diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/trunk/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl/trunk/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 1541 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1541 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/trunk/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/trunk/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c deleted file mode 100644 index 00981706..00000000 --- a/openssl/trunk/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1541 +0,0 @@ -/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <time.h> -#include <errno.h> - -#include "cryptlib.h" -#include <openssl/crypto.h> -#include <openssl/lhash.h> -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/asn1.h> -#include <openssl/x509.h> -#include <openssl/x509v3.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> - -static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); -static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); -static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); -static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); -static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); -static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); -static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); -static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); -static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); -const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; - - -static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) - { - return ok; - } - -#if 0 -static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) - { - return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); - } -#endif - -int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; - X509_NAME *xn; - int bad_chain = 0; - X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; - int depth,i,ok=0; - int num; - int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); - STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; - if (ctx->cert == NULL) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); - return -1; - } - - cb=ctx->verify_cb; - - /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is - * present and that the first entry is in place */ - if (ctx->chain == NULL) - { - if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || - (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto end; - } - CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - ctx->last_untrusted=1; - } - - /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ - if (ctx->untrusted != NULL - && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto end; - } - - num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); - x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); - depth=param->depth; - - - for (;;) - { - /* If we have enough, we break */ - if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take - * note of it and, if appropriate, use the - * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error - * code later. - */ - - /* If we are self signed, we break */ - xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); - if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; - - /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ - if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) - { - xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); - if (xtmp != NULL) - { - if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto end; - } - CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); - ctx->last_untrusted++; - x=xtmp; - num++; - /* reparse the full chain for - * the next one */ - continue; - } - } - break; - } - - /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted - * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, - * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ - - /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it - * is self signed. - */ - - i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); - x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); - xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); - if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) - { - /* we have a self signed certificate */ - if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) - { - /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if - * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact - * match to avoid possible impersonation. - */ - ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); - if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; - ctx->current_cert=x; - ctx->error_depth=i-1; - if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); - bad_chain = 1; - ok=cb(0,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - } - else - { - /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version - * so we get any trust settings. - */ - X509_free(x); - x = xtmp; - sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); - ctx->last_untrusted=0; - } - } - else - { - /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ - chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); - ctx->last_untrusted--; - num--; - x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); - } - } - - /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ - for (;;) - { - /* If we have enough, we break */ - if (depth < num) break; - - /* If we are self signed, we break */ - xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); - if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; - - ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); - - if (ok < 0) return ok; - if (ok == 0) break; - - x = xtmp; - if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) - { - X509_free(xtmp); - X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - num++; - } - - /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ - xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); - - /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ - if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) - { - if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) - { - if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; - else - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; - ctx->current_cert=x; - } - else - { - - sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); - num++; - ctx->last_untrusted=num; - ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; - chain_ss=NULL; - } - - ctx->error_depth=num-1; - bad_chain = 1; - ok=cb(0,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - } - - /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ - ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); - - if (!ok) goto end; - - /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ - - if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); - - if (!ok) goto end; - - /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ - X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); - - /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters - * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. - */ - - ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); - if(!ok) goto end; - - /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ - if (ctx->verify != NULL) - ok=ctx->verify(ctx); - else - ok=internal_verify(ctx); - if(!ok) goto end; - -#ifdef OPENSSL_RFC3779 - /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ - ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; -#endif - - /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ - if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) - ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); - if(!ok) goto end; - if (0) - { -end: - X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); - } - if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); - if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); - return ok; - } - - -/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) - */ - -static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) -{ - int i; - X509 *issuer; - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) - { - issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); - if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) - return issuer; - } - return NULL; -} - -/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ - -static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) -{ - int ret; - ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); - if (ret == X509_V_OK) - return 1; - /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ - if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) - return 0; - - ctx->error = ret; - ctx->current_cert = x; - ctx->current_issuer = issuer; - return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - return 0; -} - -/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ - -static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) -{ - *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); - if (*issuer) - { - CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - return 1; - } - else - return 0; -} - - -/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency - * with the supplied purpose - */ - -static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) -{ -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY - return 1; -#else - int i, ok=0, must_be_ca; - X509 *x; - int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); - int proxy_path_length = 0; - int allow_proxy_certs = - !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); - cb=ctx->verify_cb; - - /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: - -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct - use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). - 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not - used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. - 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for - all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. - */ - must_be_ca = -1; - - /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software - happy */ - if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) - allow_proxy_certs = 1; - - /* Check all untrusted certificates */ - for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) - { - int ret; - x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); - if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) - && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) - { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; - ctx->error_depth = i; - ctx->current_cert = x; - ok=cb(0,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - } - if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) - { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; - ctx->error_depth = i; - ctx->current_cert = x; - ok=cb(0,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - } - ret = X509_check_ca(x); - switch(must_be_ca) - { - case -1: - if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) - && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) - { - ret = 0; - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; - } - else - ret = 1; - break; - case 0: - if (ret != 0) - { - ret = 0; - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; - } - else - ret = 1; - break; - default: - if ((ret == 0) - || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) - && (ret != 1))) - { - ret = 0; - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; - } - else - ret = 1; - break; - } - if (ret == 0) - { - ctx->error_depth = i; - ctx->current_cert = x; - ok=cb(0,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - } - if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) - { - ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose, - must_be_ca > 0); - if ((ret == 0) - || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) - && (ret != 1))) - { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; - ctx->error_depth = i; - ctx->current_cert = x; - ok=cb(0,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - } - } - /* Check pathlen */ - if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) - && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) - { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; - ctx->error_depth = i; - ctx->current_cert = x; - ok=cb(0,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - } - /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next - certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE - certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a - CA certificate. */ - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) - { - if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) - { - ctx->error = - X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; - ctx->error_depth = i; - ctx->current_cert = x; - ok=cb(0,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - } - proxy_path_length++; - must_be_ca = 0; - } - else - must_be_ca = 1; - } - ok = 1; - end: - return ok; -#endif -} - -static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) -{ -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY - return 1; -#else - int i, ok; - X509 *x; - int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); - cb=ctx->verify_cb; -/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ - i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; - x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); - ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); - if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) - return 1; - ctx->error_depth = i; - ctx->current_cert = x; - if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; - else - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; - ok = cb(0, ctx); - return ok; -#endif -} - -static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - int i, last, ok; - if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) - return 1; - if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) - last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; - else - last = 0; - for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) - { - ctx->error_depth = i; - ok = check_cert(ctx); - if (!ok) return ok; - } - return 1; - } - -static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - X509_CRL *crl = NULL; - X509 *x; - int ok, cnum; - cnum = ctx->error_depth; - x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); - ctx->current_cert = x; - /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ - ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); - /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except - * notify callback - */ - if(!ok) - { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; - ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - goto err; - } - ctx->current_crl = crl; - ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); - if (!ok) goto err; - ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); - err: - ctx->current_crl = NULL; - X509_CRL_free(crl); - return ok; - - } - -/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ - -static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) - { - time_t *ptime; - int i; - ctx->current_crl = crl; - if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) - ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; - else - ptime = NULL; - - i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); - if (i == 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; - if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; - } - - if (i > 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; - if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; - } - - if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) - { - i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); - - if (i == 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; - if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; - } - - if (i < 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; - if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; - } - } - - ctx->current_crl = NULL; - - return 1; - } - -/* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name - * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one - * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise - * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but - * was invalid. - */ - -static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, - X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) - { - int i; - X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) - { - crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); - if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) - continue; - if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) - { - *pcrl = crl; - CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - return 1; - } - best_crl = crl; - } - if (best_crl) - { - *pcrl = best_crl; - CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - } - - return 0; - } - -/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a - * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later... - */ -static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x) - { - int ok; - X509_CRL *crl = NULL; - X509_OBJECT xobj; - X509_NAME *nm; - nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); - ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls); - if (ok) - { - *pcrl = crl; - return 1; - } - - ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj); - - if (!ok) - { - /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ - if (crl) - { - *pcrl = crl; - return 1; - } - return 0; - } - - *pcrl = xobj.data.crl; - if (crl) - X509_CRL_free(crl); - return 1; - } - -/* Check CRL validity */ -static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) - { - X509 *issuer = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; - int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; - cnum = ctx->error_depth; - chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; - /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer - * is next certificate in chain. - */ - if(cnum < chnum) - issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); - else - { - issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); - /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ - if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) - { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; - ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - if(!ok) goto err; - } - } - - if(issuer) - { - /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ - if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && - !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) - { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; - ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - if(!ok) goto err; - } - - /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ - ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); - - if(!ikey) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; - ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - if (!ok) goto err; - } - else - { - /* Verify CRL signature */ - if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; - ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - if (!ok) goto err; - } - } - } - - ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); - if (!ok) - goto err; - - ok = 1; - - err: - EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); - return ok; - } - -/* Check certificate against CRL */ -static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) - { - int idx, ok; - X509_REVOKED rtmp; - STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; - X509_EXTENSION *ext; - /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */ - rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x); - /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. - * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition. - */ - if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked)) - { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); - sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); - } - idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp); - /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than - * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs. - */ - if(idx >= 0) - { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; - ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - if (!ok) return 0; - } - - if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) - return 1; - - /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we - * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be - * rejected. - * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications - * shouldn't do this. - */ - - exts = crl->crl->extensions; - - for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) - { - ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx); - if (ext->critical > 0) - { - ctx->error = - X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; - ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - if(!ok) return 0; - break; - } - } - return 1; - } - -static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - int ret; - ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, - ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); - if (ret == 0) - { - X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ - if (ret == -1) - { - /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify - * callback. - */ - X509 *x; - int i; - for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) - { - x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) - continue; - ctx->current_cert = x; - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; - ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - } - return 1; - } - if (ret == -2) - { - ctx->current_cert = NULL; - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; - return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); - } - - if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) - { - ctx->current_cert = NULL; - ctx->error = X509_V_OK; - if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) - return 0; - } - - return 1; - } - -static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) - { - time_t *ptime; - int i; - - if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) - ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; - else - ptime = NULL; - - i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); - if (i == 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; - ctx->current_cert=x; - if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; - } - - if (i > 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; - ctx->current_cert=x; - if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; - } - - i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); - if (i == 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; - ctx->current_cert=x; - if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; - } - - if (i < 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; - ctx->current_cert=x; - if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; - } - - return 1; - } - -static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - int ok=0,n; - X509 *xs,*xi; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); - - cb=ctx->verify_cb; - - n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); - ctx->error_depth=n-1; - n--; - xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); - - if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) - xs=xi; - else - { - if (n <= 0) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; - ctx->current_cert=xi; - ok=cb(0,ctx); - goto end; - } - else - { - n--; - ctx->error_depth=n; - xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); - } - } - -/* ctx->error=0; not needed */ - while (n >= 0) - { - ctx->error_depth=n; - if (!xs->valid) - { - if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; - ctx->current_cert=xi; - ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - } - else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) - /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert, - * this is a waste of time. That check should - * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be - * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but - * we don't verify again and again in SSL - * handshakes and the like once the cert has - * been declared trusted. */ - { - ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; - ctx->current_cert=xs; - ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); - if (!ok) - { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - goto end; - } - } - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - pkey=NULL; - } - - xs->valid = 1; - - ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); - if (!ok) - goto end; - - /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ - ctx->current_issuer=xi; - ctx->current_cert=xs; - ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); - if (!ok) goto end; - - n--; - if (n >= 0) - { - xi=xs; - xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); - } - } - ok=1; -end: - return ok; - } - -int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm) -{ - return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); -} - -int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) - { - char *str; - ASN1_TIME atm; - long offset; - char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; - int i,j; - - p=buff1; - i=ctm->length; - str=(char *)ctm->data; - if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) - { - if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; - memcpy(p,str,10); - p+=10; - str+=10; - } - else - { - if (i < 13) return 0; - memcpy(p,str,12); - p+=12; - str+=12; - } - - if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) - { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } - else - { - *(p++)= *(str++); - *(p++)= *(str++); - /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ - if (*str == '.') - { - str++; - while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; - } - - } - *(p++)='Z'; - *(p++)='\0'; - - if (*str == 'Z') - offset=0; - else - { - if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) - return 0; - offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; - offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); - if (*str == '-') - offset= -offset; - } - atm.type=ctm->type; - atm.length=sizeof(buff2); - atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; - - if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) - return 0; - - if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) - { - i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); - if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ - j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); - if (j < 50) j+=100; - - if (i < j) return -1; - if (i > j) return 1; - } - i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); - if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ - return -1; - else - return i; - } - -ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) -{ - return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); -} - -ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm) - { - time_t t; - int type = -1; - - if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; - else time(&t); - - t+=adj; - if (s) type = s->type; - if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t); - if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t); - return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t); - } - -int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) - { - EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; - int i,j; - - if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; - - for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) - { - ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); - if (ktmp == NULL) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); - return 0; - } - if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) - break; - else - { - EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); - ktmp=NULL; - } - } - if (ktmp == NULL) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); - return 0; - } - - /* first, populate the other certs */ - for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) - { - ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); - EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); - EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); - } - - if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); - EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); - return 1; - } - -int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, - CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) - { - /* This function is (usually) called only once, by - * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ - return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, - new_func, dup_func, free_func); - } - -int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) - { - return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); - } - -void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) - { - return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); - } - -int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - return ctx->error; - } - -void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) - { - ctx->error=err; - } - -int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - return ctx->error_depth; - } - -X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - return ctx->current_cert; - } - -STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - return ctx->chain; - } - -STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - int i; - X509 *x; - STACK_OF(X509) *chain; - if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) - { - x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); - CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - } - return chain; - } - -void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) - { - ctx->cert=x; - } - -void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) - { - ctx->untrusted=sk; - } - -void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) - { - ctx->crls=sk; - } - -int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) - { - return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); - } - -int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) - { - return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); - } - -/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust - * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its - * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by - * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default - * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. - * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own - * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they - * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. - */ - -int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, - int purpose, int trust) -{ - int idx; - /* If purpose not set use default */ - if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; - /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ - if (purpose) - { - X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; - idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); - if (idx == -1) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, - X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); - return 0; - } - ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); - if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) - { - idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); - if (idx == -1) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, - X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); - return 0; - } - ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); - } - /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ - if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; - } - if (trust) - { - idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); - if (idx == -1) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, - X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); - return 0; - } - } - - if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; - if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; - return 1; -} - -X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) -{ - X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; - ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); - if (!ctx) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); - return ctx; -} - -void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) -{ - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); - OPENSSL_free(ctx); -} - -int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, - STACK_OF(X509) *chain) - { - int ret = 1; - ctx->ctx=store; - ctx->current_method=0; - ctx->cert=x509; - ctx->untrusted=chain; - ctx->crls = NULL; - ctx->last_untrusted=0; - ctx->other_ctx=NULL; - ctx->valid=0; - ctx->chain=NULL; - ctx->error=0; - ctx->explicit_policy=0; - ctx->error_depth=0; - ctx->current_cert=NULL; - ctx->current_issuer=NULL; - ctx->tree = NULL; - - ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); - - if (!ctx->param) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - - /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set - * use defaults. - */ - - - if (store) - ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); - else - ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; - - if (store) - { - ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; - ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; - } - else - ctx->cleanup = 0; - - if (ret) - ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); - - if (ret == 0) - { - X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - - if (store && store->check_issued) - ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; - else - ctx->check_issued = check_issued; - - if (store && store->get_issuer) - ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; - else - ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; - - if (store && store->verify_cb) - ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; - else - ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; - - if (store && store->verify) - ctx->verify = store->verify; - else - ctx->verify = internal_verify; - - if (store && store->check_revocation) - ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; - else - ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; - - if (store && store->get_crl) - ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; - else - ctx->get_crl = get_crl; - - if (store && store->check_crl) - ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; - else - ctx->check_crl = check_crl; - - if (store && store->cert_crl) - ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; - else - ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; - - ctx->check_policy = check_policy; - - - /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As - * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a - * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ - /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ - if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, - &(ctx->ex_data))) - { - OPENSSL_free(ctx); - X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - return 1; - } - -/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. - * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. - */ - -void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) -{ - ctx->other_ctx = sk; - ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; -} - -void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); - if (ctx->tree) - X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); - if (ctx->chain != NULL) - { - sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); - ctx->chain=NULL; - } - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); - memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); - } - -void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) - { - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); - } - -void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) - { - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); - } - -void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) - { - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); - } - -void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, - int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) - { - ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; - } - -X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - return ctx->tree; - } - -int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - return ctx->explicit_policy; - } - -int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) - { - const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; - param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); - if (!param) - return 0; - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); - } - -X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - { - return ctx->param; - } - -void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) - { - if (ctx->param) - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); - ctx->param = param; - } - -IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) -IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) - -IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) - -IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) -IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |