NULL;
-
- done:
- if (!ret)
- log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, object_rejected, generation);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- X509_free(x);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * rsync callback for fetching a TAL.
- */
-static void rsync_tal_callback(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const rsync_ctx_t *ctx,
- const rsync_status_t status,
- const uri_t *uri,
- void *cookie)
-{
- tal_ctx_t *tctx = cookie;
-
- assert(rc && tctx);
-
- if (status == rsync_status_pending)
- return;
-
- if (!check_ta_tal_callback_1(rc, tctx, object_generation_current) &&
- !check_ta_tal_callback_1(rc, tctx, object_generation_backup))
- log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, trust_anchor_skipped, object_generation_null);
-
- tal_ctx_t_free(tctx);
-}
-
-/**
- * Check a trust anchor read from a trust anchor locator (TAL).
- */
-static int check_ta_tal(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const char *fn)
-
-{
- tal_ctx_t *tctx = NULL;
- BIO *bio = NULL;
- int ret = 1;
-
- assert(rc && fn);
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Processing trust anchor locator from file %s", fn);
-
- if ((tctx = tal_ctx_t_new()) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "malloc(tal_ctxt_t) failed");
- goto done;
- }
-
- bio = BIO_new_file(fn, "r");
-
- if (!bio)
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Couldn't open trust anchor locator file %s", fn);
-
- if (!bio || BIO_gets(bio, tctx->uri.s, sizeof(tctx->uri.s)) <= 0) {
- uri_t furi;
- filename_to_uri(&furi, fn);
- log_validation_status(rc, &furi, unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, object_generation_null);
- goto done;
- }
-
- tctx->uri.s[strcspn(tctx->uri.s, " \t\r\n")] = '\0';
-
- if (!uri_to_filename(rc, &tctx->uri, &tctx->path, &rc->new_authenticated)) {
- log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, object_generation_null);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!endswith(tctx->uri.s, ".cer")) {
- log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, malformed_tal_uri, object_generation_null);
- goto done;
- }
-
- bio = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_linebreak()), bio);
- bio = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()), bio);
- if (bio)
- tctx->pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_bio(bio, NULL);
- if (!tctx->pkey) {
- log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, object_generation_null);
- goto done;
- }
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Processing trust anchor from URI %s", tctx->uri.s);
-
- rsync_ta(rc, &tctx->uri, tctx, rsync_tal_callback);
- tctx = NULL; /* Control has passed */
-
- done:
- tal_ctx_t_free(tctx);
- BIO_free_all(bio);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check a directory of trust anchors and trust anchor locators.
- */
-static int check_ta_dir(rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const char *dn)
-{
- DIR *dir = NULL;
- struct dirent *d;
- path_t path;
- int is_cer, is_tal;
-
- assert(rc && dn);
-
- if ((dir = opendir(dn)) == NULL) {
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't open trust anchor directory %s: %s",
- dn, strerror(errno));
- return 0;
- }
-
- while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
- if (snprintf(path.s, sizeof(path.s), "%s/%s", dn, d->d_name) >= sizeof(path.s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Pathname %s/%s too long", dn, d->d_name);
- break;
- }
- is_cer = endswith(path.s, ".cer");
- is_tal = endswith(path.s, ".tal");
- if (is_cer && !check_ta_cer(rc, path.s))
- break;
- if (is_tal && !check_ta_tal(rc, path.s))
- break;
- if (!is_cer && !is_tal)
- logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Skipping non-trust-anchor %s", path.s);
- }
-
- if (dir != NULL)
- closedir(dir);
-
- return !d;;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Write detailed log of what we've done as an XML file.
- */
-static int write_xml_file(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const char *xmlfile)
-{
- int i, j, use_stdout, ok;
- char hostname[HOSTNAME_MAX];
- mib_counter_t code;
- timestamp_t ts;
- FILE *f = NULL;
- path_t xmltemp;
-
- if (xmlfile == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- use_stdout = !strcmp(xmlfile, "-");
-
- logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Writing XML summary to %s",
- (use_stdout ? "standard output" : xmlfile));
-
- if (use_stdout) {
- f = stdout;
- ok = 1;
- } else if (snprintf(xmltemp.s, sizeof(xmltemp.s), "%s.%u.tmp", xmlfile, (unsigned) getpid()) >= sizeof(xmltemp.s)) {
- logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Filename \"%s\" is too long, not writing XML", xmlfile);
- return 0;
- } else {
- ok = (f = fopen(xmltemp.s, "w")) != NULL;
- }
-
- ok &= gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == 0;
-
- if (ok)
- ok &= fprintf(f, "<?xml version=\"1.0\" ?>\n"
- "<rcynic-summary date=\"%s\" rcynic-version=\"%s\""
- " summary-version=\"%d\" reporting-hostname=\"%s\">\n"
- " <labels>\n",
- time_to_string(&ts, NULL),
- svn_id, XML_SUMMARY_VERSION, hostname) != EOF;
-
- for (j = 0; ok && j < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX; ++j)
- ok &= fprintf(f, " <%s kind=\"%s\">%s</%s>\n",
- mib_counter_label[j], mib_counter_kind[j],
- (mib_counter_desc[j]
- ? mib_counter_desc[j]
- : X509_verify_cert_error_string(mib_counter_openssl[j])),
- mib_counter_label[j]) != EOF;
-
- if (ok)
- ok &= fprintf(f, " </labels>\n") != EOF;
-
- for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_validation_status_t_num(rc->validation_status); i++) {
- validation_status_t *v = sk_validation_status_t_value(rc->validation_status, i);
- assert(v);
-
- (void) time_to_string(&ts, &v->timestamp);
-
- for (code = (mib_counter_t) 0; ok && code < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX; code++) {
- if (validation_status_get_code(v, code)) {
- if (ok)
- ok &= fprintf(f, " <validation_status timestamp=\"%s\" status=\"%s\"",
- ts.s, mib_counter_label[code]) != EOF;
- if (ok && (v->generation == object_generation_current ||
- v->generation == object_generation_backup))
- ok &= fprintf(f, " generation=\"%s\"",
- object_generation_label[v->generation]) != EOF;
- if (ok)
- ok &= fprintf(f, ">%s</validation_status>\n", v->uri.s) != EOF;
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_rsync_history_t_num(rc->rsync_history); i++) {
- rsync_history_t *h = sk_rsync_history_t_value(rc->rsync_history, i);
- assert(h);
-
- if (ok)
- ok &= fprintf(f, " <rsync_history") != EOF;
- if (ok && h->started)
- ok &= fprintf(f, " started=\"%s\"",
- time_to_string(&ts, &h->started)) != EOF;
- if (ok && h->finished)
- ok &= fprintf(f, " finished=\"%s\"",
- time_to_string(&ts, &h->finished)) != EOF;
- if (ok && h->status != rsync_status_done)
- ok &= fprintf(f, " error=\"%u\"", (unsigned) h->status) != EOF;
- if (ok)
- ok &= fprintf(f, ">%s%s</rsync_history>\n",
- h->uri.s, (h->final_slash ? "/" : "")) != EOF;
- }
-
- if (ok)
- ok &= fprintf(f, "</rcynic-summary>\n") != EOF;
-
- if (f && !use_stdout)
- ok &= fclose(f) != EOF;
-
- if (ok && !use_stdout)
- ok &= rename(xmltemp.s, xmlfile) == 0;
-
- if (!ok)
- logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't write XML summary to %s: %s",
- (use_stdout ? "standard output" : xmlfile), strerror(errno));
-
- if (!ok && !use_stdout)
- (void) unlink(xmltemp.s);
-
- return ok;
-}
-
-
-
-/**
- * Long options.
- */
-#define OPTIONS \
- QA('a', "authenticated", "root of authenticated data tree") \
- QA('c', "config", "override default name of config file") \
- QF('h', "help", "print this help message") \
- QA('j', "jitter", "set jitter value") \
- QA('l', "log-level", "set log level") \
- QA('u', "unauthenticated", "root of unauthenticated data tree") \
- QF('e', "use-stderr", "log to syslog") \
- QF('s', "use-syslog", "log to stderr") \
- QF('V', "version", "print program version") \
- QA('x', "xml-file", "set XML output file location")
-
-const static struct option longopts[] = {
- { "authenticated", required_argument, NULL, 'a' },
- { "config", required_argument, NULL, 'c' },
- { "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' },
- { "jitter", required_argument, NULL, 'j' },
- { "log-level", required_argument, NULL, 'l' },
- { "unauthenticated", required_argument, NULL, 'u' },
- { "use-stderr", no_argument, NULL, 'e' },
- { "use-syslog", no_argument, NULL, 's' },
- { "version", no_argument, NULL, 'V' },
- { "xml-file", required_argument, NULL, 'x' },
- { NULL }
-};
-
-/**
- * Wrapper around printf() to take arguments like logmsg().
- * If C had closures, usage() would use them instead of this silliness.
- */
-static void logmsg_printf(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc,
- const log_level_t level,
- const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- vprintf(fmt, ap);
- putchar('\n');
- va_end(ap);
-}
-
-/**
- * Log usage message, either to stdout (for --help) or via logmsg().
- */
-static void usage (const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const char *jane)
-{
- void (*log)(const rcynic_ctx_t *, const log_level_t, const char *, ...) = rc ? logmsg : logmsg_printf;
- char left[80];
-
- if (rc && !jane)
- jane = rc->jane;
-
- log(rc, log_usage_err, "usage: %s [options]", jane);
- log(rc, log_usage_err, "options:");
-
-#define QF(_s_, _l_, _d_) \
- (void) snprintf(left, sizeof(left), "-%c --%-32s", _s_, _l_); \
- log(rc, log_usage_err, " %s%s", left, _d_);
-
-#define QA(_s_, _l_, _d_) \
- (void) snprintf(left, sizeof(left), "-%c ARG --%-32s", _s_, _l_ " ARG"); \
- log(rc, log_usage_err, " %s%s", left, _d_);
-
- OPTIONS;
-
-#undef QA
-#undef QF
-}
-
-/**
- * Main program. Parse command line, read config file, iterate over
- * trust anchors found via config file and do a tree walk for each
- * trust anchor.
- */
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-{
- int opt_jitter = 0, use_syslog = 0, use_stderr = 0, syslog_facility = 0;
- int opt_syslog = 0, opt_stderr = 0, opt_level = 0, prune = 1;
- int opt_auth = 0, opt_unauth = 0, keep_lockfile = 0;
- char *lockfile = NULL, *xmlfile = NULL;
- char *cfg_file = "rcynic.conf";
- int c, i, ret = 1, jitter = 600, lockfd = -1;
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *cfg_section = NULL;
- CONF *cfg_handle = NULL;
- time_t start = 0, finish;
- rcynic_ctx_t rc;
- unsigned delay;
- long eline = 0;
- path_t ta_dir;
-
-#define QF(_s_, _l_, _d_) _s_,
-#define QA(_s_, _l_, _d_) _s_, ':',
-
- const static char short_opts[] = { OPTIONS '\0' };
-
-#undef QA
-#undef QF
-
-#define QF(_s_, _l_, _d_) { _l_, no_argument, NULL, _s_ },
-#define QA(_s_, _l_, _d_) { _l_, required_argument, NULL, _s_ },
-
- static struct option long_opts[] = { OPTIONS { NULL } };
-
-#undef QA
-#undef QF
-
- memset(&rc, 0, sizeof(rc));
-
- if ((rc.jane = strrchr(argv[0], '/')) == NULL)
- rc.jane = argv[0];
- else
- rc.jane++;
-
- rc.log_level = log_data_err;
- rc.allow_stale_crl = 1;
- rc.allow_stale_manifest = 1;
- rc.allow_digest_mismatch = 1;
- rc.allow_crl_digest_mismatch = 1;
- rc.allow_nonconformant_name = 1;
- rc.allow_ee_without_signedObject = 1;
- rc.allow_1024_bit_ee_key = 1;
- rc.allow_wrong_cms_si_attributes = 1;
- rc.max_parallel_fetches = 1;
- rc.max_retries = 3;
- rc.retry_wait_min = 30;
- rc.run_rsync = 1;
- rc.rsync_timeout = 300;
- rc.max_select_time = 30;
- rc.rsync_early = 1;
-
-#define QQ(x,y) rc.priority[x] = y;
- LOG_LEVELS;
-#undef QQ
-
- if (!set_directory(&rc, &rc.authenticated, "rcynic-data/authenticated", 0) ||
- !set_directory(&rc, &rc.unauthenticated, "rcynic-data/unauthenticated/", 1))
- goto done;
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-
- if (!create_missing_nids()) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't initialize missing OIDs!");
- goto done;
- }
-
- memset(&ta_dir, 0, sizeof(ta_dir));
-
- opterr = 0;
-
- while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, short_opts, long_opts, NULL)) > 0) {
- switch (c) {
- case 'a':
- opt_auth = 1;
- if (!set_directory(&rc, &rc.authenticated, optarg, 0))
- goto done;
- break;
- case 'c':
- cfg_file = optarg;
- break;
- case 'l':
- opt_level = 1;
- if (!configure_logmsg(&rc, optarg))
- goto done;
- break;
- case 's':
- use_syslog = opt_syslog = 1;
- break;
- case 'e':
- use_stderr = opt_stderr = 1;
- break;
- case 'h':
- usage(NULL, rc.jane);
- ret = 0;
- goto done;
- case 'j':
- if (!configure_integer(&rc, &jitter, optarg))
- goto done;
- opt_jitter = 1;
- break;
- case 'u':
- opt_unauth = 1;
- if (!set_directory(&rc, &rc.unauthenticated, optarg, 1))
- goto done;
- break;
- case 'V':
- puts(svn_id);
- ret = 0;
- goto done;
- case 'x':
- xmlfile = strdup(optarg);
- break;
- default:
- usage(&rc, NULL);
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- if (!(asn1_zero = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, "0x0")) ||
- !(asn1_four_octets = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, "0xFFFFFFFF")) ||
- !(asn1_twenty_octets = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF")) ||
- !(NID_binary_signing_time = OBJ_create("1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46",
- "id-aa-binarySigningTime",
- "id-aa-binarySigningTime"))) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't initialize ASN.1 constants!");
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((cfg_handle = NCONF_new(NULL)) == NULL) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't create CONF opbject");
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (NCONF_load(cfg_handle, cfg_file, &eline) <= 0) {
- if (eline <= 0)
- logmsg(&rc, log_usage_err, "Couldn't load config file %s", cfg_file);
- else
- logmsg(&rc, log_usage_err, "Error on line %ld of config file %s", eline, cfg_file);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (CONF_modules_load(cfg_handle, NULL, 0) <= 0) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't configure OpenSSL");
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((cfg_section = NCONF_get_section(cfg_handle, "rcynic")) == NULL) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_usage_err, "Couldn't load rcynic section from config file");
- goto done;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cfg_section); i++) {
- CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(cfg_section, i);
-
- assert(val && val->name && val->value);
-
- if (!opt_auth &&
- !name_cmp(val->name, "authenticated") &&
- !set_directory(&rc, &rc.authenticated, val->value, 0))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!opt_unauth &&
- !name_cmp(val->name, "unauthenticated") &&
- !set_directory(&rc, &rc.unauthenticated, val->value, 1))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "trust-anchor-directory") &&
- !set_directory(&rc, &ta_dir, val->value, 0))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "rsync-timeout") &&
- !configure_integer(&rc, &rc.rsync_timeout, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "max-parallel-fetches") &&
- !configure_integer(&rc, &rc.max_parallel_fetches, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "max-select-time") &&
- !configure_unsigned_integer(&rc, &rc.max_select_time, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "rsync-program"))
- rc.rsync_program = strdup(val->value);
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "lockfile"))
- lockfile = strdup(val->value);
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "keep-lockfile") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &keep_lockfile, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!opt_jitter &&
- !name_cmp(val->name, "jitter") &&
- !configure_integer(&rc, &jitter, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!opt_level &&
- !name_cmp(val->name, "log-level") &&
- !configure_logmsg(&rc, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!opt_syslog &&
- !name_cmp(val->name, "use-syslog") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &use_syslog, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!opt_stderr &&
- !name_cmp(val->name, "use-stderr") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &use_stderr, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "syslog-facility") &&
- !configure_syslog(&rc, &syslog_facility,
- facilitynames, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!xmlfile &&
- (!name_cmp(val->name, "xml-file") ||
- !name_cmp(val->name, "xml-summary")))
- xmlfile = strdup(val->value);
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-stale-crl") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_stale_crl, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-stale-manifest") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_stale_manifest, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-non-self-signed-trust-anchor") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_non_self_signed_trust_anchor, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "require-crl-in-manifest") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.require_crl_in_manifest, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-object-not-in-manifest") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_object_not_in_manifest, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-digest-mismatch") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_digest_mismatch, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-crl-digest-mismatch") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_crl_digest_mismatch, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "use-links") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.use_links, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "prune") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &prune, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "run-rsync") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.run_rsync, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-nonconformant-name") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_nonconformant_name, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-ee-without-signedObject") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_ee_without_signedObject, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-1024-bit-ee-key") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_1024_bit_ee_key, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-wrong-cms-si-attributes") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_wrong_cms_si_attributes, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "rsync-early") &&
- !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.rsync_early, val->value))
- goto done;
-
- /*
- * Ugly, but the easiest way to handle all these strings.
- */
-
-#define QQ(x,y) \
- else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "syslog-priority-" #x) && \
- !configure_syslog(&rc, &rc.priority[x], \
- prioritynames, val->value)) \
- goto done;
-
- LOG_LEVELS; /* the semicolon is for emacs */
-
-#undef QQ
-
- }
-
- if ((rc.rsync_history = sk_rsync_history_t_new(rsync_history_cmp)) == NULL) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate rsync_history stack");
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((rc.validation_status = sk_validation_status_t_new_null()) == NULL) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate validation_status stack");
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((rc.x509_store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate X509_STORE");
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((rc.rsync_queue = sk_rsync_ctx_t_new_null()) == NULL) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate rsync_queue");
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((rc.task_queue = sk_task_t_new_null()) == NULL) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate task_queue");
- goto done;
- }
-
- rc.use_syslog = use_syslog;
-
- if (use_syslog)
- openlog(rc.jane,
- LOG_PID | (use_stderr ? LOG_PERROR : 0),
- (syslog_facility ? syslog_facility : LOG_LOCAL0));
-
- if (jitter > 0) {
- if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *) &delay, sizeof(delay)) <= 0) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't read random bytes");
- goto done;
- }
- delay %= jitter;
- logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry, "Delaying %u seconds before startup", delay);
- while (delay > 0)
- delay = sleep(delay);
- }
-
- if (lockfile &&
- ((lockfd = open(lockfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_NONBLOCK, 0666)) < 0 ||
- lockf(lockfd, F_TLOCK, 0) < 0)) {
- if (lockfd >= 0 && errno == EAGAIN)
- logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry, "Lock %s held by another process", lockfile);
- else
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Problem locking %s: %s", lockfile, strerror(errno));
- lockfd = -1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- start = time(0);
- logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry, "Starting");
-
- if (!construct_directory_names(&rc))
- goto done;
-
- if (!access(rc.new_authenticated.s, F_OK)) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err,
- "Timestamped output directory %s already exists! Clock went backwards?",
- rc.new_authenticated.s);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!mkdir_maybe(&rc, &rc.new_authenticated)) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't prepare directory %s: %s",
- rc.new_authenticated.s, strerror(errno));
- goto done;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cfg_section); i++) {
- CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(cfg_section, i);
-
- assert(val && val->name && val->value);
-
- if (!name_cmp(val->name, "trust-anchor-uri-with-key") ||
- !name_cmp(val->name, "indirect-trust-anchor")) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_usage_err,
- "Directive \"%s\" is obsolete -- please use \"trust-anchor-locator\" instead",
- val->name);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((!name_cmp(val->name, "trust-anchor") && !check_ta_cer(&rc, val->value)) ||
- (!name_cmp(val->name, "trust-anchor-locator") && !check_ta_tal(&rc, val->value)))
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (*ta_dir.s != '\0' && !check_ta_dir(&rc, ta_dir.s))
- goto done;
-
- while (sk_task_t_num(rc.task_queue) > 0 || sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc.rsync_queue) > 0) {
- task_run_q(&rc);
- rsync_mgr(&rc);
- }
-
- logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry, "Event loop done, beginning final output and cleanup");
-
- if (!finalize_directories(&rc))
- goto done;
-
- if (prune && rc.run_rsync &&
- !prune_unauthenticated(&rc, &rc.unauthenticated,
- strlen(rc.unauthenticated.s))) {
- logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Trouble pruning old unauthenticated data");
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (!write_xml_file(&rc, xmlfile))
- goto done;
-
- ret = 0;
-
- done:
- log_openssl_errors(&rc);
-
- /*
- * Do NOT free cfg_section, NCONF_free() takes care of that
- */
- sk_validation_status_t_pop_free(rc.validation_status, validation_status_t_free);
- sk_rsync_history_t_pop_free(rc.rsync_history, rsync_history_t_free);
- validation_status_t_free(rc.validation_status_in_waiting);
- X509_STORE_free(rc.x509_store);
- NCONF_free(cfg_handle);
- CONF_modules_free();
- EVP_cleanup();
- ERR_free_strings();
- if (rc.rsync_program)
- free(rc.rsync_program);
- if (lockfile && lockfd >= 0 && !keep_lockfile)
- unlink(lockfile);
- if (lockfile)
- free(lockfile);
- if (xmlfile)
- free(xmlfile);
-
- if (start) {
- finish = time(0);
- logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry,
- "Finished, elapsed time %u:%02u:%02u",
- (unsigned) ((finish - start) / 3600),
- (unsigned) ((finish - start) / 60 % 60),
- (unsigned) ((finish - start) % 60));
- }
-
- return ret;
-}