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path: root/openssl/trunk/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/trunk/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/trunk/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c145
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/trunk/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c b/openssl/trunk/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
index c9c679e9..f3185d1e 100644
--- a/openssl/trunk/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
+++ b/openssl/trunk/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
@@ -596,69 +596,107 @@ static int asid_contains(ASIdOrRanges *parent, ASIdOrRanges *child)
*/
#define validation_err(_err_) \
do { \
- ctx->error = _err_; \
- ctx->error_depth = i; \
- ctx->current_cert = x; \
- ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); \
+ if (ctx != NULL) { \
+ ctx->error = _err_; \
+ ctx->error_depth = i; \
+ ctx->current_cert = x; \
+ ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); \
+ } else { \
+ ret = 0; \
+ } \
if (!ret) \
goto done; \
} while (0)
/*
- * RFC 3779 3.3 path validation. Intended to be called from X509_verify_cert().
+ * Core code for RFC 3779 3.3 path validation.
*/
-int v3_asid_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ ASIdentifiers *resource_set)
{
ASIdOrRanges *child_as = NULL, *child_rdi = NULL;
int i, ret = 1, inherit_as = 0, inherit_rdi = 0;
X509 *x;
- assert(ctx->verify_cb);
+ assert(chain != NULL);
+ assert(ctx != NULL || resource_set != NULL);
+ assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL);
- /*
- * Start with the target certificate. If it doesn't have the extension,
- * we're done.
- */
- i = 0;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- assert(x != NULL);
- if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL)
- goto done;
+ if (resource_set != NULL) {
- /*
- * Has extension, have to check the whole chain. Make sure the
- * extension is in canonical form, then pull its resource lists
- * so we can check whether its parents had them to grant.
- */
- if (!v3_asid_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_asid))
- validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
- if (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum != NULL) {
- switch (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type) {
- case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
- inherit_as = 1;
- break;
- case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
- child_as = x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges;
- break;
+ /*
+ * Separate resource set. Check for canonical form, check for
+ * inheritance (not allowed in a resource set).
+ */
+ i = -1;
+ ret = v3_asid_is_canonical(resource_set);
+ if (ret && resource_set->asnum != NULL) {
+ switch (resource_set->asnum->type) {
+ case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
+ child_as = resource_set->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges;
+ break;
+ }
}
- }
- if (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL) {
- switch (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->type) {
- case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
- inherit_rdi = 1;
- break;
- case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
- child_rdi = x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges;
- break;
+ if (ret && resource_set->rdi != NULL) {
+ switch (resource_set->rdi->type) {
+ case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
+ child_rdi = resource_set->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ret)
+ goto done;
+
+ } else {
+
+ /*
+ * Starting with target certificate. If it doesn't have the
+ * extension, we're done. If it does, extension must be in
+ * canonical form, then we pull its resource lists so
+ * we can check whether its parents have them to grant.
+ */
+ i = 0;
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ assert(x != NULL);
+ if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL)
+ goto done;
+ if (!v3_asid_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_asid))
+ validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
+ if (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum != NULL) {
+ switch (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type) {
+ case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
+ inherit_as = 1;
+ break;
+ case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
+ child_as = x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL) {
+ switch (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->type) {
+ case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit:
+ inherit_rdi = 1;
+ break;
+ case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges:
+ child_rdi = x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
/*
- * Now walk up the chain. Extensions must be in canonical form, and
- * no cert may list resources that its parent doesn't list.
+ * Now walk up the chain. Extensions must be in canonical form, no
+ * cert may list resources that its parent doesn't list.
*/
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
assert(x != NULL);
if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL) {
if (child_as != NULL || child_rdi != NULL)
@@ -716,3 +754,22 @@ int v3_asid_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
#undef validation_err
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3779 3.3 path validation -- called from X509_verify_cert().
+ */
+int v3_asid_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return v3_asid_validate_path_internal(ctx, ctx->chain, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3779 3.3 path validation of a "resource set"
+ */
+int v3_asid_validate_resource_set(STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ ASIdentifiers *resource_set)
+{
+ if (chain == NULL || resource_set == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return v3_asid_validate_path_internal(NULL, chain, resource_set);
+}