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Diffstat (limited to 'rp/rcynic/rcynic.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | rp/rcynic/rcynic.c | 6070 |
1 files changed, 6070 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rp/rcynic/rcynic.c b/rp/rcynic/rcynic.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dea9c48f --- /dev/null +++ b/rp/rcynic/rcynic.c @@ -0,0 +1,6070 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2013--2014 Dragon Research Labs ("DRL") + * Portions copyright (C) 2009--2012 Internet Systems Consortium ("ISC") + * Portions copyright (C) 2006--2008 American Registry for Internet Numbers ("ARIN") + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notices and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DRL, ISC, AND ARIN DISCLAIM ALL + * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DRL, + * ISC, OR ARIN BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS + * OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION + * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* $Id$ */ + +/** + * @mainpage + * + * "Cynical rsync": Recursively walk RPKI tree using rsync to pull + * data from remote sites, validating certificates and CRLs as we go. + * + * Doxygen doesn't quite know what to make of a one-file C program, + * and ends up putting most of the interesting data @link rcynic.c + * here. @endlink + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/file.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <sys/signal.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <dirent.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <utime.h> +#include <glob.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <getopt.h> + +#define SYSLOG_NAMES /* defines CODE prioritynames[], facilitynames[] */ +#include <syslog.h> + +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> +#include <openssl/safestack.h> +#include <openssl/conf.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/asn1t.h> +#include <openssl/cms.h> + +#include <rpki/roa.h> +#include <rpki/manifest.h> + +#include "bio_f_linebreak.h" + +#include "defstack.h" + +#if !defined(FILENAME_MAX) && defined(PATH_MAX) && PATH_MAX > 1024 +#define FILENAME_MAX PATH_MAX +#elif !defined(FILENAME_MAX) +#define FILENAME_MAX 1024 +#endif + +#define SCHEME_RSYNC ("rsync://") +#define SIZEOF_RSYNC (sizeof(SCHEME_RSYNC) - 1) + +/** + * Maximum length of a hostname. + */ +#ifndef HOSTNAME_MAX +#define HOSTNAME_MAX 256 +#endif + +/** + * Maximum length of an URI. + */ +#define URI_MAX (SIZEOF_RSYNC + HOSTNAME_MAX + 1 + FILENAME_MAX) + +/** + * Maximum number of times we try to kill an inferior process before + * giving up. + */ +#define KILL_MAX 10 + +/** + * Version number of XML summary output. + */ +#define XML_SUMMARY_VERSION 1 + +/** + * How much buffer space do we need for a raw address? + */ +#define ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN 16 + +/** + * How many bytes is a SHA256 digest? + */ +#define HASH_SHA256_LEN 32 + +/** + * Logging levels. Same general idea as syslog(), but our own + * catagories based on what makes sense for this program. Default + * mappings to syslog() priorities are here because it's the easiest + * way to make sure that we assign a syslog level to each of ours. + */ + +#define LOG_LEVELS \ + QQ(log_sys_err, LOG_ERR) /* Error from OS or library */ \ + QQ(log_usage_err, LOG_ERR) /* Bad usage (local error) */ \ + QQ(log_data_err, LOG_NOTICE) /* Bad data, no biscuit */ \ + QQ(log_telemetry, LOG_INFO) /* Normal progress chatter */ \ + QQ(log_verbose, LOG_INFO) /* Extra chatter */ \ + QQ(log_debug, LOG_DEBUG) /* Only useful when debugging */ + +#define QQ(x,y) x , +typedef enum log_level { LOG_LEVELS LOG_LEVEL_T_MAX } log_level_t; +#undef QQ + +#define QQ(x,y) { #x , x }, +static const struct { + const char *name; + log_level_t value; +} log_levels[] = { + LOG_LEVELS +}; +#undef QQ + +/** + * MIB counters derived from OpenSSL. Long list of validation failure + * codes from OpenSSL (crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h). + */ + +#define MIB_COUNTERS_FROM_OPENSSL \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY) \ + QV(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE) + +/** + * MIB counters specific to rcynic. + */ + +#define MIB_COUNTERS \ + MIB_COUNTERS_FROM_OPENSSL \ + QB(aia_extension_missing, "AIA extension missing") \ + QB(aia_extension_forbidden, "AIA extension forbidden") \ + QB(aia_uri_missing, "AIA URI missing") \ + QB(aki_extension_issuer_mismatch, "AKI extension issuer mismatch") \ + QB(aki_extension_missing, "AKI extension missing") \ + QB(aki_extension_wrong_format, "AKI extension is wrong format") \ + QB(bad_asidentifiers, "Bad ASIdentifiers extension") \ + QB(bad_certificate_policy, "Bad certificate policy") \ + QB(bad_cms_econtenttype, "Bad CMS eContentType") \ + QB(bad_cms_si_contenttype, "Bad CMS SI ContentType") \ + QB(bad_cms_signer, "Bad CMS signer") \ + QB(bad_cms_signer_infos, "Bad CMS signerInfos") \ + QB(bad_crl, "Bad CRL") \ + QB(bad_ipaddrblocks, "Bad IPAddrBlocks extension") \ + QB(bad_key_usage, "Bad keyUsage") \ + QB(bad_manifest_digest_length, "Bad manifest digest length") \ + QB(bad_public_key, "Bad public key") \ + QB(bad_roa_asID, "Bad ROA asID") \ + QB(bad_certificate_serial_number, "Bad certificate serialNumber") \ + QB(bad_manifest_number, "Bad manifestNumber") \ + QB(certificate_bad_signature, "Bad certificate signature") \ + QB(certificate_failed_validation, "Certificate failed validation") \ + QB(cms_econtent_decode_error, "CMS eContent decode error") \ + QB(cms_includes_crls, "CMS includes CRLs") \ + QB(cms_signer_missing, "CMS signer missing") \ + QB(cms_ski_mismatch, "CMS SKI mismatch") \ + QB(cms_validation_failure, "CMS validation failure") \ + QB(crl_issuer_name_mismatch, "CRL issuer name mismatch") \ + QB(crl_not_in_manifest, "CRL not listed in manifest") \ + QB(crl_not_yet_valid, "CRL not yet valid") \ + QB(crl_number_extension_missing, "CRL number extension missing") \ + QB(crl_number_is_negative, "CRL number is negative") \ + QB(crl_number_out_of_range, "CRL number out of range") \ + QB(crldp_doesnt_match_issuer_sia, "CRLDP doesn't match issuer's SIA") \ + QB(crldp_uri_missing, "CRLDP URI missing") \ + QB(disallowed_x509v3_extension, "Disallowed X.509v3 extension") \ + QB(duplicate_name_in_manifest, "Duplicate name in manifest") \ + QB(inappropriate_eku_extension, "Inappropriate EKU extension") \ + QB(malformed_aia_extension, "Malformed AIA extension") \ + QB(malformed_sia_extension, "Malformed SIA extension") \ + QB(malformed_basic_constraints, "Malformed basicConstraints") \ + QB(malformed_trust_anchor, "Malformed trust anchor") \ + QB(malformed_cadirectory_uri, "Malformed caDirectory URI") \ + QB(malformed_crldp_extension, "Malformed CRDLP extension") \ + QB(malformed_crldp_uri, "Malformed CRDLP URI") \ + QB(malformed_roa_addressfamily, "Malformed ROA addressFamily") \ + QB(malformed_tal_uri, "Malformed TAL URI") \ + QB(manifest_carepository_mismatch, "Manifest caRepository mismatch") \ + QB(manifest_interval_overruns_cert, "Manifest interval overruns certificate") \ + QB(manifest_lists_missing_object, "Manifest lists missing object") \ + QB(manifest_not_yet_valid, "Manifest not yet valid") \ + QB(missing_resources, "Missing resources") \ + QB(nonconformant_asn1_time_value, "Nonconformant ASN.1 time value") \ + QB(nonconformant_public_key_algorithm,"Nonconformant public key algorithm")\ + QB(nonconformant_signature_algorithm, "Nonconformant signature algorithm")\ + QB(nonconformant_digest_algorithm, "Nonconformant digest algorithm") \ + QB(nonconformant_certificate_uid, "Nonconformant certificate UID") \ + QB(object_rejected, "Object rejected") \ + QB(rfc3779_inheritance_required, "RFC 3779 inheritance required") \ + QB(roa_contains_bad_afi_value, "ROA contains bad AFI value") \ + QB(roa_max_prefixlen_too_short, "ROA maxPrefixlen too short") \ + QB(roa_resource_not_in_ee, "ROA resource not in EE") \ + QB(roa_resources_malformed, "ROA resources malformed") \ + QB(rsync_transfer_failed, "rsync transfer failed") \ + QB(rsync_transfer_timed_out, "rsync transfer timed out") \ + QB(safi_not_allowed, "SAFI not allowed") \ + QB(sia_cadirectory_uri_missing, "SIA caDirectory URI missing") \ + QB(sia_extension_missing, "SIA extension missing") \ + QB(sia_manifest_uri_missing, "SIA manifest URI missing") \ + QB(ski_extension_missing, "SKI extension missing") \ + QB(ski_public_key_mismatch, "SKI public key mismatch") \ + QB(trust_anchor_key_mismatch, "Trust anchor key mismatch") \ + QB(trust_anchor_with_crldp, "Trust anchor can't have CRLDP") \ + QB(unknown_afi, "Unknown AFI") \ + QB(unknown_openssl_verify_error, "Unknown OpenSSL verify error") \ + QB(unreadable_trust_anchor, "Unreadable trust anchor") \ + QB(unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, "Unreadable trust anchor locator") \ + QB(wrong_object_version, "Wrong object version") \ + QW(aia_doesnt_match_issuer, "AIA doesn't match issuer") \ + QW(backup_thisupdate_newer_than_current, "Backup thisUpdate newer than current") \ + QW(backup_number_higher_than_current, "Backup number higher than current") \ + QW(bad_thisupdate, "Bad CRL thisUpdate") \ + QW(bad_cms_si_signed_attributes, "Bad CMS SI signed attributes") \ + QW(bad_signed_object_uri, "Bad signedObject URI") \ + QW(crldp_names_newer_crl, "CRLDP names newer CRL") \ + QW(digest_mismatch, "Digest mismatch") \ + QW(ee_certificate_with_1024_bit_key, "EE certificate with 1024 bit key") \ + QW(issuer_uses_multiple_crldp_values, "Issuer uses multiple CRLDP values")\ + QW(multiple_rsync_uris_in_extension, "Multiple rsync URIs in extension") \ + QW(nonconformant_issuer_name, "Nonconformant X.509 issuer name") \ + QW(nonconformant_subject_name, "Nonconformant X.509 subject name") \ + QW(policy_qualifier_cps, "Policy Qualifier CPS") \ + QW(rsync_partial_transfer, "rsync partial transfer") \ + QW(rsync_transfer_skipped, "rsync transfer skipped") \ + QW(sia_extension_missing_from_ee, "SIA extension missing from EE") \ + QW(skipped_because_not_in_manifest, "Skipped because not in manifest") \ + QW(stale_crl_or_manifest, "Stale CRL or manifest") \ + QW(tainted_by_stale_crl, "Tainted by stale CRL") \ + QW(tainted_by_stale_manifest, "Tainted by stale manifest") \ + QW(tainted_by_not_being_in_manifest, "Tainted by not being in manifest") \ + QW(trust_anchor_not_self_signed, "Trust anchor not self-signed") \ + QW(trust_anchor_skipped, "Trust anchor skipped") \ + QW(unknown_object_type_skipped, "Unknown object type skipped") \ + QW(uri_too_long, "URI too long") \ + QW(wrong_cms_si_signature_algorithm, "Wrong CMS SI signature algorithm") \ + QW(wrong_cms_si_digest_algorithm, "Wrong CMS SI digest algorithm") \ + QG(non_rsync_uri_in_extension, "Non-rsync URI in extension") \ + QG(object_accepted, "Object accepted") \ + QG(rechecking_object, "Rechecking object") \ + QG(rsync_transfer_succeeded, "rsync transfer succeeded") \ + QG(validation_ok, "OK") + +#define QV(x) QB(mib_openssl_##x, 0) + +static const char + mib_counter_kind_good[] = "good", + mib_counter_kind_warn[] = "warn", + mib_counter_kind_bad[] = "bad"; + +#define QG(x,y) mib_counter_kind_good , +#define QW(x,y) mib_counter_kind_warn , +#define QB(x,y) mib_counter_kind_bad , +static const char * const mib_counter_kind[] = { MIB_COUNTERS NULL }; +#undef QB +#undef QW +#undef QG + +#define QG(x,y) QQ(x,y) +#define QW(x,y) QQ(x,y) +#define QB(x,y) QQ(x,y) + +#define QQ(x,y) x , +typedef enum mib_counter { MIB_COUNTERS MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX } mib_counter_t; +#undef QQ + +#define QQ(x,y) y , +static const char * const mib_counter_desc[] = { MIB_COUNTERS NULL }; +#undef QQ + +#define QQ(x,y) #x , +static const char * const mib_counter_label[] = { MIB_COUNTERS NULL }; +#undef QQ + +#undef QV + +#define QQ(x,y) 0 , +#define QV(x) x , +static const long mib_counter_openssl[] = { MIB_COUNTERS 0 }; +#undef QV +#undef QQ + +/** + * Object sources. We always try to get fresh copies of objects using + * rsync, but if that fails we try using backup copies from what + * worked the last time we were run. This means that a URI + * potentially represents two different objects, so we need to + * distinguish them for tracking purposes in our validation log. + */ + +#define OBJECT_GENERATIONS \ + QQ(null) \ + QQ(current) \ + QQ(backup) + +#define QQ(x) object_generation_##x , +typedef enum object_generation { OBJECT_GENERATIONS OBJECT_GENERATION_MAX } object_generation_t; +#undef QQ + +#define QQ(x) #x , +static const char * const object_generation_label[] = { OBJECT_GENERATIONS NULL }; +#undef QQ + +/** + * Type-safe string wrapper for URIs. + */ +typedef struct { char s[URI_MAX]; } uri_t; + +/** + * Type-safe string wrapper for filename paths. + */ +typedef struct { char s[FILENAME_MAX]; } path_t; + +/** + * Type-safe wrapper for hash buffers. + */ +typedef struct { unsigned char h[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; } hashbuf_t; + +/** + * Type-safe wrapper for timestamp strings. + */ +typedef struct { char s[sizeof("2001-01-01T00:00:00Z") + 1]; } timestamp_t; + +/** + * Per-URI validation status object. + * uri must be first element. + */ +typedef struct validation_status { + uri_t uri; + object_generation_t generation; + time_t timestamp; + unsigned char events[(MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX + 7) / 8]; + short balance; + struct validation_status *left_child; + struct validation_status *right_child; +} validation_status_t; + +DECLARE_STACK_OF(validation_status_t) + +/** + * Structure to hold data parsed out of a certificate. + */ +typedef struct certinfo { + int ca, ta; + object_generation_t generation; + uri_t uri, sia, aia, crldp, manifest, signedobject; +} certinfo_t; + +typedef struct rcynic_ctx rcynic_ctx_t; + +/** + * States that a walk_ctx_t can be in. + */ +typedef enum { + walk_state_initial, /**< Initial state */ + walk_state_rsync, /**< rsyncing certinfo.sia */ + walk_state_ready, /**< Ready to traverse outputs */ + walk_state_current, /**< prefix = rc->unauthenticated */ + walk_state_backup, /**< prefix = rc->old_authenticated */ + walk_state_done /**< Done walking this cert's outputs */ +} walk_state_t; + +/** + * Context for certificate tree walks. This includes all the stuff + * that we would keep as automatic variables on the call stack if we + * didn't have to use callbacks to support multiple rsync processes. + */ +typedef struct walk_ctx { + unsigned refcount; + certinfo_t certinfo; + X509 *cert; + Manifest *manifest; + object_generation_t manifest_generation; + STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *filenames; + int manifest_iteration, filename_iteration, stale_manifest; + walk_state_t state; + uri_t crldp; + STACK_OF(X509) *certs; + STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls; +} walk_ctx_t; + +DECLARE_STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) + +/** + * Return codes from rsync functions. + */ +typedef enum { + rsync_status_done, /* Request completed */ + rsync_status_failed, /* Request failed */ + rsync_status_timed_out, /* Request timed out */ + rsync_status_pending, /* Request in progress */ + rsync_status_skipped /* Request not attempted */ +} rsync_status_t; + +/** + * States for asynchronous rsync. + * "initial" must be first. + */ + +#define RSYNC_STATES \ + QQ(initial) \ + QQ(running) \ + QQ(conflict_wait) \ + QQ(retry_wait) \ + QQ(closed) \ + QQ(terminating) + +#define QQ(x) rsync_state_##x, +typedef enum { RSYNC_STATES RSYNC_STATE_T_MAX } rsync_state_t; +#undef QQ + +#define QQ(x) #x , +static const char * const rsync_state_label[] = { RSYNC_STATES NULL }; +#undef QQ + +/** + * Context for asyncronous rsync. + */ +typedef struct rsync_ctx { + uri_t uri; + void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, const struct rsync_ctx *, const rsync_status_t, const uri_t *, void *); + void *cookie; + rsync_state_t state; + enum { + rsync_problem_none, /* Must be first */ + rsync_problem_timed_out, + rsync_problem_refused + } problem; + unsigned tries; + pid_t pid; + int fd; + time_t started, deadline; + char buffer[URI_MAX * 4]; + size_t buflen; +} rsync_ctx_t; + +DECLARE_STACK_OF(rsync_ctx_t) + +/** + * Record of rsync attempts. + */ +typedef struct rsync_history { + uri_t uri; + time_t started, finished; + rsync_status_t status; + int final_slash; +} rsync_history_t; + +DECLARE_STACK_OF(rsync_history_t) + +/** + * Deferred task. + */ +typedef struct task { + void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, void *); + void *cookie; +} task_t; + +DECLARE_STACK_OF(task_t) + +/** + * Trust anchor locator (TAL) fetch context. + */ +typedef struct tal_ctx { + uri_t uri; + path_t path; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; +} tal_ctx_t; + +/** + * Extended context for verify callbacks. This is a wrapper around + * OpenSSL's X509_STORE_CTX, and the embedded X509_STORE_CTX @em must be + * the first element of this structure in order for the evil cast to + * do the right thing. This is ugly but safe, as the C language + * promises us that the address of the first element of a structure is + * the same as the address of the structure. + */ +typedef struct rcynic_x509_store_ctx { + X509_STORE_CTX ctx; /* Must be first */ + rcynic_ctx_t *rc; + const certinfo_t *subject; +} rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t; + +/** + * Program context that would otherwise be a mess of global variables. + */ +struct rcynic_ctx { + path_t authenticated, old_authenticated, new_authenticated, unauthenticated; + char *jane, *rsync_program; + STACK_OF(validation_status_t) *validation_status; + STACK_OF(rsync_history_t) *rsync_history; + STACK_OF(rsync_ctx_t) *rsync_queue; + STACK_OF(task_t) *task_queue; + int use_syslog, allow_stale_crl, allow_stale_manifest, use_links; + int require_crl_in_manifest, rsync_timeout, priority[LOG_LEVEL_T_MAX]; + int allow_non_self_signed_trust_anchor, allow_object_not_in_manifest; + int max_parallel_fetches, max_retries, retry_wait_min, run_rsync; + int allow_digest_mismatch, allow_crl_digest_mismatch; + int allow_nonconformant_name, allow_ee_without_signedObject; + int allow_1024_bit_ee_key, allow_wrong_cms_si_attributes; + int rsync_early; + unsigned max_select_time; + validation_status_t *validation_status_in_waiting; + validation_status_t *validation_status_root; + log_level_t log_level; + X509_STORE *x509_store; +}; + + + +/* + * Handle NIDs we wish OpenSSL knew about. This is carefully (we + * hope) written to do nothing at all for any NID that OpenSSL knows + * about; the intent is just to add definitions for things OpenSSL + * doesn't know about yet. Of necessity, this is a bit gross, since + * it confounds runtime static variables with predefined macro names, + * but we try to put all the magic associated with this in one place. + * + * In the long run it might be cleaner to generate this with a trivial + * script and put the result in a shared .h file, but this will do for + * the moment. + */ + +#ifndef NID_ad_rpkiManifest +static int NID_ad_rpkiManifest; +#endif + +#ifndef NID_ad_signedObject +static int NID_ad_signedObject; +#endif + +#ifndef NID_ct_ROA +static int NID_ct_ROA; +#endif + +#ifndef NID_ct_rpkiManifest +static int NID_ct_rpkiManifest; +#endif + +#ifndef NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters +static int NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters; +#endif + +#ifndef NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber +static int NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber; +#endif + +#ifndef NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router +static int NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router; +#endif + +/** + * Missing NIDs, if any. + */ +static const struct { + int *nid; + const char *oid; + const char *sn; + const char *ln; +} missing_nids[] = { + +#ifndef NID_ad_rpkiManifest + {&NID_ad_rpkiManifest, "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.10", "id-ad-rpkiManifest", "RPKI Manifest"}, +#endif + +#ifndef NID_ad_signedObject + {&NID_ad_signedObject, "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.11", "id-ad-signedObject", "Signed Object"}, +#endif + +#ifndef NID_ct_ROA + {&NID_ct_ROA, "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24", "id-ct-routeOriginAttestation", "ROA eContent"}, +#endif + +#ifndef NID_ct_rpkiManifest + {&NID_ct_rpkiManifest, "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26", "id-ct-rpkiManifest", "RPKI Manifest eContent"}, +#endif + +#ifndef NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters + {&NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters, "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35", "id-ct-rpkiGhostbusters", "RPKI Ghostbusters eContent"}, +#endif + +#ifndef NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber + {&NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber, "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2", "id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber", "RPKI Certificate Policy"}, +#endif + +#ifndef NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router + {&NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router, "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30", "id-kp-bgpsec-router", "BGPSEC Router Certificate"}, +#endif + +}; + + + +/** + * Subversion ID data. + */ +static const char svn_id[] = "$Id$"; + +/** + * Suffix we use temporarily during the symlink shuffle. Could be + * almost anything, but we want to do the length check early, before + * we waste a lot of work we'll just have to throw away, so we just + * wire in something short and obvious. + */ +static const char authenticated_symlink_suffix[] = ".new"; + +/** + * Constants for comparisions. We can't build these at compile time, + * so they can't be const, but treat them as if they were once + * allocated. + * + * We probably need both a better scheme for naming NID_ replacements + * and a more comprehensive rewrite of how we handle OIDs OpenSSL + * doesn't know about, so that we neither conflict with defined + * symbols nor duplicate effort nor explode if and when OpenSSL adds + * new OIDs (with or without the names we would have used). + */ + +static const ASN1_INTEGER *asn1_zero, *asn1_four_octets, *asn1_twenty_octets; +static int NID_binary_signing_time; + + + +/** + * Handle missing NIDs. + */ +static int +create_missing_nids(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < (int) (sizeof(missing_nids) / sizeof(*missing_nids)); i++) + if ((*missing_nids[i].nid = OBJ_txt2nid(missing_nids[i].oid)) == NID_undef && + (*missing_nids[i].nid = OBJ_create(missing_nids[i].oid, + missing_nids[i].sn, + missing_nids[i].ln)) == NID_undef) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + + + +/** + * Type-safe wrapper around free() to keep safestack macros happy. + */ +static void OPENSSL_STRING_free(OPENSSL_STRING s) +{ + if (s) + free(s); +} + +/** + * Wrapper around an idiom we use with OPENSSL_STRING stacks. There's + * a bug in the current sk_OPENSSL_STRING_delete() macro that casts + * the return value to the wrong type, so we cast it to something + * innocuous here and avoid using that macro elsewhere. + */ +static void sk_OPENSSL_STRING_remove(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk, const char *str) +{ + OPENSSL_STRING_free((void *) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_delete(sk, sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(sk, str))); +} + +/** + * Allocate a new validation_status_t object. + */ +static validation_status_t *validation_status_t_new(void) +{ + validation_status_t *v = malloc(sizeof(*v)); + if (v) + memset(v, 0, sizeof(*v)); + return v; +} + +/** + * Type-safe wrapper around free() to keep safestack macros happy. + */ +static void validation_status_t_free(validation_status_t *v) +{ + if (v) + free(v); +} + + + +/** + * Allocate a new rsync_history_t object. + */ +static rsync_history_t *rsync_history_t_new(void) +{ + rsync_history_t *h = malloc(sizeof(*h)); + if (h) + memset(h, 0, sizeof(*h)); + return h; +} + +/** + * Type-safe wrapper around free() to keep safestack macros happy. + */ +static void rsync_history_t_free(rsync_history_t *h) +{ + if (h) + free(h); +} + +/** + * Compare two rsync_history_t objects. + */ +static int rsync_history_cmp(const rsync_history_t * const *a, const rsync_history_t * const *b) +{ + return strcmp((*a)->uri.s, (*b)->uri.s); +} + + + +/** + * Convert a time_t to a printable string in UTC format. + */ +static const char *time_to_string(timestamp_t *ts, const time_t *t) +{ + time_t now; + size_t n; + + assert(ts != NULL); + + if (t == NULL) { + now = time(0); + t = &now; + } + + n = strftime(ts->s, sizeof(ts->s), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", gmtime(t)); + assert(n > 0); + + return ts->s; +} + +/* + * GCC attributes to help catch format string errors. + */ + +#ifdef __GNUC__ + +static void logmsg(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const log_level_t level, + const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); +#endif + +/** + * Logging. + */ +static void vlogmsg(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const log_level_t level, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap) +{ + assert(rc && fmt); + + if (rc->log_level < level) + return; + + if (rc->use_syslog) { + vsyslog(rc->priority[level], fmt, ap); + } else { + char ts[sizeof("00:00:00")+1]; + time_t t = time(0); + strftime(ts, sizeof(ts), "%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", ts); + if (rc->jane) + fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", rc->jane); + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); + putc('\n', stderr); + } +} + +/** + * Logging. + */ +static void logmsg(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const log_level_t level, + const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + vlogmsg(rc, level, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +/** + * Print OpenSSL library errors. + */ +static void log_openssl_errors(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc) +{ + const char *data, *file; + unsigned long code; + char error[256]; + int flags, line; + + if (!rc->log_level < log_verbose) + return; + + while ((code = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags))) { + ERR_error_string_n(code, error, sizeof(error)); + if (data && (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING)) + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "OpenSSL error %s:%d: %s: %s", file, line, error, data); + else + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "OpenSSL error %s:%d: %s", file, line, error); + } +} + +/** + * Configure logging. + */ +static int configure_logmsg(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const char *name) +{ + int i; + + assert(rc && name); + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(log_levels)/sizeof(*log_levels); i++) { + if (!strcmp(name, log_levels[i].name)) { + rc->log_level = log_levels[i].value; + return 1; + } + } + + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad log level %s", name); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Configure syslog. + */ +static int configure_syslog(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + int *result, + const CODE *table, + const char *name) +{ + assert(result && table && name); + + while (table->c_name && strcmp(table->c_name, name)) + table++; + + if (table->c_name) { + *result = table->c_val; + return 1; + } else { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad syslog code %s", name); + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Configure boolean variable. + */ +static int configure_boolean(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + int *result, + const char *val) +{ + assert(rc && result && val); + + switch (*val) { + case 'y': case 'Y': case 't': case 'T': case '1': + *result = 1; + return 1; + case 'n': case 'N': case 'f': case 'F': case '0': + *result = 0; + return 1; + default: + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad boolean value %s", val); + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Configure integer variable. + */ +static int configure_integer(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + int *result, + const char *val) +{ + long res; + char *p; + + assert(rc && result && val); + + res = strtol(val, &p, 10); + + if (*val != '\0' && *p == '\0') { + *result = (int) res; + return 1; + } else { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad integer value %s", val); + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Configure unsigned integer variable. + */ +static int configure_unsigned_integer(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + unsigned *result, + const char *val) +{ + unsigned long res; + char *p; + + assert(rc && result && val); + + res = strtoul(val, &p, 10); + + if (*val != '\0' && *p == '\0') { + *result = (unsigned) res; + return 1; + } else { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Bad integer value %s", val); + return 0; + } +} + + + +/** + * Make a directory if it doesn't already exist. + */ +static int mkdir_maybe(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const path_t *name) +{ + path_t path; + char *s; + + assert(name != NULL); + if (strlen(name->s) >= sizeof(path.s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Pathname %s too long", name->s); + return 0; + } + strcpy(path.s, name->s); + s = path.s[0] == '/' ? path.s + 1 : path.s; + if ((s = strrchr(s, '/')) == NULL) + return 1; + *s = '\0'; + if (!mkdir_maybe(rc, &path)) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Failed to make directory %s", path.s); + return 0; + } + if (!access(path.s, F_OK)) + return 1; + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Creating directory %s", path.s); + return mkdir(path.s, 0777) == 0; +} + +/** + * strdup() a string and push it onto a stack. + */ +static int sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push_strdup(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk, const char *str) +{ + OPENSSL_STRING s = strdup(str); + + if (s && sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sk, s)) + return 1; + if (s) + free(s); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Compare two URI strings, for OpenSSL STACK operations. + */ + +static int uri_cmp(const char * const *a, const char * const *b) +{ + return strcmp(*a, *b); +} + +/** + * Is string an rsync URI? + */ +static int is_rsync(const char *uri) +{ + return uri && !strncmp(uri, SCHEME_RSYNC, SIZEOF_RSYNC); +} + +/** + * Convert an rsync URI to a filename, checking for evil character + * sequences. NB: This routine can't call mib_increment(), because + * mib_increment() calls it, so errors detected here only go into + * the log, not the MIB. + */ +static int uri_to_filename(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + path_t *path, + const path_t *prefix) +{ + const char *u; + size_t n; + + path->s[0] = '\0'; + + if (!is_rsync(uri->s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "%s is not an rsync URI, not converting to filename", uri->s); + return 0; + } + + u = uri->s + SIZEOF_RSYNC; + n = strlen(u); + + if (u[0] == '/' || u[0] == '.' || strstr(u, "/../") || + (n >= 3 && !strcmp(u + n - 3, "/.."))) { + logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Dangerous URI %s, not converting to filename", uri->s); + return 0; + } + + if (prefix) + n += strlen(prefix->s); + + if (n >= sizeof(path->s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "URI %s too long, not converting to filename", uri->s); + return 0; + } + + if (prefix) { + strcpy(path->s, prefix->s); + strcat(path->s, u); + } else { + strcpy(path->s, u); + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Compare filename fields of two FileAndHash structures. + */ +static int FileAndHash_name_cmp(const FileAndHash * const *a, const FileAndHash * const *b) +{ + return strcmp((char *) (*a)->file->data, (char *) (*b)->file->data); +} + +/** + * Get value of code in a validation_status_t. + */ +static int validation_status_get_code(const validation_status_t *v, + const mib_counter_t code) +{ + assert(v && code < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX); + return (v->events[code / 8] & (1 << (code % 8))) != 0; +} + +/** + * Set value of code in a validation_status_t. + */ +static void validation_status_set_code(validation_status_t *v, + const mib_counter_t code, + int value) +{ + assert(v && code < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX); + if (value) + v->events[code / 8] |= (1 << (code % 8)); + else + v->events[code / 8] &= ~(1 << (code % 8)); +} + +/** + * validation_status object comparison, for AVL tree rather than + * OpenSSL stacks. + */ +static int +validation_status_cmp(const validation_status_t *node, + const uri_t *uri, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + int cmp = ((int) node->generation) - ((int) generation); + if (cmp) + return cmp; + else + return strcmp(uri->s, node->uri.s); +} + +/** + * validation_status AVL tree insertion. Adapted from code written by + * Paul Vixie and explictly placed in the public domain using examples + * from the book: "Algorithms & Data Structures," Niklaus Wirth, + * Prentice-Hall, 1986, ISBN 0-13-022005-1. Thanks, Paul! + */ +static validation_status_t * +validation_status_sprout(validation_status_t **node, + int *needs_balancing, + validation_status_t *new_node) +{ +#ifdef AVL_DEBUG +#define AVL_MSG(msg) sprintf(stderr, "AVL_DEBUG: '%s'\n", msg) +#else +#define AVL_MSG(msg) +#endif + + validation_status_t *p1, *p2, *result; + int cmp; + + /* + * Are we grounded? If so, add the node "here" and set the + * rebalance flag, then exit. + */ + if (*node == NULL) { + AVL_MSG("Grounded, adding new node"); + new_node->left_child = NULL; + new_node->right_child = NULL; + new_node->balance = 0; + *node = new_node; + *needs_balancing = 1; + return *node; + } + + /* + * Compare the data. + */ + cmp = validation_status_cmp(*node, &new_node->uri, new_node->generation); + + /* + * If LESS, prepare to move to the left. + */ + if (cmp < 0) { + + AVL_MSG("LESS. sprouting left."); + result = validation_status_sprout(&(*node)->left_child, needs_balancing, new_node); + + if (*needs_balancing) { + AVL_MSG("LESS: left branch has grown longer"); + + switch ((*node)->balance) { + + case 1: + /* + * Right branch WAS longer; balance is ok now. + */ + AVL_MSG("LESS: case 1.. balance restored implicitly"); + (*node)->balance = 0; + *needs_balancing = 0; + break; + + case 0: + /* + * Balance WAS okay; now left branch longer. + */ + AVL_MSG("LESS: case 0.. balnce bad but still ok"); + (*node)->balance = -1; + break; + + case -1: + /* + * Left branch was already too long. Rebalance. + */ + AVL_MSG("LESS: case -1: rebalancing"); + p1 = (*node)->left_child; + + if (p1->balance == -1) { + AVL_MSG("LESS: single LL"); + (*node)->left_child = p1->right_child; + p1->right_child = *node; + (*node)->balance = 0; + *node = p1; + } + + else { + AVL_MSG("LESS: double LR"); + + p2 = p1->right_child; + p1->right_child = p2->left_child; + p2->left_child = p1; + + (*node)->left_child = p2->right_child; + p2->right_child = *node; + + if (p2->balance == -1) + (*node)->balance = 1; + else + (*node)->balance = 0; + + if (p2->balance == 1) + p1->balance = -1; + else + p1->balance = 0; + *node = p2; + } + + (*node)->balance = 0; + *needs_balancing = 0; + } + } + return result; + } + + /* + * If MORE, prepare to move to the right. + */ + if (cmp > 0) { + + AVL_MSG("MORE: sprouting to the right"); + result = validation_status_sprout(&(*node)->right_child, needs_balancing, new_node); + + if (*needs_balancing) { + AVL_MSG("MORE: right branch has grown longer"); + + switch ((*node)->balance) { + + case -1:AVL_MSG("MORE: balance was off, fixed implicitly"); + (*node)->balance = 0; + *needs_balancing = 0; + break; + + case 0: AVL_MSG("MORE: balance was okay, now off but ok"); + (*node)->balance = 1; + break; + + case 1: AVL_MSG("MORE: balance was off, need to rebalance"); + p1 = (*node)->right_child; + + if (p1->balance == 1) { + AVL_MSG("MORE: single RR"); + (*node)->right_child = p1->left_child; + p1->left_child = *node; + (*node)->balance = 0; + *node = p1; + } + + else { + AVL_MSG("MORE: double RL"); + + p2 = p1->left_child; + p1->left_child = p2->right_child; + p2->right_child = p1; + + (*node)->right_child = p2->left_child; + p2->left_child = *node; + + if (p2->balance == 1) + (*node)->balance = -1; + else + (*node)->balance = 0; + + if (p2->balance == -1) + p1->balance = 1; + else + p1->balance = 0; + + *node = p2; + } /*else*/ + (*node)->balance = 0; + *needs_balancing = 0; + } + } + return result; + } + + /* + * Neither more nor less, found existing node matching key, return it. + */ + AVL_MSG("I found it!"); + *needs_balancing = 0; + return *node; + +#undef AVL_MSG +} + +/** + * Add a validation status entry to internal log. + */ +static void log_validation_status(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + const mib_counter_t code, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + validation_status_t *v = NULL; + int needs_balancing = 0; + + assert(rc && uri && code < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX && generation < OBJECT_GENERATION_MAX); + + if (!rc->validation_status) + return; + + if (code == rsync_transfer_skipped && !rc->run_rsync) + return; + + if (rc->validation_status_in_waiting == NULL && + (rc->validation_status_in_waiting = validation_status_t_new()) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate validation status entry for %s", uri->s); + return; + } + + v = rc->validation_status_in_waiting; + memset(v, 0, sizeof(*v)); + v->uri = *uri; + v->generation = generation; + + v = validation_status_sprout(&rc->validation_status_root, &needs_balancing, v); + if (v == rc->validation_status_in_waiting) + rc->validation_status_in_waiting = NULL; + + if (rc->validation_status_in_waiting == NULL && + !sk_validation_status_t_push(rc->validation_status, v)) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't store validation status entry for %s", uri->s); + return; + } + + v->timestamp = time(0); + + if (validation_status_get_code(v, code)) + return; + + validation_status_set_code(v, code, 1); + + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Recording \"%s\" for %s%s%s", + (mib_counter_desc[code] + ? mib_counter_desc[code] + : X509_verify_cert_error_string(mib_counter_openssl[code])), + (generation != object_generation_null ? object_generation_label[generation] : ""), + (generation != object_generation_null ? " " : ""), + uri->s); +} + +/** + * Copy or link a file, as the case may be. + */ +static int cp_ln(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const path_t *source, const path_t *target) +{ + struct stat statbuf; + struct utimbuf utimebuf; + FILE *in = NULL, *out = NULL; + int c, ok = 0; + + if (rc->use_links) { + (void) unlink(target->s); + ok = link(source->s, target->s) == 0; + if (!ok) + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't link %s to %s: %s", + source->s, target->s, strerror(errno)); + return ok; + } + + if ((in = fopen(source->s, "rb")) == NULL || + (out = fopen(target->s, "wb")) == NULL) + goto done; + + while ((c = getc(in)) != EOF) + if (putc(c, out) == EOF) + goto done; + + ok = 1; + + done: + ok &= !(in != NULL && fclose(in) == EOF); + ok &= !(out != NULL && fclose(out) == EOF); + + if (!ok) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't copy %s to %s: %s", + source->s, target->s, strerror(errno)); + return ok; + } + + /* + * Perserve the file modification time to allow for detection of + * changed objects in the authenticated directory. Failure to reset + * the times is not optimal, but is also not critical, thus no + * failure return. + */ + if (stat(source->s, &statbuf) < 0 || + (utimebuf.actime = statbuf.st_atime, + utimebuf.modtime = statbuf.st_mtime, + utime(target->s, &utimebuf) < 0)) + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't copy inode timestamp from %s to %s: %s", + source->s, target->s, strerror(errno)); + + return ok; +} + +/** + * Install an object. + */ +static int install_object(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + const path_t *source, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + path_t target; + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &target, &rc->new_authenticated)) { + logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Couldn't generate installation name for %s", uri->s); + return 0; + } + + if (!mkdir_maybe(rc, &target)) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't create directory for %s", target.s); + return 0; + } + + if (!cp_ln(rc, source, &target)) + return 0; + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_accepted, generation); + return 1; +} + +/** + * AVL tree lookup for validation status objects. + */ +static validation_status_t * +validation_status_find(validation_status_t *node, + const uri_t *uri, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + int cmp; + + while (node != NULL && (cmp = validation_status_cmp(node, uri, generation)) != 0) + node = cmp < 0 ? node->left_child : node->right_child; + + return node; +} + +/** + * Check whether we have a validation status entry corresponding to a + * given filename. This is intended for use during pruning the + * unauthenticated tree, so it only checks the current generation. + */ +static int +validation_status_find_filename(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const char *filename) +{ + uri_t uri; + + if (strlen(filename) + SIZEOF_RSYNC >= sizeof(uri.s)) + return 0; + + strcpy(uri.s, SCHEME_RSYNC); + strcat(uri.s, filename); + + return validation_status_find(rc->validation_status_root, &uri, object_generation_current) != NULL; +} + +/** + * Figure out whether we already have a good copy of an object. This + * is a little more complicated than it sounds, because we might have + * failed the current generation and accepted the backup due to having + * followed the old CA certificate chain first during a key rollover. + * So if this check is of the current object and we have not already + * accepted the current object for this URI, we need to recheck. + * + * We also handle logging when we decide that we do need to check, so + * that the caller doesn't need to concern itself with why we thought + * the check was necessary. + */ +static int skip_checking_this_object(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + validation_status_t *v = NULL; + path_t path; + + assert(rc && uri && rc->validation_status); + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &path, &rc->new_authenticated)) + return 1; + + if (access(path.s, R_OK)) { + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking %s", uri->s); + return 0; + } + + if (generation != object_generation_current) + return 1; + + v = validation_status_find(rc->validation_status_root, uri, generation); + + if (v != NULL && validation_status_get_code(v, object_accepted)) + return 1; + + log_validation_status(rc, uri, rechecking_object, generation); + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Rechecking %s", uri->s); + return 0; +} + + + +/** + * Check str for a suffix. + */ +static int endswith(const char *str, const char *suffix) +{ + size_t len_str, len_suffix; + assert(str != NULL && suffix != NULL); + len_str = strlen(str); + len_suffix = strlen(suffix); + return len_str >= len_suffix && !strcmp(str + len_str - len_suffix, suffix); +} + +/** + * Check str for a prefix. + */ +static int startswith(const char *str, const char *prefix) +{ + size_t len_str, len_prefix; + assert(str != NULL && prefix != NULL); + len_str = strlen(str); + len_prefix = strlen(prefix); + return len_str >= len_prefix && !strncmp(str, prefix, len_prefix); +} + +/** + * Convert a filename to a file:// URI, for logging. + */ +static void filename_to_uri(uri_t *uri, + const char *fn) +{ + assert(sizeof("file://") < sizeof(uri->s)); + strcpy(uri->s, "file://"); + if (*fn != '/') { + if (getcwd(uri->s + strlen(uri->s), sizeof(uri->s) - strlen(uri->s)) == NULL || + (!endswith(uri->s, "/") && strlen(uri->s) >= sizeof(uri->s) - 1)) + uri->s[0] = '\0'; + else + strcat(uri->s, "/"); + } + if (uri->s[0] != '\0' && strlen(uri->s) + strlen(fn) < sizeof(uri->s)) + strcat(uri->s, fn); + else + uri->s[0] = '\0'; +} + +/** + * Set a directory name, adding or stripping trailing slash as needed. + */ +static int set_directory(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, path_t *out, const char *in, const int want_slash) +{ + int has_slash, need_slash; + size_t n; + + assert(rc && in && out); + + n = strlen(in); + + if (n == 0) { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Empty path"); + return 0; + } + + has_slash = in[n - 1] == '/'; + + need_slash = want_slash && !has_slash; + + if (n + need_slash + 1 > sizeof(out->s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Path \"%s\" too long", in); + return 0; + } + + strcpy(out->s, in); + if (need_slash) + strcat(out->s, "/"); + else if (has_slash && !want_slash) + out->s[n - 1] = '\0'; + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Test whether a filesystem path points to a directory. + */ +static int is_directory(const path_t *name) +{ + struct stat st; + + assert(name); + return lstat(name->s, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); +} + +/** + * Remove a directory tree, like rm -rf. + */ +static int rm_rf(const path_t *name) +{ + path_t path; + struct dirent *d; + DIR *dir; + int ret = 0; + + assert(name); + + if (!is_directory(name)) + return unlink(name->s) == 0; + + if ((dir = opendir(name->s)) == NULL) + return 0; + + while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { + if (!strcmp(d->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(d->d_name, "..")) + continue; + if (snprintf(path.s, sizeof(path.s), "%s/%s", name->s, d->d_name) >= sizeof(path.s)) + goto done; + if (unlink(path.s) == 0) + continue; + else if (rm_rf(&path)) + continue; + else + goto done; + } + + ret = rmdir(name->s) == 0; + + done: + closedir(dir); + return ret; +} + +/** + * Construct names for the directories not directly settable by the + * user. + * + * This function also checks for an old-style rc->authenticated + * directory, to simplify upgrade from older versions of rcynic. + */ +static int construct_directory_names(rcynic_ctx_t *rc) +{ + struct stat st; + ssize_t n; + path_t p; + time_t t = time(0); + + p = rc->authenticated; + + n = strlen(p.s); + + if (n + sizeof(authenticated_symlink_suffix) >= sizeof(p.s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Symlink name would be too long"); + return 0; + } + + if (strftime(p.s + n, sizeof(p.s) - n - 1, ".%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", gmtime(&t)) == 0) { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Generated path with timestamp would be too long"); + return 0; + } + + if (!set_directory(rc, &rc->new_authenticated, p.s, 1)) + return 0; + + if (!set_directory(rc, &rc->old_authenticated, rc->authenticated.s, 1)) + return 0; + + if (lstat(rc->authenticated.s, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR((st.st_mode)) && + strlen(rc->authenticated.s) + sizeof(".old") < sizeof(p.s)) { + p = rc->authenticated; + strcat(p.s, ".old"); + rm_rf(&p); + (void) rename(rc->authenticated.s, p.s); + } + + if (lstat(rc->authenticated.s, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, + "Existing %s directory is in the way, please remove it", + rc->authenticated.s); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Do final symlink shuffle and cleanup of output directories. + */ +static int finalize_directories(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc) +{ + path_t path, real_old, real_new; + const char *dir; + glob_t g; + int i; + + if (!realpath(rc->old_authenticated.s, real_old.s)) + real_old.s[0] = '\0'; + + if (!realpath(rc->new_authenticated.s, real_new.s)) + real_new.s[0] = '\0'; + + assert(real_new.s[0] && real_new.s[strlen(real_new.s) - 1] != '/'); + + if ((dir = strrchr(real_new.s, '/')) == NULL) + dir = real_new.s; + else + dir++; + + path = rc->authenticated; + + if (strlen(path.s) + sizeof(authenticated_symlink_suffix) >= sizeof(path.s)) + return 0; + strcat(path.s, authenticated_symlink_suffix); + + (void) unlink(path.s); + + if (symlink(dir, path.s) < 0) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't link %s to %s: %s", + path.s, dir, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + if (rename(path.s, rc->authenticated.s) < 0) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't rename %s to %s: %s", + path.s, rc->authenticated.s, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + if (real_old.s[0] && strlen(rc->authenticated.s) + sizeof(".old") < sizeof(path.s)) { + assert(real_old.s[strlen(real_old.s) - 1] != '/'); + + path = rc->authenticated; + strcat(path.s, ".old"); + + (void) unlink(path.s); + + if ((dir = strrchr(real_old.s, '/')) == NULL) + dir = real_old.s; + else + dir++; + + (void) symlink(dir, path.s); + } + + path = rc->authenticated; + assert(strlen(path.s) + sizeof(".*") < sizeof(path.s)); + strcat(path.s, ".*"); + + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + + if (real_new.s[0] && glob(path.s, 0, 0, &g) == 0) { + for (i = 0; i < g.gl_pathc; i++) + if (realpath(g.gl_pathv[i], path.s) && + strcmp(path.s, real_old.s) && + strcmp(path.s, real_new.s)) + rm_rf(&path); + globfree(&g); + } + + return 1; +} + + + +/** + * Test whether a pair of URIs "conflict", that is, whether attempting + * to rsync both of them at the same time in parallel might cause + * unpredictable behavior. Might need a better name for this test. + * + * Returns non-zero iff the two URIs "conflict". + */ +static int conflicting_uris(const uri_t *a, const uri_t *b) +{ + size_t len_a, len_b; + + assert(a && is_rsync(a->s) && b && is_rsync(b->s)); + + len_a = strlen(a->s); + len_b = strlen(b->s); + + assert(len_a < sizeof(a->s) && len_b < sizeof(b->s)); + + return !strncmp(a->s, b->s, len_a < len_b ? len_a : len_b); +} + + + +/** + * Read non-directory filenames from a directory, so we can check to + * see what's missing from a manifest. + */ +static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *directory_filenames(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const walk_state_t state, + const uri_t *uri) +{ + STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *result = NULL; + path_t dpath, fpath; + const path_t *prefix = NULL; + DIR *dir = NULL; + struct dirent *d; + int ok = 0; + + assert(rc && uri); + + switch (state) { + case walk_state_current: + prefix = &rc->unauthenticated; + break; + case walk_state_backup: + prefix = &rc->old_authenticated; + break; + default: + goto done; + } + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &dpath, prefix) || + (dir = opendir(dpath.s)) == NULL || + (result = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(uri_cmp)) == NULL) + goto done; + + while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) + if (snprintf(fpath.s, sizeof(fpath.s), "%s/%s", dpath.s, d->d_name) >= sizeof(fpath.s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Local path name %s/%s too long", dpath.s, d->d_name); + goto done; + } + else if (!is_directory(&fpath) && !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push_strdup(result, d->d_name)) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push_strdup() failed, probably memory exhaustion"); + goto done; + } + + ok = 1; + + done: + if (dir != NULL) + closedir(dir); + + if (ok) + return result; + + sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(result, OPENSSL_STRING_free); + return NULL; +} + + + +/** + * Increment walk context reference count. + */ +static void walk_ctx_attach(walk_ctx_t *w) +{ + if (w != NULL) { + w->refcount++; + assert(w->refcount != 0); + } +} + +/** + * Decrement walk context reference count; freeing the context if the + * reference count is now zero. + */ +static void walk_ctx_detach(walk_ctx_t *w) +{ + if (w != NULL && --(w->refcount) == 0) { + assert(w->refcount == 0); + X509_free(w->cert); + Manifest_free(w->manifest); + sk_X509_free(w->certs); + sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(w->crls, X509_CRL_free); + sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(w->filenames, OPENSSL_STRING_free); + free(w); + } +} + +/** + * Return top context of a walk context stack. + */ +static walk_ctx_t *walk_ctx_stack_head(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk) +{ + return sk_walk_ctx_t_value(wsk, sk_walk_ctx_t_num(wsk) - 1); +} + +/** + * Whether we're done iterating over a walk context. Think of this as + * the thing you call (negated) in the second clause of a conceptual + * "for" loop. + */ +static int walk_ctx_loop_done(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + return wsk == NULL || w == NULL || w->state >= walk_state_done; +} + +/** + * Walk context iterator. Think of this as the thing you call in the + * third clause of a conceptual "for" loop: this reinitializes as + * necessary for the next pass through the loop. + * + * General idea here is that we have several state variables in a walk + * context which collectively define the current pass, product URI, + * etc, and we want to be able to iterate through this sequence via + * the event system. So this function steps to the next state. + * + * Conceptually, w->manifest->fileList and w->filenames form a single + * array with index w->manifest_iteration + w->filename_iteration. + * Beware of fencepost errors, I've gotten this wrong once already. + * Slightly odd coding here is to make it easier to check this. + */ +static void walk_ctx_loop_next(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + int n_manifest, n_filenames; + + assert(rc && wsk && w); + + assert(w->manifest_iteration >= 0 && w->filename_iteration >= 0); + + n_manifest = w->manifest ? sk_FileAndHash_num(w->manifest->fileList) : 0; + n_filenames = w->filenames ? sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(w->filenames) : 0; + + if (w->manifest_iteration + w->filename_iteration < n_manifest + n_filenames) { + if (w->manifest_iteration < n_manifest) + w->manifest_iteration++; + else + w->filename_iteration++; + } + + assert(w->manifest_iteration <= n_manifest && w->filename_iteration <= n_filenames); + + if (w->manifest_iteration + w->filename_iteration < n_manifest + n_filenames) + return; + + while (!walk_ctx_loop_done(wsk)) { + w->state++; + w->manifest_iteration = 0; + w->filename_iteration = 0; + sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(w->filenames, OPENSSL_STRING_free); + w->filenames = directory_filenames(rc, w->state, &w->certinfo.sia); + if (w->manifest != NULL || w->filenames != NULL) + return; + } +} + +static int check_manifest(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk); + +/** + * Loop initializer for walk context. Think of this as the thing you + * call in the first clause of a conceptual "for" loop. + */ +static void walk_ctx_loop_init(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + + assert(rc && wsk && w && w->state == walk_state_ready); + + if (!w->manifest && !check_manifest(rc, wsk)) { + /* + * Simple failure to find a manifest doesn't get here. This is + * for manifest failures that cause us to reject all of this + * certificate's products due to policy knob settings. + */ + w->state = walk_state_done; + return; + } + + if (!w->manifest) + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Couldn't get manifest %s, blundering onward", w->certinfo.manifest.s); + + w->manifest_iteration = 0; + w->filename_iteration = 0; + w->state++; + assert(w->state == walk_state_current); + + assert(w->filenames == NULL); + w->filenames = directory_filenames(rc, w->state, &w->certinfo.sia); + + w->stale_manifest = w->manifest != NULL && X509_cmp_current_time(w->manifest->nextUpdate) < 0; + + while (!walk_ctx_loop_done(wsk) && + (w->manifest == NULL || w->manifest_iteration >= sk_FileAndHash_num(w->manifest->fileList)) && + (w->filenames == NULL || w->filename_iteration >= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(w->filenames))) + walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk); +} + +/** + * Extract URI and hash values from walk context. + */ +static int walk_ctx_loop_this(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + uri_t *uri, + const unsigned char **hash, + size_t *hashlen) +{ + const walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + const char *name = NULL; + FileAndHash *fah = NULL; + + assert(rc && wsk && w && uri && hash && hashlen); + + if (w->manifest != NULL && w->manifest_iteration < sk_FileAndHash_num(w->manifest->fileList)) { + fah = sk_FileAndHash_value(w->manifest->fileList, w->manifest_iteration); + name = (const char *) fah->file->data; + } else if (w->filenames != NULL && w->filename_iteration < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(w->filenames)) { + name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(w->filenames, w->filename_iteration); + } + + if (name == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Can't find a URI in walk context, this shouldn't happen: state %d, manifest_iteration %d, filename_iteration %d", + (int) w->state, w->manifest_iteration, w->filename_iteration); + return 0; + } + + if (strlen(w->certinfo.sia.s) + strlen(name) >= sizeof(uri->s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "URI %s%s too long, skipping", w->certinfo.sia.s, uri->s); + return 0; + } + + strcpy(uri->s, w->certinfo.sia.s); + strcat(uri->s, name); + + if (fah != NULL) { + sk_OPENSSL_STRING_remove(w->filenames, name); + *hash = fah->hash->data; + *hashlen = fah->hash->length; + } else { + *hash = NULL; + *hashlen = 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Create a new walk context stack. + */ +static STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *walk_ctx_stack_new(void) +{ + return sk_walk_ctx_t_new_null(); +} + +/** + * Push a walk context onto a walk context stack, return the new context. + */ +static walk_ctx_t *walk_ctx_stack_push(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + X509 *x, + const certinfo_t *certinfo) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w; + + if (x == NULL || + (certinfo == NULL) != (sk_walk_ctx_t_num(wsk) == 0) || + (w = malloc(sizeof(*w))) == NULL) + return NULL; + + memset(w, 0, sizeof(*w)); + w->cert = x; + if (certinfo != NULL) + w->certinfo = *certinfo; + else + memset(&w->certinfo, 0, sizeof(w->certinfo)); + + if (!sk_walk_ctx_t_push(wsk, w)) { + free(w); + return NULL; + } + + walk_ctx_attach(w); + return w; +} + +/** + * Pop and discard a walk context from a walk context stack. + */ +static void walk_ctx_stack_pop(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk) +{ + walk_ctx_detach(sk_walk_ctx_t_pop(wsk)); +} + +/** + * Clone a stack of walk contexts. + */ +static STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *walk_ctx_stack_clone(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *old_wsk) +{ + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *new_wsk; + int i; + if (old_wsk == NULL || (new_wsk = sk_walk_ctx_t_dup(old_wsk)) == NULL) + return NULL; + for (i = 0; i < sk_walk_ctx_t_num(new_wsk); i++) + walk_ctx_attach(sk_walk_ctx_t_value(new_wsk, i)); + return new_wsk; +} + +/** + * Extract certificate stack from walk context stack. Returns a newly + * created STACK_OF(X509) pointing to the existing cert objects. + * + * NB: This is a shallow copy, so use sk_X509_free() to free it, not + * sk_X509_pop_free(). + */ +static STACK_OF(X509) *walk_ctx_stack_certs(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk) +{ + STACK_OF(X509) *xsk = sk_X509_new_null(); + walk_ctx_t *w; + int i; + + assert(rc); + + for (i = 0; i < sk_walk_ctx_t_num(wsk); i++) + if ((w = sk_walk_ctx_t_value(wsk, i)) == NULL || + (w->cert != NULL && !sk_X509_push(xsk, w->cert))) + goto fail; + + return xsk; + + fail: + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't clone walk_ctx_stack, memory exhausted?"); + sk_X509_free(xsk); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Free a walk context stack, decrementing reference counts of each + * frame on it. + */ +static void walk_ctx_stack_free(STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk) +{ + sk_walk_ctx_t_pop_free(wsk, walk_ctx_detach); +} + + + +static int rsync_count_running(const rcynic_ctx_t *); + +/** + * Add a task to the task queue. + */ +static int task_add(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, void *), + void *cookie) +{ + task_t *t = malloc(sizeof(*t)); + + assert(rc && rc->task_queue && handler); + + assert(rsync_count_running(rc) <= rc->max_parallel_fetches); + + if (!t) + return 0; + + t->handler = handler; + t->cookie = cookie; + + if (sk_task_t_push(rc->task_queue, t)) + return 1; + + free(t); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Run tasks until queue is empty. + */ +static void task_run_q(rcynic_ctx_t *rc) +{ + task_t *t; + assert(rc && rc->task_queue); + while ((t = sk_task_t_shift(rc->task_queue)) != NULL) { + t->handler(rc, t->cookie); + free(t); + } +} + + + +/** + * Check cache of whether we've already fetched a particular URI. + */ +static rsync_history_t *rsync_history_uri(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri) +{ + rsync_history_t h; + char *s; + int i; + + assert(rc && uri && rc->rsync_history); + + if (!is_rsync(uri->s)) + return NULL; + + h.uri = *uri; + + while ((s = strrchr(h.uri.s, '/')) != NULL && s[1] == '\0') + *s = '\0'; + + while ((i = sk_rsync_history_t_find(rc->rsync_history, &h)) < 0) { + if ((s = strrchr(h.uri.s, '/')) == NULL || + (s - h.uri.s) < SIZEOF_RSYNC) + return NULL; + *s = '\0'; + } + + return sk_rsync_history_t_value(rc->rsync_history, i); +} + +/** + * Record that we've already attempted to synchronize a particular + * rsync URI. + */ +static void rsync_history_add(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const rsync_ctx_t *ctx, + const rsync_status_t status) +{ + int final_slash = 0; + rsync_history_t *h; + uri_t uri; + size_t n; + char *s; + + assert(rc && ctx && rc->rsync_history && is_rsync(ctx->uri.s)); + + uri = ctx->uri; + + while ((s = strrchr(uri.s, '/')) != NULL && s[1] == '\0') { + final_slash = 1; + *s = '\0'; + } + + if (status != rsync_status_done) { + + n = SIZEOF_RSYNC + strcspn(uri.s + SIZEOF_RSYNC, "/"); + assert(n < sizeof(uri.s)); + uri.s[n] = '\0'; + final_slash = 1; + + if ((h = rsync_history_uri(rc, &uri)) != NULL) { + assert(h->status != rsync_status_done); + return; + } + } + + if ((h = rsync_history_t_new()) != NULL) { + h->uri = uri; + h->status = status; + h->started = ctx->started; + h->finished = time(0); + h->final_slash = final_slash; + } + + if (h == NULL || !sk_rsync_history_t_push(rc->rsync_history, h)) { + rsync_history_t_free(h); + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, + "Couldn't add %s to rsync_history, blundering onwards", uri.s); + } +} + + + +/** + * Return count of how many rsync contexts are in running. + */ +static int rsync_count_running(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc) +{ + const rsync_ctx_t *ctx; + int i, n = 0; + + assert(rc && rc->rsync_queue); + + for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) { + switch (ctx->state) { + case rsync_state_running: + case rsync_state_closed: + case rsync_state_terminating: + n++; + default: + continue; + } + } + + return n; +} + +/** + * Test whether an rsync context conflicts with anything that's + * currently runable. + */ +static int rsync_conflicts(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const rsync_ctx_t *ctx) +{ + const rsync_ctx_t *c; + int i; + + assert(rc && ctx && rc->rsync_queue); + + for (i = 0; (c = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) + if (c != ctx && + (c->state == rsync_state_initial || + c->state == rsync_state_running) && + conflicting_uris(&c->uri, &ctx->uri)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Test whether a rsync context is runable at this time. + */ +static int rsync_runable(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const rsync_ctx_t *ctx) +{ + assert(rc && ctx); + + switch (ctx->state) { + + case rsync_state_initial: + case rsync_state_running: + return 1; + + case rsync_state_retry_wait: + return ctx->deadline <= time(0); + + case rsync_state_closed: + case rsync_state_terminating: + return 0; + + case rsync_state_conflict_wait: + return !rsync_conflicts(rc, ctx); + + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Return count of runable rsync contexts. + */ +static int rsync_count_runable(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc) +{ + const rsync_ctx_t *ctx; + int i, n = 0; + + assert(rc && rc->rsync_queue); + + for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) + if (rsync_runable(rc, ctx)) + n++; + + return n; +} + +/** + * Call rsync context handler, if one is set. + */ +static void rsync_call_handler(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + rsync_ctx_t *ctx, + const rsync_status_t status) +{ + if (!ctx) + return; + + switch (status) { + + case rsync_status_pending: + case rsync_status_done: + break; + + case rsync_status_failed: + log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri, rsync_transfer_failed, object_generation_null); + break; + + case rsync_status_timed_out: + log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri, rsync_transfer_timed_out, object_generation_null); + break; + + case rsync_status_skipped: + log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri, rsync_transfer_skipped, object_generation_null); + break; + } + + if (ctx->handler) + ctx->handler(rc, ctx, status, &ctx->uri, ctx->cookie); +} + +/** + * Run an rsync process. + */ +static void rsync_run(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + rsync_ctx_t *ctx) +{ + static const char * const rsync_cmd[] = { + "rsync", "--update", "--times", "--copy-links", "--itemize-changes" + }; + static const char * const rsync_tree_args[] = { + "--recursive", "--delete" + }; + + const char *argv[10]; + path_t path; + int i, argc = 0, flags, pipe_fds[2]; + + pipe_fds[0] = pipe_fds[1] = -1; + + assert(rc && ctx && ctx->pid == 0 && ctx->state != rsync_state_running && rsync_runable(rc, ctx)); + + if (rsync_history_uri(rc, &ctx->uri)) { + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Late rsync cache hit for %s", ctx->uri.s); + rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status_done); + (void) sk_rsync_ctx_t_delete_ptr(rc->rsync_queue, ctx); + free(ctx); + return; + } + + assert(rsync_count_running(rc) < rc->max_parallel_fetches); + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Fetching %s", ctx->uri.s); + + memset(argv, 0, sizeof(argv)); + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rsync_cmd)/sizeof(*rsync_cmd); i++) { + assert(argc < sizeof(argv)/sizeof(*argv)); + argv[argc++] = rsync_cmd[i]; + } + if (endswith(ctx->uri.s, "/")) { + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rsync_tree_args)/sizeof(*rsync_tree_args); i++) { + assert(argc < sizeof(argv)/sizeof(*argv)); + argv[argc++] = rsync_tree_args[i]; + } + } + + if (rc->rsync_program) + argv[0] = rc->rsync_program; + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, &ctx->uri, &path, &rc->unauthenticated)) { + logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Couldn't extract filename from URI: %s", ctx->uri.s); + goto lose; + } + + assert(argc < sizeof(argv)/sizeof(*argv)); + argv[argc++] = ctx->uri.s; + + assert(argc < sizeof(argv)/sizeof(*argv)); + argv[argc++] = path.s; + + if (!mkdir_maybe(rc, &path)) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't make target directory: %s", path.s); + goto lose; + } + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + logmsg(rc, log_debug, "rsync argv[%d]: %s", i, argv[i]); + + if (pipe(pipe_fds) < 0) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "pipe() failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + goto lose; + } + + switch ((ctx->pid = vfork())) { + + case -1: + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "vfork() failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + goto lose; + + case 0: + /* + * Child + */ +#define whine(msg) ((void) write(2, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1)) + if (close(pipe_fds[0]) < 0) + whine("close(pipe_fds[0]) failed\n"); + else if (dup2(pipe_fds[1], 1) < 0) + whine("dup2(pipe_fds[1], 1) failed\n"); + else if (dup2(pipe_fds[1], 2) < 0) + whine("dup2(pipe_fds[1], 2) failed\n"); + else if (close(pipe_fds[1]) < 0) + whine("close(pipe_fds[1]) failed\n"); + else if (execvp(argv[0], (char * const *) argv) < 0) + whine("execvp(argv[0], (char * const *) argv) failed\n"); + whine("last system error: "); + write(2, strerror(errno), strlen(strerror(errno))); + whine("\n"); + _exit(1); +#undef whine + + default: + /* + * Parent + */ + ctx->fd = pipe_fds[0]; + if ((flags = fcntl(ctx->fd, F_GETFL, 0)) == -1 || + fcntl(ctx->fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "fcntl(ctx->fd, F_[GS]ETFL, O_NONBLOCK) failed: %s", + strerror(errno)); + goto lose; + } + (void) close(pipe_fds[1]); + ctx->state = rsync_state_running; + ctx->problem = rsync_problem_none; + if (!ctx->started) + ctx->started = time(0); + if (rc->rsync_timeout) + ctx->deadline = time(0) + rc->rsync_timeout; + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Subprocess %u started, queued %d, runable %d, running %d, max %d, URI %s", + (unsigned) ctx->pid, sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue), rsync_count_runable(rc), rsync_count_running(rc), rc->max_parallel_fetches, ctx->uri.s); + rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status_pending); + return; + + } + + lose: + if (pipe_fds[0] != -1) + (void) close(pipe_fds[0]); + if (pipe_fds[1] != -1) + (void) close(pipe_fds[1]); + if (rc->rsync_queue && ctx) + (void) sk_rsync_ctx_t_delete_ptr(rc->rsync_queue, ctx); + rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status_failed); + if (ctx->pid > 0) { + (void) kill(ctx->pid, SIGKILL); + ctx->pid = 0; + } +} + +/** + * Process one line of rsync's output. This is a separate function + * primarily to centralize scraping for magic error strings. + */ +static void do_one_rsync_log_line(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + rsync_ctx_t *ctx) +{ + unsigned u; + char *s; + + /* + * Send line to our log unless it's empty. + */ + if (ctx->buffer[strspn(ctx->buffer, " \t\n\r")] != '\0') + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "rsync[%u]: %s", ctx->pid, ctx->buffer); + + /* + * Check for magic error strings + */ + if ((s = strstr(ctx->buffer, "@ERROR: max connections")) != NULL) { + ctx->problem = rsync_problem_refused; + if (sscanf(s, "@ERROR: max connections (%u) reached -- try again later", &u) == 1) + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Subprocess %u reported limit of %u for %s", ctx->pid, u, ctx->uri.s); + } +} + +/** + * Construct select() arguments. + */ +static int rsync_construct_select(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const time_t now, + fd_set *rfds, + struct timeval *tv) +{ + rsync_ctx_t *ctx; + time_t when = 0; + int i, n = 0; + + assert(rc && rc->rsync_queue && rfds && tv && rc->max_select_time >= 0); + + FD_ZERO(rfds); + + for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) { + +#if 0 + logmsg(rc, log_debug, "+++ ctx[%d] pid %d fd %d state %s started %lu deadline %lu", + i, ctx->pid, ctx->fd, rsync_state_label[ctx->state], + (unsigned long) ctx->started, (unsigned long) ctx->deadline); +#endif + + switch (ctx->state) { + + case rsync_state_running: + assert(ctx->fd >= 0); + FD_SET(ctx->fd, rfds); + if (ctx->fd > n) + n = ctx->fd; + if (!rc->rsync_timeout) + continue; + /* Fall through */ + + case rsync_state_retry_wait: + if (when == 0 || ctx->deadline < when) + when = ctx->deadline; + /* Fall through */ + + default: + continue; + } + } + + if (!when) + tv->tv_sec = rc->max_select_time; + else if (when < now) + tv->tv_sec = 0; + else if (when < now + rc->max_select_time) + tv->tv_sec = when - now; + else + tv->tv_sec = rc->max_select_time; + tv->tv_usec = 0; + return n; +} + +/** + * Convert rsync_status_t to mib_counter_t. + * + * Maybe some day this will go away and we won't be carrying + * essentially the same information in two different databases, but + * for now I'll settle for cleaning up the duplicate code logic. + */ +static mib_counter_t rsync_status_to_mib_counter(rsync_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case rsync_status_done: return rsync_transfer_succeeded; + case rsync_status_timed_out: return rsync_transfer_timed_out; + case rsync_status_failed: return rsync_transfer_failed; + case rsync_status_skipped: return rsync_transfer_skipped; + default: + /* + * Keep GCC from whining about untested cases. + */ + assert(status == rsync_status_done || + status == rsync_status_timed_out || + status == rsync_status_failed || + status == rsync_status_skipped); + return rsync_transfer_failed; + } +} + +/** + * Manager for queue of rsync tasks in progress. + * + * General plan here is to process one completed child, or output + * accumulated from children, or block if there is absolutely nothing + * to do, on the theory that caller had nothing to do either or would + * not have called us. Once we've done something allegedly useful, we + * return, because this is not the event loop; if and when the event + * loop has nothing more important to do, we'll be called again. + * + * So this is the only place where the program blocks waiting for + * children, but we only do it when we know there's nothing else + * useful that we could be doing while we wait. + */ +static void rsync_mgr(rcynic_ctx_t *rc) +{ + rsync_status_t rsync_status; + int i, n, pid_status = -1; + rsync_ctx_t *ctx = NULL; + time_t now = time(0); + struct timeval tv; + fd_set rfds; + pid_t pid; + char *s; + + assert(rc && rc->rsync_queue); + + /* + * Check for exited subprocesses. + */ + + while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &pid_status, WNOHANG)) > 0) { + + /* + * Child exited, handle it. + */ + + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Subprocess %u exited with status %d", + (unsigned) pid, WEXITSTATUS(pid_status)); + + for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) + if (ctx->pid == pid) + break; + if (ctx == NULL) { + assert(i == sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue)); + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't find rsync context for pid %d", pid); + continue; + } + + close(ctx->fd); + ctx->fd = -1; + + if (ctx->buflen > 0) { + assert(ctx->buflen < sizeof(ctx->buffer)); + ctx->buffer[ctx->buflen] = '\0'; + do_one_rsync_log_line(rc, ctx); + ctx->buflen = 0; + } + + switch (WEXITSTATUS(pid_status)) { + + case 0: + rsync_status = rsync_status_done; + break; + + case 5: /* "Error starting client-server protocol" */ + /* + * Handle remote rsyncd refusing to talk to us because we've + * exceeded its connection limit. Back off for a short + * interval, then retry. + */ + if (ctx->problem == rsync_problem_refused && ctx->tries < rc->max_retries) { + unsigned char r; + if (!RAND_bytes(&r, sizeof(r))) + r = 60; + ctx->deadline = time(0) + rc->retry_wait_min + r; + ctx->state = rsync_state_retry_wait; + ctx->problem = rsync_problem_none; + ctx->pid = 0; + ctx->tries++; + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Scheduling retry for %s", ctx->uri.s); + continue; + } + goto failure; + + case 23: /* "Partial transfer due to error" */ + /* + * This appears to be a catch-all for "something bad happened + * trying to do what you asked me to do". In the cases I've + * seen to date, this is things like "the directory you + * requested isn't there" or "NFS exploded when I tried to touch + * the directory". These aren't network layer failures, so we + * (probably) shouldn't give up on the repository host. + */ + rsync_status = rsync_status_done; + log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri, rsync_partial_transfer, object_generation_null); + break; + + default: + failure: + rsync_status = rsync_status_failed; + logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "rsync %u exited with status %d fetching %s", + (unsigned) pid, WEXITSTATUS(pid_status), ctx->uri.s); + break; + } + + if (rc->rsync_timeout && now >= ctx->deadline) + rsync_status = rsync_status_timed_out; + log_validation_status(rc, &ctx->uri, + rsync_status_to_mib_counter(rsync_status), + object_generation_null); + rsync_history_add(rc, ctx, rsync_status); + rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status); + (void) sk_rsync_ctx_t_delete_ptr(rc->rsync_queue, ctx); + free(ctx); + ctx = NULL; + } + + if (pid == -1 && errno != EINTR && errno != ECHILD) + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "waitpid() returned error: %s", strerror(errno)); + + assert(rsync_count_running(rc) <= rc->max_parallel_fetches); + + /* + * Look for rsync contexts that have become runable. Odd loop + * structure is because rsync_run() might decide to remove the + * specified rsync task from the queue instead of running it. + */ + for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; i++) { + n = sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue); + if (ctx->state != rsync_state_running && + rsync_runable(rc, ctx) && + rsync_count_running(rc) < rc->max_parallel_fetches) + rsync_run(rc, ctx); + if (n > sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue)) + i--; + } + + assert(rsync_count_running(rc) <= rc->max_parallel_fetches); + + /* + * Check for log text from subprocesses. + */ + + n = rsync_construct_select(rc, now, &rfds, &tv); + + if (n > 0 && tv.tv_sec) + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Waiting up to %u seconds for rsync, queued %d, runable %d, running %d, max %d", + (unsigned) tv.tv_sec, sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc->rsync_queue), rsync_count_runable(rc), + rsync_count_running(rc), rc->max_parallel_fetches); + + if (n > 0) { +#if 0 + logmsg(rc, log_debug, "++ select(%d, %u)", n, tv.tv_sec); +#endif + n = select(n + 1, &rfds, NULL, NULL, &tv); + } + + if (n > 0) { + + for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) { + if (ctx->fd <= 0 || !FD_ISSET(ctx->fd, &rfds)) + continue; + + assert(ctx->buflen < sizeof(ctx->buffer) - 1); + + while ((n = read(ctx->fd, ctx->buffer + ctx->buflen, sizeof(ctx->buffer) - 1 - ctx->buflen)) > 0) { + ctx->buflen += n; + assert(ctx->buflen < sizeof(ctx->buffer)); + ctx->buffer[ctx->buflen] = '\0'; + + while ((s = strchr(ctx->buffer, '\n')) != NULL) { + *s++ = '\0'; + do_one_rsync_log_line(rc, ctx); + assert(s > ctx->buffer && s < ctx->buffer + sizeof(ctx->buffer)); + ctx->buflen -= s - ctx->buffer; + assert(ctx->buflen < sizeof(ctx->buffer)); + if (ctx->buflen > 0) + memmove(ctx->buffer, s, ctx->buflen); + ctx->buffer[ctx->buflen] = '\0'; + } + + if (ctx->buflen == sizeof(ctx->buffer) - 1) { + ctx->buffer[sizeof(ctx->buffer) - 1] = '\0'; + do_one_rsync_log_line(rc, ctx); + ctx->buflen = 0; + } + } + + if (n == 0) { + (void) close(ctx->fd); + ctx->fd = -1; + ctx->state = rsync_state_closed; + } + } + } + + assert(rsync_count_running(rc) <= rc->max_parallel_fetches); + + /* + * Deal with children that have been running too long. + */ + if (rc->rsync_timeout) { + for (i = 0; (ctx = sk_rsync_ctx_t_value(rc->rsync_queue, i)) != NULL; ++i) { + int sig; + if (ctx->pid <= 0 || now < ctx->deadline) + continue; + sig = ctx->tries++ < KILL_MAX ? SIGTERM : SIGKILL; + if (ctx->state != rsync_state_terminating) { + ctx->problem = rsync_problem_timed_out; + ctx->state = rsync_state_terminating; + ctx->tries = 0; + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Subprocess %u is taking too long fetching %s, whacking it", (unsigned) ctx->pid, ctx->uri.s); + rsync_history_add(rc, ctx, rsync_status_timed_out); + } else if (sig == SIGTERM) { + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Whacking subprocess %u again", (unsigned) ctx->pid); + } else { + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Whacking subprocess %u with big hammer", (unsigned) ctx->pid); + } + (void) kill(ctx->pid, sig); + ctx->deadline = now + 1; + } + } +} + +/** + * Set up rsync context and attempt to start it. + */ +static void rsync_init(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + void *cookie, + void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, const rsync_ctx_t *, const rsync_status_t, const uri_t *, void *)) +{ + rsync_ctx_t *ctx = NULL; + + assert(rc && uri && strlen(uri->s) > SIZEOF_RSYNC); + + if (!rc->run_rsync) { + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "rsync disabled, skipping %s", uri->s); + if (handler) + handler(rc, NULL, rsync_status_skipped, uri, cookie); + return; + } + + if (rsync_history_uri(rc, uri)) { + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "rsync cache hit for %s", uri->s); + if (handler) + handler(rc, NULL, rsync_status_done, uri, cookie); + return; + } + + if ((ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "malloc(rsync_ctxt_t) failed"); + if (handler) + handler(rc, NULL, rsync_status_failed, uri, cookie); + return; + } + + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + ctx->uri = *uri; + ctx->handler = handler; + ctx->cookie = cookie; + ctx->fd = -1; + + if (!sk_rsync_ctx_t_push(rc->rsync_queue, ctx)) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't push rsync state object onto queue, punting %s", ctx->uri.s); + rsync_call_handler(rc, ctx, rsync_status_failed); + free(ctx); + return; + } + + if (rsync_conflicts(rc, ctx)) { + logmsg(rc, log_debug, "New rsync context %s is feeling conflicted", ctx->uri.s); + ctx->state = rsync_state_conflict_wait; + } +} + +/** + * rsync a trust anchor. + */ +static void rsync_ta(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + tal_ctx_t *tctx, + void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, const rsync_ctx_t *, + const rsync_status_t, const uri_t *, void *)) +{ + assert(endswith(uri->s, ".cer")); + rsync_init(rc, uri, tctx, handler); +} + +/** + * rsync an entire subtree, generally rooted at a SIA collection. + */ +static void rsync_tree(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + void (*handler)(rcynic_ctx_t *, const rsync_ctx_t *, + const rsync_status_t, const uri_t *, void *)) +{ + assert(endswith(uri->s, "/")); + rsync_init(rc, uri, wsk, handler); +} + + + +/** + * Clean up old stuff from previous rsync runs. --delete doesn't help + * if the URI changes and we never visit the old URI again. + */ +static int prune_unauthenticated(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const path_t *name, + const size_t baselen) +{ + path_t path; + struct dirent *d; + DIR *dir; + const char *slash; + + assert(rc && name && baselen > 0 && strlen(name->s) >= baselen); + + if (!is_directory(name)) { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "prune: %s is not a directory", name->s); + return 0; + } + + if ((dir = opendir(name->s)) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "prune: opendir() failed on %s: %s", name->s, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + slash = endswith(name->s, "/") ? "" : "/"; + + while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { + if (!strcmp(d->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(d->d_name, "..")) + continue; + + if (snprintf(path.s, sizeof(path.s), "%s%s%s", name->s, slash, d->d_name) >= sizeof(path.s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_debug, "prune: %s%s%s too long", name->s, slash, d->d_name); + goto done; + } + + if (validation_status_find_filename(rc, path.s + baselen)) { + logmsg(rc, log_debug, "prune: cache hit %s", path.s); + continue; + } + + if (unlink(path.s) == 0) { + logmsg(rc, log_debug, "prune: removed %s", path.s); + continue; + } + + if (prune_unauthenticated(rc, &path, baselen)) + continue; + + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "prune: removing %s failed: %s", path.s, strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } + + if (rmdir(name->s) == 0) + logmsg(rc, log_debug, "prune: removed %s", name->s); + else if (errno != ENOTEMPTY) + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "prune: couldn't remove %s: %s", name->s, strerror(errno)); + + done: + closedir(dir); + return !d; +} + + + +/** + * Read a DER object using a BIO pipeline that hashes the file content + * as we read it. Returns the internal form of the parsed DER object, + * sets the hash buffer (if specified) as a side effect. The default + * hash algorithm is SHA-256. + */ +static void *read_file_with_hash(const path_t *filename, + const ASN1_ITEM *it, + const EVP_MD *md, + hashbuf_t *hash) +{ + void *result = NULL; + BIO *b; + + if ((b = BIO_new_file(filename->s, "rb")) == NULL) + goto error; + + if (hash != NULL) { + BIO *b2 = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); + if (b2 == NULL) + goto error; + if (md == NULL) + md = EVP_sha256(); + if (!BIO_set_md(b2, md)) { + BIO_free(b2); + goto error; + } + BIO_push(b2, b); + b = b2; + } + + if ((result = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(it, b, NULL)) == NULL) + goto error; + + if (hash != NULL) { + memset(hash, 0, sizeof(*hash)); + BIO_gets(b, (char *) hash, sizeof(hash->h)); + } + + error: + BIO_free_all(b); + return result; +} + +/** + * Read and hash a certificate. + */ +static X509 *read_cert(const path_t *filename, hashbuf_t *hash) +{ + return read_file_with_hash(filename, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), NULL, hash); +} + +/** + * Read and hash a CRL. + */ +static X509_CRL *read_crl(const path_t *filename, hashbuf_t *hash) +{ + return read_file_with_hash(filename, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), NULL, hash); +} + +/** + * Read and hash a CMS message. + */ +static CMS_ContentInfo *read_cms(const path_t *filename, hashbuf_t *hash) +{ + return read_file_with_hash(filename, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo), NULL, hash); +} + + + +/** + * Extract CRLDP data from a certificate. Stops looking after finding + * the first rsync URI. + */ +static int extract_crldp_uri(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + const object_generation_t generation, + const STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp, + uri_t *result) +{ + DIST_POINT *d; + int i; + + assert(rc && uri && crldp && result); + + if (sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp) != 1) + goto bad; + + d = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, 0); + + if (d->reasons || d->CRLissuer || !d->distpoint || d->distpoint->type != 0) + goto bad; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(d->distpoint->name.fullname); i++) { + GENERAL_NAME *n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(d->distpoint->name.fullname, i); + if (n == NULL || n->type != GEN_URI) + goto bad; + if (!is_rsync((char *) n->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->data)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, non_rsync_uri_in_extension, generation); + else if (sizeof(result->s) <= n->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->length) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, uri_too_long, generation); + else if (result->s[0]) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, multiple_rsync_uris_in_extension, generation); + else + strcpy(result->s, (char *) n->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->data); + } + + return result->s[0]; + + bad: + log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_crldp_extension, generation); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Extract SIA or AIA data from a certificate. + */ +static int extract_access_uri(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + const object_generation_t generation, + const AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *xia, + const int nid, + uri_t *result, + int *count) +{ + int i; + + assert(rc && uri && xia && result && count); + + for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(xia); i++) { + ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(xia, i); + if (a == NULL || a->location->type != GEN_URI) + return 0; + if (OBJ_obj2nid(a->method) != nid) + continue; + ++*count; + if (!is_rsync((char *) a->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->data)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, non_rsync_uri_in_extension, generation); + else if (sizeof(result->s) <= a->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->length) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, uri_too_long, generation); + else if (result->s[0]) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, multiple_rsync_uris_in_extension, generation); + else + strcpy(result->s, (char *) a->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier->data); + } + return 1; +} + + + +/** + * Check to see whether an AKI extension is present, is of the right + * form, and matches the issuer. + */ +static int check_aki(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + const X509 *issuer, + const AUTHORITY_KEYID *aki, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + assert(rc && uri && issuer && issuer->skid); + + if (aki == NULL) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, aki_extension_missing, generation); + return 0; + } + + if (!aki->keyid || aki->serial || aki->issuer) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, aki_extension_wrong_format, generation); + return 0; + } + + if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(aki->keyid, issuer->skid)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, aki_extension_issuer_mismatch, generation); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + + + +/** + * Check whether a Distinguished Name conforms to the rescert profile. + * The profile is very restrictive: it only allows one mandatory + * CommonName field and one optional SerialNumber field, both of which + * must be of type PrintableString. + */ +static int check_allowed_dn(X509_NAME *dn) +{ + X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; + ASN1_STRING *s; + int loc; + + if (dn == NULL) + return 0; + + switch (X509_NAME_entry_count(dn)) { + + case 2: + if ((loc = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn, NID_serialNumber, -1)) < 0 || + (ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn, loc)) == NULL || + (s = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne)) == NULL || + ASN1_STRING_type(s) != V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) + return 0; + + /* Fall through */ + + case 1: + if ((loc = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn, NID_commonName, -1)) < 0 || + (ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn, loc)) == NULL || + (s = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne)) == NULL || + ASN1_STRING_type(s) != V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) + return 0; + + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Check whether an ASN.1 TIME value conforms to RFC 5280 4.1.2.5. + */ +static int check_allowed_time_encoding(ASN1_TIME *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + + case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: + return t->length == sizeof("yymmddHHMMSSZ") - 1; + + case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: + return (t->length == sizeof("yyyymmddHHMMSSZ") - 1 && + strcmp("205", (char *) t->data) <= 0); + + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * Compare ASN1_TIME values. + */ +static int asn1_time_cmp(ASN1_TIME *t1, ASN1_TIME *t2) +{ + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *g1 = ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(t1, NULL); + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *g2 = ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(t2, NULL); + + int cmp = ASN1_STRING_cmp(g1, g2); + + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(g1); + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(g2); + + return cmp; +} + + + +/** + * Attempt to read and check one CRL from disk. + */ + +static X509_CRL *check_crl_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + path_t *path, + const path_t *prefix, + X509 *issuer, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked; + X509_CRL *crl = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + int i, ret; + + assert(uri && path && issuer); + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, path, prefix) || + (crl = read_crl(path, NULL)) == NULL) + goto punt; + + if (X509_CRL_get_version(crl) != 1) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_object_version, generation); + goto punt; + } + + if (!crl->crl || !crl->crl->sig_alg || !crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm || + OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm) != NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_signature_algorithm, generation); + goto punt; + } + + if (!check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) || + !check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_asn1_time_value, generation); + goto punt; + } + + if (X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) > 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_not_yet_valid, generation); + goto punt; + } + + if (X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) < 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, stale_crl_or_manifest, generation); + if (!rc->allow_stale_crl) + goto punt; + } + + if (!check_aki(rc, uri, issuer, crl->akid, generation)) + goto punt; + + if (crl->crl_number == NULL) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_number_extension_missing, generation); + goto punt; + } + + if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(crl->crl_number, asn1_zero) < 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_number_is_negative, generation); + goto punt; + } + + if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(crl->crl_number, asn1_twenty_octets) > 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_number_out_of_range, generation); + goto punt; + } + + if (X509_CRL_get_ext_count(crl) != 2) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, disallowed_x509v3_extension, generation); + goto punt; + } + + if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), X509_get_subject_name(issuer))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_issuer_name_mismatch, generation); + goto punt; + } + + if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_issuer_name, generation); + if (!rc->allow_nonconformant_name) + goto punt; + } + + if ((revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl)) != NULL) { + for (i = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked) - 1; i >= 0; --i) { + if (X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i)) > 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, disallowed_x509v3_extension, generation); + goto punt; + } + } + } + + if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer)) == NULL) + goto punt; + ret = X509_CRL_verify(crl, pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + if (ret > 0) + return crl; + + punt: + X509_CRL_free(crl); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Check whether we already have a particular CRL, attempt to fetch it + * and check issuer's signature if we don't. + * + * General plan here is to do basic checks on both current and backup + * generation CRLs, then, if both generations pass all of our other + * tests, pick the generation with the highest CRL number, to protect + * against replay attacks. + */ +static X509_CRL *check_crl(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + X509 *issuer) +{ + X509_CRL *old_crl, *new_crl, *result = NULL; + path_t old_path, new_path; + + if (uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &new_path, &rc->new_authenticated) && + (new_crl = read_crl(&new_path, NULL)) != NULL) + return new_crl; + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking CRL %s", uri->s); + + new_crl = check_crl_1(rc, uri, &new_path, &rc->unauthenticated, + issuer, object_generation_current); + + old_crl = check_crl_1(rc, uri, &old_path, &rc->old_authenticated, + issuer, object_generation_backup); + + if (!new_crl) + result = old_crl; + + else if (!old_crl) + result = new_crl; + + else { + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *g_old = ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(old_crl), NULL); + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *g_new = ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(new_crl), NULL); + int num_cmp = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(old_crl->crl_number, new_crl->crl_number); + int date_cmp = (!g_old || !g_new) ? 0 : ASN1_STRING_cmp(g_old, g_new); + + if (!g_old) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_thisupdate, object_generation_backup); + if (!g_new) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_thisupdate, object_generation_current); + if (num_cmp > 0) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, backup_number_higher_than_current, object_generation_current); + if (g_old && g_new && date_cmp > 0) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, backup_thisupdate_newer_than_current, object_generation_current); + + if (num_cmp > 0 && (!g_old || !g_new || date_cmp > 0)) + result = old_crl; + else + result = new_crl; + + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(g_old); + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(g_new); + } + + if (result && result == new_crl) + install_object(rc, uri, &new_path, object_generation_current); + else if (!access(new_path.s, F_OK)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_current); + + if (result && result == old_crl) + install_object(rc, uri, &old_path, object_generation_backup); + else if (!result && !access(old_path.s, F_OK)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_backup); + + if (result != new_crl) + X509_CRL_free(new_crl); + + if (result != old_crl) + X509_CRL_free(old_crl); + + return result; +} + + +/** + * Check digest of a CRL we've already accepted. + */ +static int check_crl_digest(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri, + const unsigned char *hash, + const size_t hashlen) +{ + X509_CRL *crl = NULL; + hashbuf_t hashbuf; + path_t path; + int result; + + assert(rc && uri && hash); + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &path, &rc->new_authenticated) || + (crl = read_crl(&path, &hashbuf)) == NULL) + return 0; + + result = hashlen <= sizeof(hashbuf.h) && !memcmp(hashbuf.h, hash, hashlen); + + X509_CRL_free(crl); + + return result; +} + + + +/** + * Validation callback function for use with x509_verify_cert(). + */ +static int check_x509_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +{ + rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t *rctx = (rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t *) ctx; + mib_counter_t code; + + assert(rctx != NULL); + + switch (ctx->error) { + case X509_V_OK: + return ok; + + case X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: + /* + * Informational events, not really errors. ctx->check_issued() + * is called in many places where failure to find an issuer is not + * a failure for the calling function. Just leave these alone. + */ + return ok; + + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: + /* + * This isn't really an error, exactly. CRLs don't really + * "expire". What OpenSSL really means by this error is just + * "it's now later than the issuer said it intended to publish a + * new CRL". Whether we treat this as an error or not is + * configurable, see the allow_stale_crl parameter. + * + * Deciding whether to allow stale CRLs is check_crl_1()'s job, + * not ours. By the time this callback occurs, we've already + * accepted the CRL; this callback is just notifying us that the + * object being checked is tainted by a stale CRL. So we mark the + * object as tainted and carry on. + */ + log_validation_status(rctx->rc, &rctx->subject->uri, tainted_by_stale_crl, rctx->subject->generation); + ok = 1; + return ok; + + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: + /* + * This is another error that's only an error in the strange world + * of OpenSSL, but a more serious one. By default, OpenSSL + * expects all trust anchors to be self-signed. This is not a + * PKIX requirement, it's just an OpenSSL thing, but one violates + * it at one's peril, because the only way to convince OpenSSL to + * allow a non-self-signed trust anchor is to intercept this + * "error" in the verify callback handler. + * + * So this program supports non-self-signed trust anchors, but be + * warned that enabling this feature may cause this program's + * output not to work with other OpenSSL-based applications. + */ + if (rctx->rc->allow_non_self_signed_trust_anchor) + ok = 1; + log_validation_status(rctx->rc, &rctx->subject->uri, trust_anchor_not_self_signed, rctx->subject->generation); + return ok; + + /* + * Select correct MIB counter for every known OpenSSL verify errors + * except the ones we handle explicitly above, then fall through to + * common handling for all of these. + */ +#define QV(x) \ + case x: \ + code = mib_openssl_##x; \ + break; + MIB_COUNTERS_FROM_OPENSSL; +#undef QV + + default: + code = unknown_openssl_verify_error; + break; + } + + log_validation_status(rctx->rc, &rctx->subject->uri, code, rctx->subject->generation); + return ok; +} + +/** + * Check crypto aspects of a certificate, policy OID, RFC 3779 path + * validation, and conformance to the RPKI certificate profile. + */ +static int check_x509(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + const uri_t *uri, + X509 *x, + certinfo_t *certinfo, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + rcynic_x509_store_ctx_t rctx; + EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey = NULL, *subject_pkey = NULL; + unsigned long flags = (X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY | X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT); + AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *sia = NULL, *aia = NULL; + STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *policies = NULL; + ASN1_BIT_STRING *ski_pubkey = NULL; + STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp = NULL; + EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku = NULL; + BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bc = NULL; + hashbuf_t ski_hashbuf; + unsigned ski_hashlen, afi; + int i, ok, crit, loc, ex_count, routercert = 0, ret = 0; + + assert(rc && wsk && w && uri && x && w->cert); + + /* + * Cleanup logic will explode if rctx.ctx hasn't been initialized, + * so we need to do this before running any test that can fail. + */ + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&rctx.ctx, rc->x509_store, x, NULL)) + return 0; + + /* + * certinfo == NULL means x is a self-signed trust anchor. + */ + if (certinfo == NULL) + certinfo = &w->certinfo; + + memset(certinfo, 0, sizeof(*certinfo)); + + certinfo->uri = *uri; + certinfo->generation = generation; + + if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(x), asn1_zero) <= 0 || + ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(x), asn1_twenty_octets) > 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_certificate_serial_number, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (!check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notBefore(x)) || + !check_allowed_time_encoding(X509_get_notAfter(x))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_asn1_time_value, generation); + goto done; + } + + /* + * Apparently nothing ever looks at these fields, so there are no + * API functions for them. We wouldn't bother either if they + * weren't forbidden by the RPKI certificate profile. + */ + if (!x->cert_info || x->cert_info->issuerUID || x->cert_info->subjectUID) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_certificate_uid, generation); + goto done; + } + + /* + * Keep track of allowed extensions we've seen. Once we've + * processed all the ones we expect, anything left is an error. + */ + ex_count = X509_get_ext_count(x); + + /* + * We don't use X509_check_ca() to set certinfo->ca anymore, because + * it's not paranoid enough to enforce the RPKI certificate profile, + * but we still call it because we need it (or something) to invoke + * x509v3_cache_extensions() for us. + */ + (void) X509_check_ca(x); + + if ((bc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + ex_count--; + if (!crit || bc->ca <= 0 || bc->pathlen != NULL) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_basic_constraints, generation); + goto done; + } + } + + certinfo->ca = bc != NULL; + + if (certinfo == &w->certinfo) { + certinfo->ta = 1; + if (!certinfo->ca) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_trust_anchor, generation); + goto done; + } + } + + if ((aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { + int n_caIssuers = 0; + ex_count--; + if (!extract_access_uri(rc, uri, generation, aia, NID_ad_ca_issuers, + &certinfo->aia, &n_caIssuers) || + !certinfo->aia.s[0] || + sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia) != n_caIssuers) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_aia_extension, generation); + goto done; + } + } + + if (certinfo->ta && aia) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, aia_extension_forbidden, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (!certinfo->ta && !aia) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, aia_extension_missing, generation); + goto done; + } + + if ((eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + ex_count--; + if (crit || certinfo->ca || !endswith(uri->s, ".cer") || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku) == 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, inappropriate_eku_extension, generation); + goto done; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) + routercert |= OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i)) == NID_id_kp_bgpsec_router; + } + + if ((sia = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sinfo_access, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { + int got_caDirectory, got_rpkiManifest, got_signedObject; + int n_caDirectory = 0, n_rpkiManifest = 0, n_signedObject = 0; + ex_count--; + ok = (extract_access_uri(rc, uri, generation, sia, NID_caRepository, + &certinfo->sia, &n_caDirectory) && + extract_access_uri(rc, uri, generation, sia, NID_ad_rpkiManifest, + &certinfo->manifest, &n_rpkiManifest) && + extract_access_uri(rc, uri, generation, sia, NID_ad_signedObject, + &certinfo->signedobject, &n_signedObject)); + got_caDirectory = certinfo->sia.s[0] != '\0'; + got_rpkiManifest = certinfo->manifest.s[0] != '\0'; + got_signedObject = certinfo->signedobject.s[0] != '\0'; + ok &= sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(sia) == n_caDirectory + n_rpkiManifest + n_signedObject; + if (certinfo->ca) + ok &= got_caDirectory && got_rpkiManifest && !got_signedObject; + else if (rc->allow_ee_without_signedObject) + ok &= !got_caDirectory && !got_rpkiManifest; + else + ok &= !got_caDirectory && !got_rpkiManifest && got_signedObject; + if (!ok) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_sia_extension, generation); + goto done; + } + } else if (certinfo->ca || !rc->allow_ee_without_signedObject) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, sia_extension_missing, generation); + goto done; + } else if (!routercert) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, sia_extension_missing_from_ee, generation); + } + + if (certinfo->signedobject.s[0] && strcmp(uri->s, certinfo->signedobject.s)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_signed_object_uri, generation); + + if ((crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { + ex_count--; + if (!extract_crldp_uri(rc, uri, generation, crldp, &certinfo->crldp)) + goto done; + } + + rctx.rc = rc; + rctx.subject = certinfo; + + if (w->certs == NULL && (w->certs = walk_ctx_stack_certs(rc, wsk)) == NULL) + goto done; + + if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_object_version, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (!x->cert_info || !x->cert_info->signature || !x->cert_info->signature->algorithm || + OBJ_obj2nid(x->cert_info->signature->algorithm) != NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_signature_algorithm, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (certinfo->sia.s[0] && certinfo->sia.s[strlen(certinfo->sia.s) - 1] != '/') { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_cadirectory_uri, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (!w->certinfo.ta && strcmp(w->certinfo.uri.s, certinfo->aia.s)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, aia_doesnt_match_issuer, generation); + + if (certinfo->ca && !certinfo->sia.s[0]) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, sia_cadirectory_uri_missing, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (certinfo->ca && !certinfo->manifest.s[0]) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, sia_manifest_uri_missing, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (certinfo->ca && !startswith(certinfo->manifest.s, certinfo->sia.s)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_carepository_mismatch, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (x->skid) { + ex_count--; + } else { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, ski_extension_missing, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_get_subject_name(x))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_subject_name, generation); + if (!rc->allow_nonconformant_name) + goto done; + } + + if (!check_allowed_dn(X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_issuer_name, generation); + if (!rc->allow_nonconformant_name) + goto done; + } + + if ((policies = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_certificate_policies, &crit, NULL)) != NULL) { + POLICYQUALINFO *qualifier = NULL; + POLICYINFO *policy = NULL; + ex_count--; + if (!crit || sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) != 1 || + (policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, 0)) == NULL || + OBJ_obj2nid(policy->policyid) != NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber || + sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(policy->qualifiers) > 1 || + (sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(policy->qualifiers) == 1 && + ((qualifier = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(policy->qualifiers, 0)) == NULL || + OBJ_obj2nid(qualifier->pqualid) != NID_id_qt_cps))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_certificate_policy, generation); + goto done; + } + if (qualifier) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, policy_qualifier_cps, generation); + } + + if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_key_usage, -1))) || + (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0 || + x->ex_kusage != (certinfo->ca ? KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | KU_CRL_SIGN : KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_key_usage, generation); + goto done; + } + ex_count--; + + if (x->rfc3779_addr) { + ex_count--; + if (routercert || + (loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, -1)) < 0 || + !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, loc)) || + !v3_addr_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_addr) || + sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr) == 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_ipaddrblocks, generation); + goto done; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr); i++) { + IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, i); + afi = v3_addr_get_afi(f); + if (afi != IANA_AFI_IPV4 && afi != IANA_AFI_IPV6) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, unknown_afi, generation); + goto done; + } + if (f->addressFamily->length != 2) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, safi_not_allowed, generation); + goto done; + } + } + } + + if (x->rfc3779_asid) { + ex_count--; + if ((loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, -1)) < 0 || + !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext(x, loc)) || + !v3_asid_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_asid) || + x->rfc3779_asid->asnum == NULL || + x->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL || + (routercert && x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_asidentifiers, generation); + goto done; + } + } + + if (!x->rfc3779_addr && !x->rfc3779_asid) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, missing_resources, generation); + goto done; + } + + subject_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + ok = subject_pkey != NULL; + if (ok) { + ASN1_OBJECT *algorithm; + + (void) X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&algorithm, NULL, NULL, NULL, X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x)); + + switch (OBJ_obj2nid(algorithm)) { + + case NID_rsaEncryption: + ok = (EVP_PKEY_type(subject_pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA && + BN_get_word(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->e) == 65537); + if (!ok) + break; + if (!certinfo->ca && rc->allow_1024_bit_ee_key && + BN_num_bits(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->n) == 1024) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, ee_certificate_with_1024_bit_key, generation); + else + ok = BN_num_bits(subject_pkey->pkey.rsa->n) == 2048; + break; + + case NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey: + ok = !certinfo->ca && routercert; + break; + + default: + ok = 0; + } + } + if (!ok) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_public_key, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (x->skid == NULL || + (ski_pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(x)) == NULL || + !EVP_Digest(ski_pubkey->data, ski_pubkey->length, + ski_hashbuf.h, &ski_hashlen, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || + ski_hashlen != 20 || + ski_hashlen != x->skid->length || + memcmp(ski_hashbuf.h, x->skid->data, ski_hashlen)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, ski_public_key_mismatch, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (x->akid) { + ex_count--; + if (!check_aki(rc, uri, w->cert, x->akid, generation)) + goto done; + } + + if (!x->akid && !certinfo->ta) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, aki_extension_missing, generation); + goto done; + } + + if ((issuer_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(w->cert)) == NULL || X509_verify(x, issuer_pkey) <= 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, certificate_bad_signature, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (certinfo->ta) { + + if (certinfo->crldp.s[0]) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, trust_anchor_with_crldp, generation); + goto done; + } + + } else { + + if (!certinfo->crldp.s[0]) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, crldp_uri_missing, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (!certinfo->ca && !startswith(certinfo->crldp.s, w->certinfo.sia.s)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, crldp_doesnt_match_issuer_sia, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (w->crls == NULL && ((w->crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null()) == NULL || + !sk_X509_CRL_push(w->crls, NULL))) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Internal allocation error setting up CRL for validation"); + goto done; + } + + assert(sk_X509_CRL_num(w->crls) == 1); + assert((w->crldp.s[0] == '\0') == (sk_X509_CRL_value(w->crls, 0) == NULL)); + + if (strcmp(w->crldp.s, certinfo->crldp.s)) { + X509_CRL *old_crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(w->crls, 0); + X509_CRL *new_crl = check_crl(rc, &certinfo->crldp, w->cert); + + if (w->crldp.s[0]) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, issuer_uses_multiple_crldp_values, generation); + + if (new_crl == NULL) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_crl, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (old_crl && new_crl && ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(old_crl->crl_number, new_crl->crl_number) < 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, crldp_names_newer_crl, generation); + X509_CRL_free(old_crl); + old_crl = NULL; + } + + if (old_crl == NULL) { + sk_X509_CRL_set(w->crls, 0, new_crl); + w->crldp = certinfo->crldp; + } else { + X509_CRL_free(new_crl); + } + } + + assert(sk_X509_CRL_value(w->crls, 0)); + flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK; + X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&rctx.ctx, w->crls); + } + + if (ex_count > 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, disallowed_x509v3_extension, generation); + goto done; + } + + assert(w->certs != NULL); + X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&rctx.ctx, w->certs); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&rctx.ctx, check_x509_cb); + + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(rctx.ctx.param, flags); + + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(rctx.ctx.param, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_cp_ipAddr_asNumber)); + + if (X509_verify_cert(&rctx.ctx) <= 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, certificate_failed_validation, generation); + goto done; + } + + ret = 1; + + done: + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&rctx.ctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(issuer_pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(subject_pkey); + BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bc); + sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(sia, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free); + sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(aia, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free); + sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free); + sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(policies, POLICYINFO_free); + sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(eku, ASN1_OBJECT_free); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * Extract one datum from a CMS_SignerInfo. + */ +static void *extract_si_datum(CMS_SignerInfo *si, + int *n, + const int optional, + const int nid, + const int asn1_type) +{ + int i = CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(si, nid, -1); + void *result = NULL; + X509_ATTRIBUTE *a; + + assert(si && n); + + if (i < 0 && optional) + return NULL; + + if (i >= 0 && + CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(si, nid, i) < 0 && + (a = CMS_signed_get_attr(si, i)) != NULL && + X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(a) == 1 && + (result = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(a, 0, asn1_type, NULL)) != NULL) + --*n; + else + *n = -1; + + return result; +} + +/** + * Check a signed CMS object. + */ +static int check_cms(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + const uri_t *uri, + path_t *path, + const path_t *prefix, + CMS_ContentInfo **pcms, + X509 **px, + certinfo_t *certinfo, + BIO *bio, + const unsigned char *hash, + const size_t hashlen, + const int expected_eContentType_nid, + const int require_inheritance, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *signer_infos = NULL; + CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; + CMS_SignerInfo *si = NULL; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sid = NULL; + X509_NAME *si_issuer = NULL; + ASN1_INTEGER *si_serial = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL; + X509_ALGOR *signature_alg = NULL, *digest_alg = NULL; + ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL; + hashbuf_t hashbuf; + X509 *x = NULL; + certinfo_t certinfo_; + int i, result = 0; + + assert(rc && wsk && uri && path && prefix); + + if (!certinfo) + certinfo = &certinfo_; + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, path, prefix)) + goto error; + + if (hash) + cms = read_cms(path, &hashbuf); + else + cms = read_cms(path, NULL); + + if (!cms) + goto error; + + if (hash && (hashlen > sizeof(hashbuf.h) || + memcmp(hashbuf.h, hash, hashlen))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, digest_mismatch, generation); + if (!rc->allow_digest_mismatch) + goto error; + } + + if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_eContentType(cms)) != expected_eContentType_nid) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_econtenttype, generation); + goto error; + } + + if (CMS_verify(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, bio, CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY) <= 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_validation_failure, generation); + goto error; + } + + if ((crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms)) != NULL) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_includes_crls, generation); + goto error; + } + + if ((signer_infos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms)) == NULL || + sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(signer_infos) != 1 || + (si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(signer_infos, 0)) == NULL || + !CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id(si, &sid, &si_issuer, &si_serial) || + sid == NULL || si_issuer != NULL || si_serial != NULL || + CMS_unsigned_get_attr_count(si) != -1) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_signer_infos, generation); + goto error; + } + + CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &x, &digest_alg, &signature_alg); + + if (x == NULL) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_signer_missing, generation); + goto error; + } + + if ((certs = CMS_get1_certs(cms)) == NULL || + sk_X509_num(certs) != 1 || + X509_cmp(x, sk_X509_value(certs, 0))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_signer, generation); + goto error; + } + + X509_ALGOR_get0(&oid, NULL, NULL, signature_alg); + i = OBJ_obj2nid(oid); + if (i != NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption && i != NID_rsaEncryption) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_cms_si_signature_algorithm, generation); + goto error; + } + + X509_ALGOR_get0(&oid, NULL, NULL, digest_alg); + if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) != NID_sha256) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_cms_si_digest_algorithm, generation); + goto error; + } + + i = CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si); + + (void) extract_si_datum(si, &i, 1, NID_pkcs9_signingTime, V_ASN1_UTCTIME); + (void) extract_si_datum(si, &i, 1, NID_binary_signing_time, V_ASN1_INTEGER); + oid = extract_si_datum(si, &i, 0, NID_pkcs9_contentType, V_ASN1_OBJECT); + (void) extract_si_datum(si, &i, 0, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); + + if (i != 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_si_signed_attributes, generation); + if (!rc->allow_wrong_cms_si_attributes) + goto error; + } + + if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) != expected_eContentType_nid) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_cms_si_contenttype, generation); + goto error; + } + + if (CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(si, x)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_ski_mismatch, generation); + goto error; + } + + if (!check_x509(rc, wsk, uri, x, certinfo, generation)) + goto error; + + if (require_inheritance && x->rfc3779_addr) { + for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr); i++) { + IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, i); + if (f->ipAddressChoice->type != IPAddressChoice_inherit) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, rfc3779_inheritance_required, generation); + goto error; + } + } + } + + if (require_inheritance && x->rfc3779_asid && x->rfc3779_asid->asnum && + x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type != ASIdentifierChoice_inherit) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, rfc3779_inheritance_required, generation); + goto error; + } + + if (pcms) { + *pcms = cms; + cms = NULL; + } + + if (px) + *px = x; + + result = 1; + + error: + CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); + sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); + sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); + + return result; +} + + + +/** + * Load certificate, check against manifest, then run it through all + * the check_x509() tests. + */ +static X509 *check_cert_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + const uri_t *uri, + path_t *path, + const path_t *prefix, + certinfo_t *certinfo, + const unsigned char *hash, + const size_t hashlen, + object_generation_t generation) +{ + hashbuf_t hashbuf; + X509 *x = NULL; + + assert(uri && path && wsk && certinfo); + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, uri, path, prefix)) + return NULL; + + if (access(path->s, R_OK)) + return NULL; + + if (hash) + x = read_cert(path, &hashbuf); + else + x = read_cert(path, NULL); + + if (!x) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Can't read certificate %s", path->s); + goto punt; + } + + if (hash && (hashlen > sizeof(hashbuf.h) || + memcmp(hashbuf.h, hash, hashlen))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, digest_mismatch, generation); + if (!rc->allow_digest_mismatch) + goto punt; + } + + if (check_x509(rc, wsk, uri, x, certinfo, generation)) + return x; + + punt: + X509_free(x); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Try to find a good copy of a certificate either in fresh data or in + * backup data from a previous run of this program. + */ +static X509 *check_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + uri_t *uri, + certinfo_t *certinfo, + const unsigned char *hash, + const size_t hashlen) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + object_generation_t generation; + const path_t *prefix = NULL; + path_t path; + X509 *x; + + assert(rc && uri && wsk && w && certinfo); + + switch (w->state) { + case walk_state_current: + prefix = &rc->unauthenticated; + generation = object_generation_current; + break; + case walk_state_backup: + prefix = &rc->old_authenticated; + generation = object_generation_backup; + break; + default: + return NULL; + } + + if (skip_checking_this_object(rc, uri, generation)) + return NULL; + + if ((x = check_cert_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, prefix, certinfo, + hash, hashlen, generation)) != NULL) + install_object(rc, uri, &path, generation); + else if (!access(path.s, F_OK)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, generation); + else if (hash && generation == w->manifest_generation) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, generation); + + return x; +} + + + +/** + * Read and check one manifest from disk. + */ +static Manifest *check_manifest_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + const uri_t *uri, + path_t *path, + const path_t *prefix, + certinfo_t *certinfo, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + STACK_OF(FileAndHash) *sorted_fileList = NULL; + Manifest *manifest = NULL, *result = NULL; + CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; + FileAndHash *fah = NULL, *fah2 = NULL; + BIO *bio = NULL; + X509 *x; + int i; + + assert(rc && wsk && uri && path && prefix); + + if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate BIO for manifest %s", uri->s); + goto done; + } + + if (!check_cms(rc, wsk, uri, path, prefix, &cms, &x, certinfo, bio, NULL, 0, + NID_ct_rpkiManifest, 1, generation)) + goto done; + + if ((manifest = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(Manifest), bio, NULL)) == NULL) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_econtent_decode_error, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (manifest->version) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_object_version, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (X509_cmp_current_time(manifest->thisUpdate) > 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_not_yet_valid, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (X509_cmp_current_time(manifest->nextUpdate) < 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, stale_crl_or_manifest, generation); + if (!rc->allow_stale_manifest) + goto done; + } + + if (asn1_time_cmp(manifest->thisUpdate, X509_get_notBefore(x)) < 0 || + asn1_time_cmp(manifest->nextUpdate, X509_get_notAfter(x)) > 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_interval_overruns_cert, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(manifest->manifestNumber, asn1_zero) < 0 || + ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(manifest->manifestNumber, asn1_twenty_octets) > 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_manifest_number, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (OBJ_obj2nid(manifest->fileHashAlg) != NID_sha256) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, nonconformant_digest_algorithm, generation); + goto done; + } + + if ((sorted_fileList = sk_FileAndHash_dup(manifest->fileList)) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate shallow copy of fileList for manifest %s", uri->s); + goto done; + } + + (void) sk_FileAndHash_set_cmp_func(sorted_fileList, FileAndHash_name_cmp); + sk_FileAndHash_sort(sorted_fileList); + + for (i = 0; (fah = sk_FileAndHash_value(sorted_fileList, i)) != NULL && (fah2 = sk_FileAndHash_value(sorted_fileList, i + 1)) != NULL; i++) { + if (!strcmp((char *) fah->file->data, (char *) fah2->file->data)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, duplicate_name_in_manifest, generation); + goto done; + } + } + + for (i = 0; (fah = sk_FileAndHash_value(manifest->fileList, i)) != NULL; i++) { + if (fah->hash->length != HASH_SHA256_LEN || + (fah->hash->flags & (ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 7)) > ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_manifest_digest_length, generation); + goto done; + } + } + + result = manifest; + manifest = NULL; + + done: + BIO_free(bio); + Manifest_free(manifest); + CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); + sk_FileAndHash_free(sorted_fileList); + return result; +} + +/** + * Check whether we already have a particular manifest, attempt to fetch it + * and check issuer's signature if we don't. + * + * General plan here is to do basic checks on both current and backup + * generation manifests, then, if both generations pass all of our + * other tests, pick the generation with the highest manifest number, + * to protect against replay attacks. + * + * Once we've picked the manifest we're going to use, we need to check + * it against the CRL we've chosen. Not much we can do if they don't + * match besides whine about it, but we do need to whine in this case. + */ +static int check_manifest(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + Manifest *old_manifest, *new_manifest, *result = NULL; + certinfo_t old_certinfo, new_certinfo; + const uri_t *uri, *crldp = NULL; + object_generation_t generation = object_generation_null; + path_t old_path, new_path; + FileAndHash *fah = NULL; + const char *crl_tail; + int i, ok = 1; + + assert(rc && wsk && w && !w->manifest); + + uri = &w->certinfo.manifest; + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking manifest %s", uri->s); + + new_manifest = check_manifest_1(rc, wsk, uri, &new_path, + &rc->unauthenticated, &new_certinfo, + object_generation_current); + + old_manifest = check_manifest_1(rc, wsk, uri, &old_path, + &rc->old_authenticated, &old_certinfo, + object_generation_backup); + + if (!new_manifest) + result = old_manifest; + + else if (!old_manifest) + result = new_manifest; + + else { + int num_cmp = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(old_manifest->manifestNumber, new_manifest->manifestNumber); + int date_cmp = ASN1_STRING_cmp(old_manifest->thisUpdate, new_manifest->thisUpdate); + + if (num_cmp > 0) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, backup_number_higher_than_current, object_generation_current); + if (date_cmp > 0) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, backup_thisupdate_newer_than_current, object_generation_current); + + if (num_cmp > 0 && date_cmp > 0) + result = old_manifest; + else + result = new_manifest; + } + + if (result && result == new_manifest) { + generation = object_generation_current; + install_object(rc, uri, &new_path, generation); + crldp = &new_certinfo.crldp; + } + + if (result && result == old_manifest) { + generation = object_generation_backup; + install_object(rc, uri, &old_path, generation); + crldp = &old_certinfo.crldp; + } + + if (result) { + crl_tail = strrchr(crldp->s, '/'); + assert(crl_tail != NULL); + crl_tail++; + + for (i = 0; (fah = sk_FileAndHash_value(result->fileList, i)) != NULL; i++) + if (!strcmp((char *) fah->file->data, crl_tail)) + break; + + if (!fah) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, crl_not_in_manifest, generation); + if (rc->require_crl_in_manifest) + ok = 0; + } + + else if (!check_crl_digest(rc, crldp, fah->hash->data, fah->hash->length)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, digest_mismatch, generation); + if (!rc->allow_crl_digest_mismatch) + ok = 0; + } + } + + if ((!result || result != new_manifest) && !access(new_path.s, F_OK)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_current); + + if (!result && !access(old_path.s, F_OK)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_backup); + + if (result != new_manifest) + Manifest_free(new_manifest); + + if (result != old_manifest) + Manifest_free(old_manifest); + + w->manifest = result; + if (crldp) + w->crldp = *crldp; + w->manifest_generation = generation; + + return ok; +} + + + +/** + * Mark CRL or manifest that we're rechecking so XML report makes more sense. + */ +static void rsync_needed_mark_recheck(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const uri_t *uri) +{ + validation_status_t *v = NULL; + + if (uri->s[0] != '\0') + v = validation_status_find(rc->validation_status_root, + uri, object_generation_current); + + if (v) { + validation_status_set_code(v, stale_crl_or_manifest, 0); + log_validation_status(rc, uri, rechecking_object, + object_generation_current); + } +} + +/** + * Check whether we need to rsync a particular tree. This depends on + * the setting of rc->rsync_early, whether we have a valid manifest on + * file, and whether that manifest is stale yet. + */ +static int rsync_needed(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + int needed; + + assert(rc && wsk && w); + + needed = (rc->rsync_early || + !check_manifest(rc, wsk) || + w->manifest == NULL || + X509_cmp_current_time(w->manifest->nextUpdate) < 0); + + if (needed && w->manifest != NULL) { + rsync_needed_mark_recheck(rc, &w->certinfo.manifest); + rsync_needed_mark_recheck(rc, &w->certinfo.crldp); + Manifest_free(w->manifest); + w->manifest = NULL; + } + + return needed; +} + + + +/** + * Extract a ROA prefix from the ASN.1 bitstring encoding. + */ +static int extract_roa_prefix(const ROAIPAddress *ra, + const unsigned afi, + unsigned char *addr, + unsigned *prefixlen, + unsigned *max_prefixlen) +{ + unsigned length; + long maxlen; + + assert(ra && addr && prefixlen && max_prefixlen); + + maxlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ra->maxLength); + + switch (afi) { + case IANA_AFI_IPV4: length = 4; break; + case IANA_AFI_IPV6: length = 16; break; + default: return 0; + } + + if (ra->IPAddress->length < 0 || ra->IPAddress->length > length || + maxlen < 0 || maxlen > (long) length * 8) + return 0; + + if (ra->IPAddress->length > 0) { + memcpy(addr, ra->IPAddress->data, ra->IPAddress->length); + if ((ra->IPAddress->flags & 7) != 0) { + unsigned char mask = 0xFF >> (8 - (ra->IPAddress->flags & 7)); + addr[ra->IPAddress->length - 1] &= ~mask; + } + } + + memset(addr + ra->IPAddress->length, 0, length - ra->IPAddress->length); + *prefixlen = (ra->IPAddress->length * 8) - (ra->IPAddress->flags & 7); + *max_prefixlen = ra->maxLength ? (unsigned) maxlen : *prefixlen; + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Read and check one ROA from disk. + */ +static int check_roa_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + const uri_t *uri, + path_t *path, + const path_t *prefix, + const unsigned char *hash, + const size_t hashlen, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) *roa_resources = NULL, *ee_resources = NULL; + unsigned char addrbuf[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; + CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; + BIO *bio = NULL; + ROA *roa = NULL; + X509 *x = NULL; + int i, j, result = 0; + unsigned afi, *safi = NULL, safi_, prefixlen, max_prefixlen; + ROAIPAddressFamily *rf; + ROAIPAddress *ra; + + assert(rc && wsk && uri && path && prefix); + + if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate BIO for ROA %s", uri->s); + goto error; + } + + if (!check_cms(rc, wsk, uri, path, prefix, &cms, &x, NULL, bio, NULL, 0, + NID_ct_ROA, 0, generation)) + goto error; + + if (!(roa = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ROA), bio, NULL))) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, cms_econtent_decode_error, generation); + goto error; + } + + if (roa->version) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, wrong_object_version, generation); + goto error; + } + + if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(roa->asID, asn1_zero) < 0 || + ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(roa->asID, asn1_four_octets) > 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, bad_roa_asID, generation); + goto error; + } + + ee_resources = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL); + + /* + * Extract prefixes from ROA and convert them into a resource set. + */ + + if (!(roa_resources = sk_IPAddressFamily_new_null())) + goto error; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_ROAIPAddressFamily_num(roa->ipAddrBlocks); i++) { + rf = sk_ROAIPAddressFamily_value(roa->ipAddrBlocks, i); + if (!rf || !rf->addressFamily || rf->addressFamily->length < 2 || rf->addressFamily->length > 3) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, malformed_roa_addressfamily, generation); + goto error; + } + afi = (rf->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | (rf->addressFamily->data[1]); + if (rf->addressFamily->length == 3) + *(safi = &safi_) = rf->addressFamily->data[2]; + for (j = 0; j < sk_ROAIPAddress_num(rf->addresses); j++) { + ra = sk_ROAIPAddress_value(rf->addresses, j); + if (!ra || + !extract_roa_prefix(ra, afi, addrbuf, &prefixlen, &max_prefixlen) || + !v3_addr_add_prefix(roa_resources, afi, safi, addrbuf, prefixlen)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_resources_malformed, generation); + goto error; + } + if (max_prefixlen < prefixlen) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_max_prefixlen_too_short, generation); + goto error; + } + } + } + + /* + * ROAs can include nested prefixes, so direct translation to + * resource sets could include overlapping ranges, which is illegal. + * So we have to remove nested stuff before whacking into canonical + * form. Fortunately, this is relatively easy, since we know these + * are just prefixes, not ranges: in a list of prefixes sorted by + * the RFC 3779 rules, the first element of a set of nested prefixes + * will always be the least specific. + */ + + for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(roa_resources); i++) { + IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(roa_resources, i); + + if ((afi = v3_addr_get_afi(f)) == 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_contains_bad_afi_value, generation); + goto error; + } + + if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges) { + IPAddressOrRanges *aors = f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges; + + sk_IPAddressOrRange_sort(aors); + + for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; j++) { + IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); + IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1); + unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; + unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; + int length; + + if ((length = v3_addr_get_range(a, afi, a_min, a_max, ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN)) == 0 || + (length = v3_addr_get_range(b, afi, b_min, b_max, ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN)) == 0) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_resources_malformed, generation); + goto error; + } + + if (memcmp(a_max, b_max, length) >= 0) { + (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, j + 1); + IPAddressOrRange_free(b); + --j; + } + } + } + } + + if (!v3_addr_canonize(roa_resources)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_resources_malformed, generation); + goto error; + } + + if (!v3_addr_subset(roa_resources, ee_resources)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, roa_resource_not_in_ee, generation); + goto error; + } + + result = 1; + + error: + BIO_free(bio); + ROA_free(roa); + CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); + sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(roa_resources, IPAddressFamily_free); + sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ee_resources, IPAddressFamily_free); + + return result; +} + +/** + * Check whether we already have a particular ROA, attempt to fetch it + * and check issuer's signature if we don't. + */ +static void check_roa(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + const uri_t *uri, + const unsigned char *hash, + const size_t hashlen) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + path_t path; + + assert(rc && wsk && w && uri); + + if (uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &path, &rc->new_authenticated) && + !access(path.s, F_OK)) + return; + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking ROA %s", uri->s); + + if (check_roa_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, &rc->unauthenticated, + hash, hashlen, object_generation_current)) { + install_object(rc, uri, &path, object_generation_current); + return; + } + + if (!access(path.s, F_OK)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_current); + else if (hash) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, object_generation_current); + + if (check_roa_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, &rc->old_authenticated, + hash, hashlen, object_generation_backup)) { + install_object(rc, uri, &path, object_generation_backup); + return; + } + + if (!access(path.s, F_OK)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_backup); + else if (hash && w->manifest_generation == object_generation_backup) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, object_generation_backup); +} + + + +/** + * Read and check one Ghostbuster record from disk. + */ +static int check_ghostbuster_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + const uri_t *uri, + path_t *path, + const path_t *prefix, + const unsigned char *hash, + const size_t hashlen, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; + BIO *bio = NULL; + X509 *x; + int result = 0; + + assert(rc && wsk && uri && path && prefix); + +#if 0 + /* + * May want this later if we're going to inspect the VCard. For now, + * just leave this NULL and the right thing should happen. + */ + if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate BIO for Ghostbuster record %s", uri->s); + goto error; + } +#endif + + if (!check_cms(rc, wsk, uri, path, prefix, &cms, &x, NULL, bio, NULL, 0, + NID_ct_rpkiGhostbusters, 1, generation)) + goto error; + +#if 0 + /* + * Here is where we would read the VCard from the bio returned by + * CMS_verify() so that we could check the VCard. + */ +#endif + + result = 1; + + error: + BIO_free(bio); + CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); + + return result; +} + +/** + * Check whether we already have a particular Ghostbuster record, + * attempt to fetch it and check issuer's signature if we don't. + */ +static void check_ghostbuster(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk, + const uri_t *uri, + const unsigned char *hash, + const size_t hashlen) +{ + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + path_t path; + + assert(rc && wsk && w && uri); + + if (uri_to_filename(rc, uri, &path, &rc->new_authenticated) && + !access(path.s, F_OK)) + return; + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Checking Ghostbuster record %s", uri->s); + + if (check_ghostbuster_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, &rc->unauthenticated, + hash, hashlen, object_generation_current)) { + install_object(rc, uri, &path, object_generation_current); + return; + } + + if (!access(path.s, F_OK)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_current); + else if (hash) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, object_generation_current); + + if (check_ghostbuster_1(rc, wsk, uri, &path, &rc->old_authenticated, + hash, hashlen, object_generation_backup)) { + install_object(rc, uri, &path, object_generation_backup); + return; + } + + if (!access(path.s, F_OK)) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, object_generation_backup); + else if (hash && w->manifest_generation == object_generation_backup) + log_validation_status(rc, uri, manifest_lists_missing_object, object_generation_backup); +} + + + +static void walk_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *, void *); + +/** + * rsync callback for fetching SIA tree. + */ +static void rsync_sia_callback(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const rsync_ctx_t *ctx, + const rsync_status_t status, + const uri_t *uri, + void *cookie) +{ + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk = cookie; + walk_ctx_t *w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk); + + assert(rc && wsk); + + if (status != rsync_status_pending) { + w->state++; + task_add(rc, walk_cert, wsk); + return; + } + + if (rsync_count_runable(rc) >= rc->max_parallel_fetches) + return; + + if ((wsk = walk_ctx_stack_clone(wsk)) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, + "walk_ctx_stack_clone() failed, probably memory exhaustion, blundering onwards without forking stack"); + return; + } + + walk_ctx_stack_pop(wsk); + task_add(rc, walk_cert, wsk); +} + +/** + * Recursive walk of certificate hierarchy (core of the program). + * + * Walk all products of the current certificate, starting with the + * ones named in the manifest and continuing with any that we find in + * the publication directory but which are not named in the manifest. + * + * Dispatch to correct checking code for the object named by URI, + * based on the filename extension in the uri. CRLs are a special + * case because we've already checked them by the time we get here, so + * we just ignore them. Other objects are either certificates or + * CMS-signed objects of one kind or another. + */ +static void walk_cert(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, void *cookie) +{ + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk = cookie; + const unsigned char *hash = NULL; + object_generation_t generation; + size_t hashlen; + walk_ctx_t *w; + uri_t uri; + + assert(rc && wsk); + + while ((w = walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk)) != NULL) { + + switch (w->state) { + case walk_state_current: + generation = object_generation_current; + break; + case walk_state_backup: + generation = object_generation_backup; + break; + default: + generation = object_generation_null; + break; + } + + switch (w->state) { + + case walk_state_initial: + + if (!w->certinfo.sia.s[0] || !w->certinfo.ca) { + w->state = walk_state_done; + continue; + } + + if (!w->certinfo.manifest.s[0]) { + log_validation_status(rc, &w->certinfo.uri, sia_manifest_uri_missing, w->certinfo.generation); + w->state = walk_state_done; + continue; + } + + w->state++; + continue; + + case walk_state_rsync: + + if (rsync_needed(rc, wsk)) { + rsync_tree(rc, &w->certinfo.sia, wsk, rsync_sia_callback); + return; + } + log_validation_status(rc, &w->certinfo.sia, rsync_transfer_skipped, object_generation_null); + w->state++; + continue; + + case walk_state_ready: + + walk_ctx_loop_init(rc, wsk); /* sets w->state */ + continue; + + case walk_state_current: + case walk_state_backup: + + if (!walk_ctx_loop_this(rc, wsk, &uri, &hash, &hashlen)) { + walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk); + continue; + } + + if (endswith(uri.s, ".crl") || endswith(uri.s, ".mft") || endswith(uri.s, ".mnf")) { + walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk); + continue; /* CRLs and manifests checked elsewhere */ + } + + if (hash == NULL && !rc->allow_object_not_in_manifest) { + log_validation_status(rc, &uri, skipped_because_not_in_manifest, generation); + walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk); + continue; + } + + if (hash == NULL) + log_validation_status(rc, &uri, tainted_by_not_being_in_manifest, generation); + else if (w->stale_manifest) + log_validation_status(rc, &uri, tainted_by_stale_manifest, generation); + + if (endswith(uri.s, ".roa")) { + check_roa(rc, wsk, &uri, hash, hashlen); + walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk); + continue; + } + + if (endswith(uri.s, ".gbr")) { + check_ghostbuster(rc, wsk, &uri, hash, hashlen); + walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk); + continue; + } + + if (endswith(uri.s, ".cer")) { + certinfo_t certinfo; + X509 *x = check_cert(rc, wsk, &uri, &certinfo, hash, hashlen); + if (!walk_ctx_stack_push(wsk, x, &certinfo)) + walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk); + continue; + } + + log_validation_status(rc, &uri, unknown_object_type_skipped, object_generation_null); + walk_ctx_loop_next(rc, wsk); + continue; + + case walk_state_done: + + walk_ctx_stack_pop(wsk); /* Resume our issuer's state */ + continue; + + } + } + + assert(walk_ctx_stack_head(wsk) == NULL); + walk_ctx_stack_free(wsk); +} + +/** + * Check a trust anchor. Yes, we trust it, by definition, but it + * still needs to conform to the certificate profile, the + * self-signature must be correct, etcetera. + * + * Ownership of the TA certificate object passes to this function when + * called (ie, freeing "x" is our responsibility). + */ +static int check_ta(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, X509 *x, const uri_t *uri, + const path_t *path1, const path_t *path2, + const object_generation_t generation) +{ + STACK_OF(walk_ctx_t) *wsk = NULL; + walk_ctx_t *w = NULL; + + assert(rc && x && uri && path1 && path2); + + if (x == NULL) + return 1; + + if ((wsk = walk_ctx_stack_new()) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate walk context stack"); + X509_free(x); + return 0; + } + + if ((w = walk_ctx_stack_push(wsk, x, NULL)) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't push walk context stack"); + walk_ctx_stack_free(wsk); + X509_free(x); + return 0; + } + + if (!check_x509(rc, wsk, uri, x, NULL, generation)) { + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_rejected, generation); + walk_ctx_stack_free(wsk); + return 1; + } + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Copying trust anchor %s to %s", path1->s, path2->s); + + if (!mkdir_maybe(rc, path2) || !cp_ln(rc, path1, path2)) { + walk_ctx_stack_free(wsk); + return 0; + } + + log_validation_status(rc, uri, object_accepted, generation); + task_add(rc, walk_cert, wsk); + return 1; +} + + + +/** + * Check a trust anchor read from a local file. + */ +static int check_ta_cer(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const char *fn) + +{ + path_t path1, path2; + unsigned long hash; + X509 *x = NULL; + uri_t uri; + int i; + + assert(rc && fn); + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Processing trust anchor from file %s", fn); + + if (strlen(fn) >= sizeof(path1.s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Trust anchor path name too long %s", fn); + return 0; + } + strcpy(path1.s, fn); + filename_to_uri(&uri, path1.s); + + if ((x = read_cert(&path1, NULL)) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Couldn't read trust anchor from file %s", fn); + log_validation_status(rc, &uri, unreadable_trust_anchor, object_generation_null); + goto lose; + } + + hash = X509_subject_name_hash(x); + + for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX; i++) { + if (snprintf(path2.s, sizeof(path2.s), "%s%lx.%d.cer", + rc->new_authenticated.s, hash, i) >= sizeof(path2.s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, + "Couldn't construct path name for trust anchor %s", path1.s); + goto lose; + } + if (access(path2.s, F_OK)) + break; + } + if (i == INT_MAX) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't find a free name for trust anchor %s", path1.s); + goto lose; + } + + return check_ta(rc, x, &uri, &path1, &path2, object_generation_null); + + lose: + log_validation_status(rc, &uri, trust_anchor_skipped, object_generation_null); + X509_free(x); + return 0; +} + + + +/** + * Allocate a new tal_ctx_t. + */ +static tal_ctx_t *tal_ctx_t_new(void) +{ + tal_ctx_t *tctx = malloc(sizeof(*tctx)); + if (tctx) + memset(tctx, 0, sizeof(*tctx)); + return tctx; +} + +/** + * Free a tal_ctx_t. + */ +static void tal_ctx_t_free(tal_ctx_t *tctx) +{ + if (tctx) { + EVP_PKEY_free(tctx->pkey); + free(tctx); + } +} + +/** + * Read a trust anchor from disk and compare with known public key. + * + * NB: EVP_PKEY_cmp() returns 1 for match, not 0 like every other + * xyz_cmp() function in the entire OpenSSL library. Go figure. + */ +static int check_ta_tal_callback_1(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const tal_ctx_t *tctx, + object_generation_t generation) + +{ + const path_t *prefix = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + X509 *x = NULL; + path_t path; + int ret = 0; + + switch (generation) { + case object_generation_current: + prefix = &rc->unauthenticated; + break; + case object_generation_backup: + prefix = &rc->old_authenticated; + break; + default: + goto done; + } + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, &tctx->uri, &path, prefix)) { + log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, generation); + goto done; + } + + if ((x = read_cert(&path, NULL)) == NULL || (pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x)) == NULL) { + log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, unreadable_trust_anchor, generation); + goto done; + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_cmp(tctx->pkey, pkey) != 1) { + log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, trust_anchor_key_mismatch, generation); + goto done; + } + + ret = check_ta(rc, x, &tctx->uri, &path, &tctx->path, generation); + x = NULL; + + done: + if (!ret) + log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, object_rejected, generation); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + X509_free(x); + return ret; +} + +/** + * rsync callback for fetching a TAL. + */ +static void rsync_tal_callback(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const rsync_ctx_t *ctx, + const rsync_status_t status, + const uri_t *uri, + void *cookie) +{ + tal_ctx_t *tctx = cookie; + + assert(rc && tctx); + + if (status == rsync_status_pending) + return; + + if (!check_ta_tal_callback_1(rc, tctx, object_generation_current) && + !check_ta_tal_callback_1(rc, tctx, object_generation_backup)) + log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, trust_anchor_skipped, object_generation_null); + + tal_ctx_t_free(tctx); +} + +/** + * Check a trust anchor read from a trust anchor locator (TAL). + */ +static int check_ta_tal(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const char *fn) + +{ + tal_ctx_t *tctx = NULL; + BIO *bio = NULL; + int ret = 1; + + assert(rc && fn); + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Processing trust anchor locator from file %s", fn); + + if ((tctx = tal_ctx_t_new()) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "malloc(tal_ctxt_t) failed"); + goto done; + } + + bio = BIO_new_file(fn, "r"); + + if (!bio) + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Couldn't open trust anchor locator file %s", fn); + + if (!bio || BIO_gets(bio, tctx->uri.s, sizeof(tctx->uri.s)) <= 0) { + uri_t furi; + filename_to_uri(&furi, fn); + log_validation_status(rc, &furi, unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, object_generation_null); + goto done; + } + + tctx->uri.s[strcspn(tctx->uri.s, " \t\r\n")] = '\0'; + + if (!uri_to_filename(rc, &tctx->uri, &tctx->path, &rc->new_authenticated)) { + log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, object_generation_null); + goto done; + } + + if (!endswith(tctx->uri.s, ".cer")) { + log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, malformed_tal_uri, object_generation_null); + goto done; + } + + bio = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_linebreak()), bio); + bio = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()), bio); + if (bio) + tctx->pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_bio(bio, NULL); + if (!tctx->pkey) { + log_validation_status(rc, &tctx->uri, unreadable_trust_anchor_locator, object_generation_null); + goto done; + } + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Processing trust anchor from URI %s", tctx->uri.s); + + rsync_ta(rc, &tctx->uri, tctx, rsync_tal_callback); + tctx = NULL; /* Control has passed */ + + done: + tal_ctx_t_free(tctx); + BIO_free_all(bio); + return ret; +} + +/** + * Check a directory of trust anchors and trust anchor locators. + */ +static int check_ta_dir(rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const char *dn) +{ + DIR *dir = NULL; + struct dirent *d; + path_t path; + int is_cer, is_tal; + + assert(rc && dn); + + if ((dir = opendir(dn)) == NULL) { + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't open trust anchor directory %s: %s", + dn, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { + if (snprintf(path.s, sizeof(path.s), "%s/%s", dn, d->d_name) >= sizeof(path.s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_data_err, "Pathname %s/%s too long", dn, d->d_name); + break; + } + is_cer = endswith(path.s, ".cer"); + is_tal = endswith(path.s, ".tal"); + if (is_cer && !check_ta_cer(rc, path.s)) + break; + if (is_tal && !check_ta_tal(rc, path.s)) + break; + if (!is_cer && !is_tal) + logmsg(rc, log_verbose, "Skipping non-trust-anchor %s", path.s); + } + + if (dir != NULL) + closedir(dir); + + return !d;; +} + + + +/** + * Write detailed log of what we've done as an XML file. + */ +static int write_xml_file(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const char *xmlfile) +{ + int i, j, use_stdout, ok; + char hostname[HOSTNAME_MAX]; + mib_counter_t code; + timestamp_t ts; + FILE *f = NULL; + path_t xmltemp; + + if (xmlfile == NULL) + return 1; + + use_stdout = !strcmp(xmlfile, "-"); + + logmsg(rc, log_telemetry, "Writing XML summary to %s", + (use_stdout ? "standard output" : xmlfile)); + + if (use_stdout) { + f = stdout; + ok = 1; + } else if (snprintf(xmltemp.s, sizeof(xmltemp.s), "%s.%u.tmp", xmlfile, (unsigned) getpid()) >= sizeof(xmltemp.s)) { + logmsg(rc, log_usage_err, "Filename \"%s\" is too long, not writing XML", xmlfile); + return 0; + } else { + ok = (f = fopen(xmltemp.s, "w")) != NULL; + } + + ok &= gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == 0; + + if (ok) + ok &= fprintf(f, "<?xml version=\"1.0\" ?>\n" + "<rcynic-summary date=\"%s\" rcynic-version=\"%s\"" + " summary-version=\"%d\" reporting-hostname=\"%s\">\n" + " <labels>\n", + time_to_string(&ts, NULL), + svn_id, XML_SUMMARY_VERSION, hostname) != EOF; + + for (j = 0; ok && j < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX; ++j) + ok &= fprintf(f, " <%s kind=\"%s\">%s</%s>\n", + mib_counter_label[j], mib_counter_kind[j], + (mib_counter_desc[j] + ? mib_counter_desc[j] + : X509_verify_cert_error_string(mib_counter_openssl[j])), + mib_counter_label[j]) != EOF; + + if (ok) + ok &= fprintf(f, " </labels>\n") != EOF; + + for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_validation_status_t_num(rc->validation_status); i++) { + validation_status_t *v = sk_validation_status_t_value(rc->validation_status, i); + assert(v); + + (void) time_to_string(&ts, &v->timestamp); + + for (code = (mib_counter_t) 0; ok && code < MIB_COUNTER_T_MAX; code++) { + if (validation_status_get_code(v, code)) { + if (ok) + ok &= fprintf(f, " <validation_status timestamp=\"%s\" status=\"%s\"", + ts.s, mib_counter_label[code]) != EOF; + if (ok && (v->generation == object_generation_current || + v->generation == object_generation_backup)) + ok &= fprintf(f, " generation=\"%s\"", + object_generation_label[v->generation]) != EOF; + if (ok) + ok &= fprintf(f, ">%s</validation_status>\n", v->uri.s) != EOF; + } + } + } + + for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_rsync_history_t_num(rc->rsync_history); i++) { + rsync_history_t *h = sk_rsync_history_t_value(rc->rsync_history, i); + assert(h); + + if (ok) + ok &= fprintf(f, " <rsync_history") != EOF; + if (ok && h->started) + ok &= fprintf(f, " started=\"%s\"", + time_to_string(&ts, &h->started)) != EOF; + if (ok && h->finished) + ok &= fprintf(f, " finished=\"%s\"", + time_to_string(&ts, &h->finished)) != EOF; + if (ok && h->status != rsync_status_done) + ok &= fprintf(f, " error=\"%u\"", (unsigned) h->status) != EOF; + if (ok) + ok &= fprintf(f, ">%s%s</rsync_history>\n", + h->uri.s, (h->final_slash ? "/" : "")) != EOF; + } + + if (ok) + ok &= fprintf(f, "</rcynic-summary>\n") != EOF; + + if (f && !use_stdout) + ok &= fclose(f) != EOF; + + if (ok && !use_stdout) + ok &= rename(xmltemp.s, xmlfile) == 0; + + if (!ok) + logmsg(rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't write XML summary to %s: %s", + (use_stdout ? "standard output" : xmlfile), strerror(errno)); + + if (!ok && !use_stdout) + (void) unlink(xmltemp.s); + + return ok; +} + + + +/** + * Long options. + */ +#define OPTIONS \ + QA('a', "authenticated", "root of authenticated data tree") \ + QA('c', "config", "override default name of config file") \ + QF('h', "help", "print this help message") \ + QA('j', "jitter", "set jitter value") \ + QA('l', "log-level", "set log level") \ + QA('u', "unauthenticated", "root of unauthenticated data tree") \ + QF('e', "use-stderr", "log to syslog") \ + QF('s', "use-syslog", "log to stderr") \ + QF('V', "version", "print program version") \ + QA('x', "xml-file", "set XML output file location") + +const static struct option longopts[] = { + { "authenticated", required_argument, NULL, 'a' }, + { "config", required_argument, NULL, 'c' }, + { "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' }, + { "jitter", required_argument, NULL, 'j' }, + { "log-level", required_argument, NULL, 'l' }, + { "unauthenticated", required_argument, NULL, 'u' }, + { "use-stderr", no_argument, NULL, 'e' }, + { "use-syslog", no_argument, NULL, 's' }, + { "version", no_argument, NULL, 'V' }, + { "xml-file", required_argument, NULL, 'x' }, + { NULL } +}; + +/** + * Wrapper around printf() to take arguments like logmsg(). + * If C had closures, usage() would use them instead of this silliness. + */ +static void logmsg_printf(const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, + const log_level_t level, + const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + vprintf(fmt, ap); + putchar('\n'); + va_end(ap); +} + +/** + * Log usage message, either to stdout (for --help) or via logmsg(). + */ +static void usage (const rcynic_ctx_t *rc, const char *jane) +{ + void (*log)(const rcynic_ctx_t *, const log_level_t, const char *, ...) = rc ? logmsg : logmsg_printf; + char left[80]; + + if (rc && !jane) + jane = rc->jane; + + log(rc, log_usage_err, "usage: %s [options]", jane); + log(rc, log_usage_err, "options:"); + +#define QF(_s_, _l_, _d_) \ + (void) snprintf(left, sizeof(left), "-%c --%-32s", _s_, _l_); \ + log(rc, log_usage_err, " %s%s", left, _d_); + +#define QA(_s_, _l_, _d_) \ + (void) snprintf(left, sizeof(left), "-%c ARG --%-32s", _s_, _l_ " ARG"); \ + log(rc, log_usage_err, " %s%s", left, _d_); + + OPTIONS; + +#undef QA +#undef QF +} + +/** + * Main program. Parse command line, read config file, iterate over + * trust anchors found via config file and do a tree walk for each + * trust anchor. + */ +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int opt_jitter = 0, use_syslog = 0, use_stderr = 0, syslog_facility = 0; + int opt_syslog = 0, opt_stderr = 0, opt_level = 0, prune = 1; + int opt_auth = 0, opt_unauth = 0, keep_lockfile = 0; + char *lockfile = NULL, *xmlfile = NULL; + char *cfg_file = "rcynic.conf"; + int c, i, ret = 1, jitter = 600, lockfd = -1; + STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *cfg_section = NULL; + CONF *cfg_handle = NULL; + time_t start = 0, finish; + rcynic_ctx_t rc; + unsigned delay; + long eline = 0; + path_t ta_dir; + +#define QF(_s_, _l_, _d_) _s_, +#define QA(_s_, _l_, _d_) _s_, ':', + + const static char short_opts[] = { OPTIONS '\0' }; + +#undef QA +#undef QF + +#define QF(_s_, _l_, _d_) { _l_, no_argument, NULL, _s_ }, +#define QA(_s_, _l_, _d_) { _l_, required_argument, NULL, _s_ }, + + static struct option long_opts[] = { OPTIONS { NULL } }; + +#undef QA +#undef QF + + memset(&rc, 0, sizeof(rc)); + + if ((rc.jane = strrchr(argv[0], '/')) == NULL) + rc.jane = argv[0]; + else + rc.jane++; + + rc.log_level = log_data_err; + rc.allow_stale_crl = 1; + rc.allow_stale_manifest = 1; + rc.allow_digest_mismatch = 1; + rc.allow_crl_digest_mismatch = 1; + rc.allow_nonconformant_name = 1; + rc.allow_ee_without_signedObject = 1; + rc.allow_1024_bit_ee_key = 1; + rc.allow_wrong_cms_si_attributes = 1; + rc.max_parallel_fetches = 1; + rc.max_retries = 3; + rc.retry_wait_min = 30; + rc.run_rsync = 1; + rc.rsync_timeout = 300; + rc.max_select_time = 30; + rc.rsync_early = 1; + +#define QQ(x,y) rc.priority[x] = y; + LOG_LEVELS; +#undef QQ + + if (!set_directory(&rc, &rc.authenticated, "rcynic-data/authenticated", 0) || + !set_directory(&rc, &rc.unauthenticated, "rcynic-data/unauthenticated/", 1)) + goto done; + + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + + if (!create_missing_nids()) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't initialize missing OIDs!"); + goto done; + } + + memset(&ta_dir, 0, sizeof(ta_dir)); + + opterr = 0; + + while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, short_opts, long_opts, NULL)) > 0) { + switch (c) { + case 'a': + opt_auth = 1; + if (!set_directory(&rc, &rc.authenticated, optarg, 0)) + goto done; + break; + case 'c': + cfg_file = optarg; + break; + case 'l': + opt_level = 1; + if (!configure_logmsg(&rc, optarg)) + goto done; + break; + case 's': + use_syslog = opt_syslog = 1; + break; + case 'e': + use_stderr = opt_stderr = 1; + break; + case 'h': + usage(NULL, rc.jane); + ret = 0; + goto done; + case 'j': + if (!configure_integer(&rc, &jitter, optarg)) + goto done; + opt_jitter = 1; + break; + case 'u': + opt_unauth = 1; + if (!set_directory(&rc, &rc.unauthenticated, optarg, 1)) + goto done; + break; + case 'V': + puts(svn_id); + ret = 0; + goto done; + case 'x': + xmlfile = strdup(optarg); + break; + default: + usage(&rc, NULL); + goto done; + } + } + + if (!(asn1_zero = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, "0x0")) || + !(asn1_four_octets = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, "0xFFFFFFFF")) || + !(asn1_twenty_octets = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF")) || + !(NID_binary_signing_time = OBJ_create("1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46", + "id-aa-binarySigningTime", + "id-aa-binarySigningTime"))) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't initialize ASN.1 constants!"); + goto done; + } + + if ((cfg_handle = NCONF_new(NULL)) == NULL) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't create CONF opbject"); + goto done; + } + + if (NCONF_load(cfg_handle, cfg_file, &eline) <= 0) { + if (eline <= 0) + logmsg(&rc, log_usage_err, "Couldn't load config file %s", cfg_file); + else + logmsg(&rc, log_usage_err, "Error on line %ld of config file %s", eline, cfg_file); + goto done; + } + + if (CONF_modules_load(cfg_handle, NULL, 0) <= 0) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't configure OpenSSL"); + goto done; + } + + if ((cfg_section = NCONF_get_section(cfg_handle, "rcynic")) == NULL) { + logmsg(&rc, log_usage_err, "Couldn't load rcynic section from config file"); + goto done; + } + + for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cfg_section); i++) { + CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(cfg_section, i); + + assert(val && val->name && val->value); + + if (!opt_auth && + !name_cmp(val->name, "authenticated") && + !set_directory(&rc, &rc.authenticated, val->value, 0)) + goto done; + + else if (!opt_unauth && + !name_cmp(val->name, "unauthenticated") && + !set_directory(&rc, &rc.unauthenticated, val->value, 1)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "trust-anchor-directory") && + !set_directory(&rc, &ta_dir, val->value, 0)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "rsync-timeout") && + !configure_integer(&rc, &rc.rsync_timeout, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "max-parallel-fetches") && + !configure_integer(&rc, &rc.max_parallel_fetches, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "max-select-time") && + !configure_unsigned_integer(&rc, &rc.max_select_time, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "rsync-program")) + rc.rsync_program = strdup(val->value); + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "lockfile")) + lockfile = strdup(val->value); + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "keep-lockfile") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &keep_lockfile, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!opt_jitter && + !name_cmp(val->name, "jitter") && + !configure_integer(&rc, &jitter, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!opt_level && + !name_cmp(val->name, "log-level") && + !configure_logmsg(&rc, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!opt_syslog && + !name_cmp(val->name, "use-syslog") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &use_syslog, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!opt_stderr && + !name_cmp(val->name, "use-stderr") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &use_stderr, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "syslog-facility") && + !configure_syslog(&rc, &syslog_facility, + facilitynames, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!xmlfile && + (!name_cmp(val->name, "xml-file") || + !name_cmp(val->name, "xml-summary"))) + xmlfile = strdup(val->value); + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-stale-crl") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_stale_crl, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-stale-manifest") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_stale_manifest, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-non-self-signed-trust-anchor") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_non_self_signed_trust_anchor, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "require-crl-in-manifest") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.require_crl_in_manifest, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-object-not-in-manifest") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_object_not_in_manifest, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-digest-mismatch") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_digest_mismatch, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-crl-digest-mismatch") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_crl_digest_mismatch, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "use-links") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.use_links, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "prune") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &prune, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "run-rsync") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.run_rsync, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-nonconformant-name") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_nonconformant_name, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-ee-without-signedObject") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_ee_without_signedObject, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-1024-bit-ee-key") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_1024_bit_ee_key, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "allow-wrong-cms-si-attributes") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.allow_wrong_cms_si_attributes, val->value)) + goto done; + + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "rsync-early") && + !configure_boolean(&rc, &rc.rsync_early, val->value)) + goto done; + + /* + * Ugly, but the easiest way to handle all these strings. + */ + +#define QQ(x,y) \ + else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "syslog-priority-" #x) && \ + !configure_syslog(&rc, &rc.priority[x], \ + prioritynames, val->value)) \ + goto done; + + LOG_LEVELS; /* the semicolon is for emacs */ + +#undef QQ + + } + + if ((rc.rsync_history = sk_rsync_history_t_new(rsync_history_cmp)) == NULL) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate rsync_history stack"); + goto done; + } + + if ((rc.validation_status = sk_validation_status_t_new_null()) == NULL) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate validation_status stack"); + goto done; + } + + if ((rc.x509_store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate X509_STORE"); + goto done; + } + + if ((rc.rsync_queue = sk_rsync_ctx_t_new_null()) == NULL) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate rsync_queue"); + goto done; + } + + if ((rc.task_queue = sk_task_t_new_null()) == NULL) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't allocate task_queue"); + goto done; + } + + rc.use_syslog = use_syslog; + + if (use_syslog) + openlog(rc.jane, + LOG_PID | (use_stderr ? LOG_PERROR : 0), + (syslog_facility ? syslog_facility : LOG_LOCAL0)); + + if (jitter > 0) { + if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *) &delay, sizeof(delay)) <= 0) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't read random bytes"); + goto done; + } + delay %= jitter; + logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry, "Delaying %u seconds before startup", delay); + while (delay > 0) + delay = sleep(delay); + } + + if (lockfile && + ((lockfd = open(lockfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_NONBLOCK, 0666)) < 0 || + lockf(lockfd, F_TLOCK, 0) < 0)) { + if (lockfd >= 0 && errno == EAGAIN) + logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry, "Lock %s held by another process", lockfile); + else + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Problem locking %s: %s", lockfile, strerror(errno)); + lockfd = -1; + goto done; + } + + start = time(0); + logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry, "Starting"); + + if (!construct_directory_names(&rc)) + goto done; + + if (!access(rc.new_authenticated.s, F_OK)) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, + "Timestamped output directory %s already exists! Clock went backwards?", + rc.new_authenticated.s); + goto done; + } + + if (!mkdir_maybe(&rc, &rc.new_authenticated)) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Couldn't prepare directory %s: %s", + rc.new_authenticated.s, strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } + + for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cfg_section); i++) { + CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(cfg_section, i); + + assert(val && val->name && val->value); + + if (!name_cmp(val->name, "trust-anchor-uri-with-key") || + !name_cmp(val->name, "indirect-trust-anchor")) { + logmsg(&rc, log_usage_err, + "Directive \"%s\" is obsolete -- please use \"trust-anchor-locator\" instead", + val->name); + goto done; + } + + if ((!name_cmp(val->name, "trust-anchor") && !check_ta_cer(&rc, val->value)) || + (!name_cmp(val->name, "trust-anchor-locator") && !check_ta_tal(&rc, val->value))) + goto done; + } + + if (*ta_dir.s != '\0' && !check_ta_dir(&rc, ta_dir.s)) + goto done; + + while (sk_task_t_num(rc.task_queue) > 0 || sk_rsync_ctx_t_num(rc.rsync_queue) > 0) { + task_run_q(&rc); + rsync_mgr(&rc); + } + + logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry, "Event loop done, beginning final output and cleanup"); + + if (!finalize_directories(&rc)) + goto done; + + if (prune && rc.run_rsync && + !prune_unauthenticated(&rc, &rc.unauthenticated, + strlen(rc.unauthenticated.s))) { + logmsg(&rc, log_sys_err, "Trouble pruning old unauthenticated data"); + goto done; + } + + if (!write_xml_file(&rc, xmlfile)) + goto done; + + ret = 0; + + done: + log_openssl_errors(&rc); + + /* + * Do NOT free cfg_section, NCONF_free() takes care of that + */ + sk_validation_status_t_pop_free(rc.validation_status, validation_status_t_free); + sk_rsync_history_t_pop_free(rc.rsync_history, rsync_history_t_free); + validation_status_t_free(rc.validation_status_in_waiting); + X509_STORE_free(rc.x509_store); + NCONF_free(cfg_handle); + CONF_modules_free(); + EVP_cleanup(); + ERR_free_strings(); + if (rc.rsync_program) + free(rc.rsync_program); + if (lockfile && lockfd >= 0 && !keep_lockfile) + unlink(lockfile); + if (lockfile) + free(lockfile); + if (xmlfile) + free(xmlfile); + + if (start) { + finish = time(0); + logmsg(&rc, log_telemetry, + "Finished, elapsed time %u:%02u:%02u", + (unsigned) ((finish - start) / 3600), + (unsigned) ((finish - start) / 60 % 60), + (unsigned) ((finish - start) % 60)); + } + + return ret; +} |