/* p5_pbev2.c */ /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL * project 1999-2004. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include /* PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption structures */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBE2PARAM) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PBE2PARAM, keyfunc, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(PBE2PARAM, encryption, X509_ALGOR) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBE2PARAM) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBE2PARAM) ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBKDF2PARAM) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PBKDF2PARAM, salt, ASN1_ANY), ASN1_SIMPLE(PBKDF2PARAM, iter, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_OPT(PBKDF2PARAM, keylength, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_OPT(PBKDF2PARAM, prf, X509_ALGOR) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBKDF2PARAM) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBKDF2PARAM) /* Return an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithm: * yes I know this is horrible! */ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen) { X509_ALGOR *scheme = NULL, *kalg = NULL, *ret = NULL; int alg_nid; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL; PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *osalt = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; alg_nid = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher); if(alg_nid == NID_undef) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET, ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); goto err; } obj = OBJ_nid2obj(alg_nid); if(!(pbe2 = PBE2PARAM_new())) goto merr; /* Setup the AlgorithmIdentifier for the encryption scheme */ scheme = pbe2->encryption; scheme->algorithm = obj; if(!(scheme->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new())) goto merr; /* Create random IV */ if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) && RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) < 0) goto err; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); /* Dummy cipherinit to just setup the IV */ EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, iv, 0); if(EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(&ctx, scheme->parameter) < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET, ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); goto err; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); if(!(kdf = PBKDF2PARAM_new())) goto merr; if(!(osalt = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new())) goto merr; if (!saltlen) saltlen = PKCS5_SALT_LEN; if (!(osalt->data = OPENSSL_malloc (saltlen))) goto merr; osalt->length = saltlen; if (salt) memcpy (osalt->data, salt, saltlen); else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes (osalt->data, saltlen) < 0) goto merr; if(iter <= 0) iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER; if(!ASN1_INTEGER_set(kdf->iter, iter)) goto merr; /* Now include salt in kdf structure */ kdf->salt->value.octet_string = osalt; kdf->salt->type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; osalt = NULL; /* If its RC2 then we'd better setup the key length */ if(alg_nid == NID_rc2_cbc) { if(!(kdf->keylength = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new())) goto merr; if(!ASN1_INTEGER_set (kdf->keylength, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher))) goto merr; } /* prf can stay NULL because we are using hmacWithSHA1 */ /* Now setup the PBE2PARAM keyfunc structure */ pbe2->keyfunc->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_pbkdf2); /* Encode PBKDF2PARAM
=pod

=head1 NAME

RAND_add, RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen - add
entropy to the PRNG

=head1 SYNOPSIS

 #include <openssl/rand.h>

 void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);

 void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);

 int  RAND_status(void);

 int  RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);
 void RAND_screen(void);

=head1 DESCRIPTION

RAND_add() mixes the B<num> bytes at B<buf> into the PRNG state. Thus,
if the data at B<buf> are unpredictable to an adversary, this
increases the uncertainty about the state and makes the PRNG output
less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random
key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The
B<entropy> argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much
randomness is contained in B<buf>, measured in bytes. Details about
sources of randomness and how to estimate their entropy can be found
in the literature, e.g. RFC 1750.

RAND_add() may be called with sensitive data such as user entered
passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output.

OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state is unique for each thread. On
systems that provide C</dev/urandom>, the randomness device is used
to seed the PRNG transparently. However, on all other systems, the
application is responsible for seeding the PRNG by calling RAND_add(),
L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>
or L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>.

RAND_seed() is equivalent to RAND_add() when B<num == entropy>.

RAND_event() collects the entropy from Windows events such as mouse
movements and other user interaction. It should be called with the
B<iMsg>, B<wParam> and B<lParam> arguments of I<all> messages sent to
the window procedure. It will estimate the entropy contained in the
event message (if any), and add it to the PRNG. The program can then
process the messages as usual.

The RAND_screen() function is available for the convenience of Windows
programmers. It adds the current contents of the screen to the PRNG.
For applications that can catch Windows events, seeding the PRNG by
calling RAND_event() is a significantly better source of
randomness. It should be noted that both methods cannot be used on
servers that run without user interaction.

=head1 RETURN VALUES

RAND_status() and RAND_event() return 1 if the PRNG has been seeded
with enough data, 0 otherwise.

The other functions do not return values.

=head1 SEE ALSO

L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>,
L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>, L<RAND_cleanup(3)|RAND_cleanup(3)>

=head1 HISTORY

RAND_seed() and RAND_screen() are available in all versions of SSLeay
and OpenSSL. RAND_add() and RAND_status() have been added in OpenSSL
0.9.5, RAND_event() in OpenSSL 0.9.5a.

=cut