diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ext/POW.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ext/POW.c | 152 |
1 files changed, 106 insertions, 46 deletions
@@ -1350,7 +1350,16 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bc = NULL; unsigned char ski_hashbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned ski_hashlen, afi; - int i, ok, crit, loc, ex_count, is_ca, routercert = 0, ret = 0; + int i, ok, crit, loc, ex_count, is_ca = 0, routercert = 0, ret = 0; + + /* + * We don't use X509_check_ca() to check whether the certificate is + * a CA, because it's not paranoid enough to enforce the RPKI + * certificate profile, but we still call it because we need it (or + * something) to invoke x509v3_cache_extensions() for us. + */ + + (void) X509_check_ca(x); if (!check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notBefore(x)) || !check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notAfter(x))) @@ -1373,23 +1382,24 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, * API functions for them. We wouldn't bother either if they * weren't forbidden by the RPKI certificate profile. */ + if (!x->cert_info || x->cert_info->issuerUID || x->cert_info->subjectUID) record_validation_status(status, NONCONFORMANT_CERTIFICATE_UID); /* - * Keep track of allowed extensions we've seen. Once we've - * processed all the ones we expect, anything left is an error. + * Public key checks postponed until we've checked extensions (in + * particular, until we've checked Basic Constraints and know + * whether to apply the CA or EE rules). */ - ex_count = X509_get_ext_count(x); /* - * We don't use X509_check_ca() to check whether the certificate is - * a CA, because it's not paranoid enough to enforce the RPKI - * certificate profile, but we still call it because we need it (or - * something) to invoke x509v3_cache_extensions() for us. + * Keep track of allowed extensions we've seen. Once we've + * processed all the ones we expect, anything left is an error. */ - (void) X509_check_ca(x); + ex_count = X509_get_ext_count(x); + + /* Critical */ if ((bc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { ex_count--; if (!crit || bc->ca <= 0 || bc->pathlen != NULL) @@ -1403,21 +1413,58 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, /* * Check for presence of AIA, SIA, and CRLDP, and make sure that - * they're in the correct format, but leave checking of the URIs for - * Python code. + * they're in the correct format, but leave checking of the URIs + * themselves for Python code to handle. */ -#warning Why are we not checking the critical flag on these extensions? -#warning We may need to check that these extensions only contain URIs (see extract_crldp_uri() and extract_access_uri()) - - if ((aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) + /* Non-criticial */ + if ((aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { ex_count--; + if (crit) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + ok = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia) > 0; + for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia); i++) { + ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, i); + ok = (a != NULL && a->location->type == GEN_URI || + OBJ_obj2nid(a->method) == NID_ad_ca_issuers); + } + if (!ok) + record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_AIA_EXTENSION); + } - if ((sia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sinfo_access, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) + /* Non-criticial */ + if ((sia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sinfo_access, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { ex_count--; + if (crit) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + ok = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia) > 0; + for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia); i++) { + ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(sia, i); + int nid = a == NULL ? NID_undef : OBJ_obj2nid(a->method); + ok = (a != NULL && a->location->type == GEN_URI && + (nid == NID_caRepository || nid == NID_ad_rpkiManifest || + nid == NID_ad_signedObject || nid == NID_ad_rpkiNotify)); + } + if (!ok) + record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_SIA_EXTENSION); + } - if ((crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) + /* Non-critical */ + if ((crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, 0); ex_count--; + if (crit) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + ok = (sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp) == 1 && + dp->reasons == NULL && dp->CRLissuer == NULL && + dp->distpoint != NULL && dp->distpoint->type == 0); + for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname); i++) { + GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, i); + ok = gn != NULL && gn->type == GEN_URI; + } + if (!ok) + record_validation_status(status, MALFORMED_CRLDP_EXTENSION); + } #warning Too many things need to know whether we are looking at a router cert, need a signaling mechanism /* @@ -1431,6 +1478,7 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, * API default of None, obviously, which again is a good match. */ + /* Non-critical */ if ((eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { ex_count--; if (crit || is_ca || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku) == 0) @@ -1440,6 +1488,7 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, routercert |= OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i)) == NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router; } + /* Critical */ if ((policies = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_certificate_policies, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { POLICYQUALINFO *qualifier = NULL; POLICYINFO *policy = NULL; @@ -1456,6 +1505,7 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, record_validation_status(status, POLICY_QUALIFIER_CPS); } + /* Critical */ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0) record_validation_status(status, KEY_USAGE_MISSING); else { @@ -1465,6 +1515,7 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, record_validation_status(status, BAD_KEY_USAGE); } + /* Critical */ if (x->rfc3779_addr) { ex_count--; if (routercert || @@ -1484,6 +1535,7 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, } } + /* Critical */ if (x->rfc3779_asid) { ex_count--; if ((loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, -1)) < 0 || @@ -1498,6 +1550,38 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, if (!x->rfc3779_addr && !x->rfc3779_asid) record_validation_status(status, MISSING_RESOURCES); + /* Non-critical */ + if (!x->skid) + record_validation_status(status, SKI_EXTENSION_MISSING); + else { + ex_count--; + if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1)))) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + if ((ski_pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(x)) == NULL || + !EVP_Digest(ski_pubkey->data, ski_pubkey->length, + ski_hashbuf, &ski_hashlen, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || + ski_hashlen != 20 || + ski_hashlen != x->skid->length || + memcmp(ski_hashbuf, x->skid->data, ski_hashlen)) + record_validation_status(status, SKI_PUBLIC_KEY_MISMATCH); + } + + /* Non-critical */ + if (x->akid) { + ex_count--; + if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, -1)))) + record_validation_status(status, GRATUITOUSLY_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + if (!x->akid->keyid || x->akid->serial || x->akid->issuer) + record_validation_status(status, AKI_EXTENSION_WRONG_FORMAT); + } + + if (ex_count > 0) + record_validation_status(status, DISALLOWED_X509V3_EXTENSION); + + /* + * Public key checks. + */ + subject_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); ok = subject_pkey != NULL; if (ok) { @@ -1514,13 +1598,11 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, break; case NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey: - ok = !is_ca && routercert; - /* - * Perhaps this should also be testing: - * - * && EVP_PKEY_type(subject_pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_EC) - * && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(subject_pkey->pkey.ec)) == NID_X9_62_prime_field - */ + if (routercert) + ok = (EVP_PKEY_type(subject_pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_EC && + EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(subject_pkey->pkey.ec)) == NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + else + ok = 0; break; default: @@ -1530,31 +1612,9 @@ static int check_x509(X509 *x, if (!ok) record_validation_status(status, BAD_PUBLIC_KEY); - if (!x->skid) - record_validation_status(status, SKI_EXTENSION_MISSING); - else { - ex_count--; - if ((ski_pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(x)) == NULL || - !EVP_Digest(ski_pubkey->data, ski_pubkey->length, - ski_hashbuf, &ski_hashlen, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || - ski_hashlen != 20 || - ski_hashlen != x->skid->length || - memcmp(ski_hashbuf, x->skid->data, ski_hashlen)) - record_validation_status(status, SKI_PUBLIC_KEY_MISMATCH); - } - - if (x->akid) { - ex_count--; - if (!x->akid->keyid || x->akid->serial || x->akid->issuer) - record_validation_status(status, AKI_EXTENSION_WRONG_FORMAT); - } - if ((issuer_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer)) == NULL || X509_verify(x, issuer_pkey) <= 0) record_validation_status(status, CERTIFICATE_BAD_SIGNATURE); - if (ex_count > 0) - record_validation_status(status, DISALLOWED_X509V3_EXTENSION); - #warning Move policy stuff to optional OID in base X509.verify() /* * It seems that the only reason we have for needing the |