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+# $Id$
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2014 Dragon Research Labs ("DRL")
+# Portions copyright (C) 2009--2013 Internet Systems Consortium ("ISC")
+# Portions copyright (C) 2007--2008 American Registry for Internet Numbers ("ARIN")
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notices and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DRL, ISC, AND ARIN DISCLAIM ALL
+# WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED
+# WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DRL,
+# ISC, OR ARIN BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR
+# CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS
+# OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+# NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+# WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+"""
+One X.509 implementation to rule them all...
+
+...and in the darkness hide the twisty maze of partially-overlapping
+X.509 support packages in Python.
+
+Once upon a time we were using four separate partially-overlapping
+implementions of X.509 and related protocols. Over the years this has
+collapsed down to one, but the interface module we built on top of the
+previous mess has itself become heavily embedded in the code base. So
+this is a bit more complicated (not to mention baroque) than one might
+expect for a module that had grown in a saner fashion. We clean up
+bits of it from time to time. Some day this may all make sense.
+"""
+
+import rpki.POW
+import base64
+import lxml.etree
+import os
+import subprocess
+import email.mime.application
+import email.utils
+import mailbox
+import time
+import rpki.exceptions
+import rpki.resource_set
+import rpki.oids
+import rpki.sundial
+import rpki.log
+import rpki.async
+import rpki.relaxng
+
+def base64_with_linebreaks(der):
+ """
+ Encode DER (really, anything) as Base64 text, with linebreaks to
+ keep the result (sort of) readable.
+ """
+ b = base64.b64encode(der)
+ n = len(b)
+ return "\n" + "\n".join(b[i : min(i + 64, n)] for i in xrange(0, n, 64)) + "\n"
+
+def looks_like_PEM(text):
+ """
+ Guess whether text looks like a PEM encoding.
+ """
+
+ i = text.find("-----BEGIN ")
+ return i >= 0 and text.find("\n-----END ", i) > i
+
+def first_rsync_uri(xia):
+ """
+ Find first rsync URI in a sequence of AIA or SIA URIs.
+ Returns the URI if found, otherwise None.
+ """
+
+ if xia is not None:
+ for uri in xia:
+ if uri.startswith("rsync://"):
+ return uri
+ return None
+
+class X501DN(object):
+ """
+ Class to hold an X.501 Distinguished Name.
+
+ This is nothing like a complete implementation, just enough for our
+ purposes. See RFC 5280 4.1.2.4 for the ASN.1 details. In brief:
+
+ - A DN is a SEQUENCE OF RDNs.
+
+ - A RDN is a SET OF AttributeAndValues; in practice, multi-value
+ RDNs are rare, so an RDN is almost always a set with a single
+ element.
+
+ - An AttributeAndValue is a SEQUENCE consisting of a OID and a
+ value, where a whole bunch of things including both syntax and
+ semantics of the value are determined by the OID.
+
+ - The value is some kind of ASN.1 string; there are far too many
+ encoding options options, most of which are either strongly
+ discouraged or outright forbidden by the PKIX profile, but which
+ persist for historical reasons. The only ones PKIX actually
+ likes are PrintableString and UTF8String, but there are nuances
+ and special cases where some of the others are required.
+
+ The RPKI profile further restricts DNs to a single mandatory
+ CommonName attribute with a single optional SerialNumber attribute
+ (not to be confused with the certificate serial number).
+
+ BPKI certificates should (we hope) follow the general PKIX guideline
+ but the ones we construct ourselves are likely to be relatively
+ simple.
+ """
+
+ def __str__(self):
+ return "".join("/" + "+".join("%s=%s" % (rpki.oids.oid2name(a[0]), a[1])
+ for a in rdn)
+ for rdn in self.dn)
+
+ def __cmp__(self, other):
+ return cmp(self.dn, other.dn)
+
+ def __repr__(self):
+ return rpki.log.log_repr(self, str(self))
+
+ def _debug(self):
+ if False:
+ import traceback
+ for chunk in traceback.format_stack(limit = 5):
+ for line in chunk.splitlines():
+ rpki.log.debug("== %s" % line)
+ rpki.log.debug("++ %r %r" % (self, self.dn))
+
+ @classmethod
+ def from_cn(cls, cn, sn = None):
+ assert isinstance(cn, (str, unicode))
+ if isinstance(sn, (int, long)):
+ sn = "%08X" % sn
+ elif isinstance(sn, (str, unicode)):
+ assert all(c in "0123456789abcdefABCDEF" for c in sn)
+ sn = str(sn)
+ self = cls()
+ if sn is not None:
+ self.dn = (((rpki.oids.commonName, cn),), ((rpki.oids.serialNumber, sn),))
+ else:
+ self.dn = (((rpki.oids.commonName, cn),),)
+ return self
+
+ @classmethod
+ def from_POW(cls, t):
+ assert isinstance(t, tuple)
+ self = cls()
+ self.dn = t
+ return self
+
+ def get_POW(self):
+ return self.dn
+
+ def extract_cn_and_sn(self):
+ cn = None
+ sn = None
+
+ for rdn in self.dn:
+ if len(rdn) == 1 and len(rdn[0]) == 2:
+ oid = rdn[0][0]
+ val = rdn[0][1]
+ if oid == rpki.oids.commonName and cn is None:
+ cn = val
+ continue
+ if oid == rpki.oids.serialNumber and sn is None:
+ sn = val
+ continue
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadX510DN("Bad subject name: %s" % (self.dn,))
+
+ if cn is None:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadX510DN("Subject name is missing CN: %s" % (self.dn,))
+
+ return cn, sn
+
+
+class DER_object(object):
+ """
+ Virtual class to hold a generic DER object.
+ """
+
+ ## @var formats
+ # Formats supported in this object. This is kind of redundant now
+ # that we're down to a single ASN.1 package and everything supports
+ # the same DER and POW formats, it's mostly historical baggage from
+ # the days when we had three different ASN.1 encoders, each with its
+ # own low-level Python object format. Clean up, some day.
+ formats = ("DER", "POW")
+
+ ## @var POW_class
+ # Class of underlying POW object. Concrete subclasses must supply this.
+ POW_class = None
+
+ ## Other attributes that self.clear() should whack.
+ other_clear = ()
+
+ ## @var DER
+ # DER value of this object
+ DER = None
+
+ ## @var failure_threshold
+ # Rate-limiting interval between whines about Auto_update objects.
+ failure_threshold = rpki.sundial.timedelta(minutes = 5)
+
+ def empty(self):
+ """
+ Test whether this object is empty.
+ """
+ return all(getattr(self, a, None) is None for a in self.formats)
+
+ def clear(self):
+ """
+ Make this object empty.
+ """
+ for a in self.formats + self.other_clear:
+ setattr(self, a, None)
+ self.filename = None
+ self.timestamp = None
+ self.lastfail = None
+
+ def __init__(self, **kw):
+ """
+ Initialize a DER_object.
+ """
+ self.clear()
+ if len(kw):
+ self.set(**kw)
+
+ def set(self, **kw):
+ """
+ Set this object by setting one of its known formats.
+
+ This method only allows one to set one format at a time.
+ Subsequent calls will clear the object first. The point of all
+ this is to let the object's internal converters handle mustering
+ the object into whatever format you need at the moment.
+ """
+
+ if len(kw) == 1:
+ name = kw.keys()[0]
+ if name in self.formats:
+ self.clear()
+ setattr(self, name, kw[name])
+ return
+ if name == "PEM":
+ self.clear()
+ self._set_PEM(kw[name])
+ return
+ if name == "Base64":
+ self.clear()
+ self.DER = base64.b64decode(kw[name])
+ return
+ if name == "Auto_update":
+ self.filename = kw[name]
+ self.check_auto_update()
+ return
+ if name in ("PEM_file", "DER_file", "Auto_file"):
+ f = open(kw[name], "rb")
+ value = f.read()
+ f.close()
+ self.clear()
+ if name == "PEM_file" or (name == "Auto_file" and looks_like_PEM(value)):
+ self._set_PEM(value)
+ else:
+ self.DER = value
+ return
+ raise rpki.exceptions.DERObjectConversionError("Can't honor conversion request %r" % (kw,))
+
+ def check_auto_update(self):
+ """
+ Check for updates to a DER object that auto-updates from a file.
+ """
+ if self.filename is None:
+ return
+ try:
+ filename = self.filename
+ timestamp = os.stat(self.filename).st_mtime
+ if self.timestamp is None or self.timestamp < timestamp:
+ rpki.log.debug("Updating %s, timestamp %s" % (filename, rpki.sundial.datetime.fromtimestamp(timestamp)))
+ f = open(filename, "rb")
+ value = f.read()
+ f.close()
+ self.clear()
+ if looks_like_PEM(value):
+ self._set_PEM(value)
+ else:
+ self.DER = value
+ self.filename = filename
+ self.timestamp = timestamp
+ except (IOError, OSError), e:
+ now = rpki.sundial.now()
+ if self.lastfail is None or now > self.lastfail + self.failure_threshold:
+ rpki.log.warn("Could not auto_update %r (last failure %s): %s" % (self, self.lastfail, e))
+ self.lastfail = now
+ else:
+ self.lastfail = None
+
+ def check(self):
+ """
+ Perform basic checks on a DER object.
+ """
+ self.check_auto_update()
+ assert not self.empty()
+
+ def _set_PEM(self, pem):
+ """
+ Set the POW value of this object based on a PEM input value.
+ Subclasses may need to override this.
+ """
+ assert self.empty()
+ self.POW = self.POW_class.pemRead(pem)
+
+ def get_DER(self):
+ """
+ Get the DER value of this object.
+ Subclasses may need to override this method.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if self.DER:
+ return self.DER
+ if self.POW:
+ self.DER = self.POW.derWrite()
+ return self.get_DER()
+ raise rpki.exceptions.DERObjectConversionError("No conversion path to DER available")
+
+ def get_POW(self):
+ """
+ Get the rpki.POW value of this object.
+ Subclasses may need to override this method.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if not self.POW: # pylint: disable=E0203
+ self.POW = self.POW_class.derRead(self.get_DER())
+ return self.POW
+
+ def get_Base64(self):
+ """
+ Get the Base64 encoding of the DER value of this object.
+ """
+ return base64_with_linebreaks(self.get_DER())
+
+ def get_PEM(self):
+ """
+ Get the PEM representation of this object.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().pemWrite()
+
+ def __cmp__(self, other):
+ """
+ Compare two DER-encoded objects.
+ """
+ if self is None and other is None:
+ return 0
+ elif self is None:
+ return -1
+ elif other is None:
+ return 1
+ elif isinstance(other, str):
+ return cmp(self.get_DER(), other)
+ else:
+ return cmp(self.get_DER(), other.get_DER())
+
+ def hSKI(self):
+ """
+ Return hexadecimal string representation of SKI for this object.
+ Only work for subclasses that implement get_SKI().
+ """
+ ski = self.get_SKI()
+ return ":".join(("%02X" % ord(i) for i in ski)) if ski else ""
+
+ def gSKI(self):
+ """
+ Calculate g(SKI) for this object. Only work for subclasses
+ that implement get_SKI().
+ """
+ return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(self.get_SKI()).rstrip("=")
+
+ def hAKI(self):
+ """
+ Return hexadecimal string representation of AKI for this
+ object. Only work for subclasses that implement get_AKI().
+ """
+ aki = self.get_AKI()
+ return ":".join(("%02X" % ord(i) for i in aki)) if aki else ""
+
+ def gAKI(self):
+ """
+ Calculate g(AKI) for this object. Only work for subclasses
+ that implement get_AKI().
+ """
+ return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(self.get_AKI()).rstrip("=")
+
+ def get_AKI(self):
+ """
+ Get the AKI extension from this object, if supported.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getAKI()
+
+ def get_SKI(self):
+ """
+ Get the SKI extension from this object, if supported.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getSKI()
+
+ def get_EKU(self):
+ """
+ Get the Extended Key Usage extension from this object, if supported.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getEKU()
+
+ def get_SIA(self):
+ """
+ Get the SIA extension from this object. Only works for subclasses
+ that support getSIA().
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getSIA()
+
+ def get_sia_directory_uri(self):
+ """
+ Get SIA directory (id-ad-caRepository) URI from this object.
+ Only works for subclasses that support getSIA().
+ """
+ sia = self.get_POW().getSIA()
+ return None if sia is None else first_rsync_uri(sia[0])
+
+ def get_sia_manifest_uri(self):
+ """
+ Get SIA manifest (id-ad-rpkiManifest) URI from this object.
+ Only works for subclasses that support getSIA().
+ """
+ sia = self.get_POW().getSIA()
+ return None if sia is None else first_rsync_uri(sia[1])
+
+ def get_sia_object_uri(self):
+ """
+ Get SIA object (id-ad-signedObject) URI from this object.
+ Only works for subclasses that support getSIA().
+ """
+ sia = self.get_POW().getSIA()
+ return None if sia is None else first_rsync_uri(sia[2])
+
+ def get_AIA(self):
+ """
+ Get the SIA extension from this object. Only works for subclasses
+ that support getAIA().
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getAIA()
+
+ def get_aia_uri(self):
+ """
+ Get AIA (id-ad-caIssuers) URI from this object.
+ Only works for subclasses that support getAIA().
+ """
+ return first_rsync_uri(self.get_POW().getAIA())
+
+ def get_basicConstraints(self):
+ """
+ Get the basicConstraints extension from this object. Only works
+ for subclasses that support getExtension().
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getBasicConstraints()
+
+ def is_CA(self):
+ """
+ Return True if and only if object has the basicConstraints
+ extension and its cA value is true.
+ """
+ basicConstraints = self.get_basicConstraints()
+ return basicConstraints is not None and basicConstraints[0]
+
+ def get_3779resources(self):
+ """
+ Get RFC 3779 resources as rpki.resource_set objects.
+ """
+ resources = rpki.resource_set.resource_bag.from_POW_rfc3779(self.get_POW().getRFC3779())
+ try:
+ resources.valid_until = self.getNotAfter()
+ except AttributeError:
+ pass
+ return resources
+
+ @classmethod
+ def from_sql(cls, x):
+ """
+ Convert from SQL storage format.
+ """
+ return cls(DER = x)
+
+ def to_sql(self):
+ """
+ Convert to SQL storage format.
+ """
+ return self.get_DER()
+
+ def dumpasn1(self):
+ """
+ Pretty print an ASN.1 DER object using cryptlib dumpasn1 tool.
+ Use a temporary file rather than popen4() because dumpasn1 uses
+ seek() when decoding ASN.1 content nested in OCTET STRING values.
+ """
+
+ ret = None
+ fn = "dumpasn1.%d.tmp" % os.getpid()
+ try:
+ f = open(fn, "wb")
+ f.write(self.get_DER())
+ f.close()
+ p = subprocess.Popen(("dumpasn1", "-a", fn), stdout = subprocess.PIPE, stderr = subprocess.STDOUT)
+ ret = "\n".join(x for x in p.communicate()[0].splitlines() if x.startswith(" "))
+ except Exception, e:
+ ret = "[Could not run dumpasn1: %s]" % e
+ finally:
+ os.unlink(fn)
+ return ret
+
+ def tracking_data(self, uri):
+ """
+ Return a string containing data we want to log when tracking how
+ objects move through the RPKI system. Subclasses may wrap this to
+ provide more information, but should make sure to include at least
+ this information at the start of the tracking line.
+ """
+ try:
+ d = rpki.POW.Digest(rpki.POW.SHA1_DIGEST)
+ d.update(self.get_DER())
+ return "%s %s %s" % (uri, self.creation_timestamp,
+ "".join(("%02X" % ord(b) for b in d.digest())))
+ except: # pylint: disable=W0702
+ return uri
+
+ def __getstate__(self):
+ """
+ Pickling protocol -- pickle the DER encoding.
+ """
+ return self.get_DER()
+
+ def __setstate__(self, state):
+ """
+ Pickling protocol -- unpickle the DER encoding.
+ """
+ self.set(DER = state)
+
+class X509(DER_object):
+ """
+ X.509 certificates.
+
+ This class is designed to hold all the different representations of
+ X.509 certs we're using and convert between them. X.509 support in
+ Python a nasty maze of half-cooked stuff (except perhaps for
+ cryptlib, which is just different). Users of this module should not
+ have to care about this implementation nightmare.
+ """
+
+ POW_class = rpki.POW.X509
+
+ def getIssuer(self):
+ """
+ Get the issuer of this certificate.
+ """
+ return X501DN.from_POW(self.get_POW().getIssuer())
+
+ def getSubject(self):
+ """
+ Get the subject of this certificate.
+ """
+ return X501DN.from_POW(self.get_POW().getSubject())
+
+ def getNotBefore(self):
+ """
+ Get the inception time of this certificate.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getNotBefore()
+
+ def getNotAfter(self):
+ """
+ Get the expiration time of this certificate.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getNotAfter()
+
+ def getSerial(self):
+ """
+ Get the serial number of this certificate.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getSerial()
+
+ def getPublicKey(self):
+ """
+ Extract the public key from this certificate.
+ """
+ return PublicKey(POW = self.get_POW().getPublicKey())
+
+ def get_SKI(self):
+ """
+ Get the SKI extension from this object.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getSKI()
+
+ def expired(self):
+ """
+ Test whether this certificate has expired.
+ """
+ return self.getNotAfter() <= rpki.sundial.now()
+
+ def issue(self, keypair, subject_key, serial, sia, aia, crldp, notAfter,
+ cn = None, resources = None, is_ca = True, notBefore = None,
+ sn = None, eku = None):
+ """
+ Issue an RPKI certificate.
+ """
+
+ assert aia is not None and crldp is not None
+
+ assert eku is None or not is_ca
+
+ return self._issue(
+ keypair = keypair,
+ subject_key = subject_key,
+ serial = serial,
+ sia = sia,
+ aia = aia,
+ crldp = crldp,
+ notBefore = notBefore,
+ notAfter = notAfter,
+ cn = cn,
+ sn = sn,
+ resources = resources,
+ is_ca = is_ca,
+ aki = self.get_SKI(),
+ issuer_name = self.getSubject(),
+ eku = eku)
+
+
+ @classmethod
+ def self_certify(cls, keypair, subject_key, serial, sia, notAfter,
+ cn = None, resources = None, notBefore = None,
+ sn = None):
+ """
+ Generate a self-certified RPKI certificate.
+ """
+
+ ski = subject_key.get_SKI()
+
+ if cn is None:
+ cn = "".join(("%02X" % ord(i) for i in ski))
+
+ return cls._issue(
+ keypair = keypair,
+ subject_key = subject_key,
+ serial = serial,
+ sia = sia,
+ aia = None,
+ crldp = None,
+ notBefore = notBefore,
+ notAfter = notAfter,
+ cn = cn,
+ sn = sn,
+ resources = resources,
+ is_ca = True,
+ aki = ski,
+ issuer_name = X501DN.from_cn(cn, sn),
+ eku = None)
+
+
+ @classmethod
+ def _issue(cls, keypair, subject_key, serial, sia, aia, crldp, notAfter,
+ cn, sn, resources, is_ca, aki, issuer_name, notBefore, eku):
+ """
+ Common code to issue an RPKI certificate.
+ """
+
+ now = rpki.sundial.now()
+ ski = subject_key.get_SKI()
+
+ if notBefore is None:
+ notBefore = now
+
+ if cn is None:
+ cn = "".join(("%02X" % ord(i) for i in ski))
+
+ if now >= notAfter:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.PastNotAfter("notAfter value %s is already in the past" % notAfter)
+
+ if notBefore >= notAfter:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.NullValidityInterval("notAfter value %s predates notBefore value %s" %
+ (notAfter, notBefore))
+
+ cert = rpki.POW.X509()
+
+ cert.setVersion(2)
+ cert.setSerial(serial)
+ cert.setIssuer(issuer_name.get_POW())
+ cert.setSubject(X501DN.from_cn(cn, sn).get_POW())
+ cert.setNotBefore(notBefore)
+ cert.setNotAfter(notAfter)
+ cert.setPublicKey(subject_key.get_POW())
+ cert.setSKI(ski)
+ cert.setAKI(aki)
+ cert.setCertificatePolicies((rpki.oids.id_cp_ipAddr_asNumber,))
+
+ if crldp is not None:
+ cert.setCRLDP((crldp,))
+
+ if aia is not None:
+ cert.setAIA((aia,))
+
+ if is_ca:
+ cert.setBasicConstraints(True, None)
+ cert.setKeyUsage(frozenset(("keyCertSign", "cRLSign")))
+
+ else:
+ cert.setKeyUsage(frozenset(("digitalSignature",)))
+
+ assert sia is not None or not is_ca
+
+ if sia is not None:
+ caRepository, rpkiManifest, signedObject = sia
+ cert.setSIA(
+ (caRepository,) if isinstance(caRepository, str) else caRepository,
+ (rpkiManifest,) if isinstance(rpkiManifest, str) else rpkiManifest,
+ (signedObject,) if isinstance(signedObject, str) else signedObject)
+
+ if resources is not None:
+ cert.setRFC3779(
+ asn = ("inherit" if resources.asn.inherit else
+ ((r.min, r.max) for r in resources.asn)),
+ ipv4 = ("inherit" if resources.v4.inherit else
+ ((r.min, r.max) for r in resources.v4)),
+ ipv6 = ("inherit" if resources.v6.inherit else
+ ((r.min, r.max) for r in resources.v6)))
+
+ if eku is not None:
+ assert not is_ca
+ cert.setEKU(eku)
+
+ cert.sign(keypair.get_POW(), rpki.POW.SHA256_DIGEST)
+
+ return cls(POW = cert)
+
+ def bpki_cross_certify(self, keypair, source_cert, serial, notAfter,
+ now = None, pathLenConstraint = 0):
+ """
+ Issue a BPKI certificate with values taking from an existing certificate.
+ """
+ return self.bpki_certify(
+ keypair = keypair,
+ subject_name = source_cert.getSubject(),
+ subject_key = source_cert.getPublicKey(),
+ serial = serial,
+ notAfter = notAfter,
+ now = now,
+ pathLenConstraint = pathLenConstraint,
+ is_ca = True)
+
+ @classmethod
+ def bpki_self_certify(cls, keypair, subject_name, serial, notAfter,
+ now = None, pathLenConstraint = None):
+ """
+ Issue a self-signed BPKI CA certificate.
+ """
+ return cls._bpki_certify(
+ keypair = keypair,
+ issuer_name = subject_name,
+ subject_name = subject_name,
+ subject_key = keypair.get_public(),
+ serial = serial,
+ now = now,
+ notAfter = notAfter,
+ pathLenConstraint = pathLenConstraint,
+ is_ca = True)
+
+ def bpki_certify(self, keypair, subject_name, subject_key, serial, notAfter, is_ca,
+ now = None, pathLenConstraint = None):
+ """
+ Issue a normal BPKI certificate.
+ """
+ assert keypair.get_public() == self.getPublicKey()
+ return self._bpki_certify(
+ keypair = keypair,
+ issuer_name = self.getSubject(),
+ subject_name = subject_name,
+ subject_key = subject_key,
+ serial = serial,
+ now = now,
+ notAfter = notAfter,
+ pathLenConstraint = pathLenConstraint,
+ is_ca = is_ca)
+
+ @classmethod
+ def _bpki_certify(cls, keypair, issuer_name, subject_name, subject_key,
+ serial, now, notAfter, pathLenConstraint, is_ca):
+ """
+ Issue a BPKI certificate. This internal method does the real
+ work, after one of the wrapper methods has extracted the relevant
+ fields.
+ """
+
+ if now is None:
+ now = rpki.sundial.now()
+
+ issuer_key = keypair.get_public()
+
+ assert (issuer_key == subject_key) == (issuer_name == subject_name)
+ assert is_ca or issuer_name != subject_name
+ assert is_ca or pathLenConstraint is None
+ assert pathLenConstraint is None or (isinstance(pathLenConstraint, (int, long)) and
+ pathLenConstraint >= 0)
+
+ cert = rpki.POW.X509()
+ cert.setVersion(2)
+ cert.setSerial(serial)
+ cert.setIssuer(issuer_name.get_POW())
+ cert.setSubject(subject_name.get_POW())
+ cert.setNotBefore(now)
+ cert.setNotAfter(notAfter)
+ cert.setPublicKey(subject_key.get_POW())
+ cert.setSKI(subject_key.get_POW().calculateSKI())
+ if issuer_key != subject_key:
+ cert.setAKI(issuer_key.get_POW().calculateSKI())
+ if is_ca:
+ cert.setBasicConstraints(True, pathLenConstraint)
+ cert.sign(keypair.get_POW(), rpki.POW.SHA256_DIGEST)
+ return cls(POW = cert)
+
+ @classmethod
+ def normalize_chain(cls, chain):
+ """
+ Normalize a chain of certificates into a tuple of X509 objects.
+ Given all the glue certificates needed for BPKI cross
+ certification, it's easiest to allow sloppy arguments to the CMS
+ validation methods and provide a single method that normalizes the
+ allowed cases. So this method allows X509, None, lists, and
+ tuples, and returns a tuple of X509 objects.
+ """
+ if isinstance(chain, cls):
+ chain = (chain,)
+ return tuple(x for x in chain if x is not None)
+
+ @property
+ def creation_timestamp(self):
+ """
+ Time at which this object was created.
+ """
+ return self.getNotBefore()
+
+class PKCS10(DER_object):
+ """
+ Class to hold a PKCS #10 request.
+ """
+
+ POW_class = rpki.POW.PKCS10
+
+ ## @var expected_ca_keyUsage
+ # KeyUsage extension flags expected for CA requests.
+
+ expected_ca_keyUsage = frozenset(("keyCertSign", "cRLSign"))
+
+ ## @var allowed_extensions
+ # Extensions allowed by RPKI profile.
+
+ allowed_extensions = frozenset((rpki.oids.basicConstraints,
+ rpki.oids.keyUsage,
+ rpki.oids.subjectInfoAccess,
+ rpki.oids.extendedKeyUsage))
+
+
+ def get_DER(self):
+ """
+ Get the DER value of this certification request.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if self.DER:
+ return self.DER
+ if self.POW:
+ self.DER = self.POW.derWrite()
+ return self.get_DER()
+ raise rpki.exceptions.DERObjectConversionError("No conversion path to DER available")
+
+ def get_POW(self):
+ """
+ Get the rpki.POW value of this certification request.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if not self.POW: # pylint: disable=E0203
+ self.POW = rpki.POW.PKCS10.derRead(self.get_DER())
+ return self.POW
+
+ def getSubject(self):
+ """
+ Extract the subject name from this certification request.
+ """
+ return X501DN.from_POW(self.get_POW().getSubject())
+
+ def getPublicKey(self):
+ """
+ Extract the public key from this certification request.
+ """
+ return PublicKey(POW = self.get_POW().getPublicKey())
+
+ def get_SKI(self):
+ """
+ Compute SKI for public key from this certification request.
+ """
+ return self.getPublicKey().get_SKI()
+
+
+ def check_valid_request_common(self):
+ """
+ Common code for checking this certification requests to see
+ whether they conform to the RPKI certificate profile.
+
+ Throws an exception if the request isn't valid, so if this method
+ returns at all, the request is ok.
+
+ You probably don't want to call this directly, as it only performs
+ the checks that are common to all RPKI certificates.
+ """
+
+ if not self.get_POW().verify():
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 signature check failed")
+
+ ver = self.get_POW().getVersion()
+
+ if ver != 0:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 request has bad version number %s" % ver)
+
+ ku = self.get_POW().getKeyUsage()
+
+ if ku is not None and self.expected_ca_keyUsage != ku:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 keyUsage doesn't match profile: %r" % ku)
+
+ forbidden_extensions = self.get_POW().getExtensionOIDs() - self.allowed_extensions
+
+ if forbidden_extensions:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadExtension("Forbidden extension%s in PKCS #10 certificate request: %s" % (
+ "" if len(forbidden_extensions) == 1 else "s",
+ ", ".join(forbidden_extensions)))
+
+
+ def check_valid_request_ca(self):
+ """
+ Check this certification request to see whether it's a valid
+ request for an RPKI CA certificate.
+
+ Throws an exception if the request isn't valid, so if this method
+ returns at all, the request is ok.
+ """
+
+ self.check_valid_request_common()
+
+ alg = self.get_POW().getSignatureAlgorithm()
+ bc = self.get_POW().getBasicConstraints()
+ eku = self.get_POW().getEKU()
+ sias = self.get_POW().getSIA()
+
+ if alg != rpki.oids.sha256WithRSAEncryption:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 has bad signature algorithm for CA: %s" % alg)
+
+ if bc is None or not bc[0] or bc[1] is not None:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA bad basicConstraints")
+
+ if eku is not None:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA EKU not allowed")
+
+ if sias is None:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA SIA missing")
+
+ caRepository, rpkiManifest, signedObject = sias
+
+ if signedObject:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA SIA must not have id-ad-signedObject")
+
+ if not caRepository:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA SIA must have id-ad-caRepository")
+
+ if not any(uri.startswith("rsync://") for uri in caRepository):
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA SIA id-ad-caRepository contains no rsync URIs")
+
+ if any(uri.startswith("rsync://") and not uri.endswith("/") for uri in caRepository):
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA SIA id-ad-caRepository does not end with slash")
+
+ if not rpkiManifest:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA SIA must have id-ad-rpkiManifest")
+
+ if not any(uri.startswith("rsync://") for uri in rpkiManifest):
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA SIA id-ad-rpkiManifest contains no rsync URIs")
+
+ if any(uri.startswith("rsync://") and uri.endswith("/") for uri in rpkiManifest):
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 CA SIA id-ad-rpkiManifest ends with slash")
+
+
+ def check_valid_request_ee(self):
+ """
+ Check this certification request to see whether it's a valid
+ request for an RPKI EE certificate.
+
+ Throws an exception if the request isn't valid, so if this method
+ returns at all, the request is ok.
+
+ We're a bit less strict here than we are for either CA
+ certificates or BGPSEC router certificates, because the profile is
+ less tightly nailed down for unspecified-use RPKI EE certificates.
+ Future specific purposes may impose tighter constraints.
+
+ Note that this method does NOT apply to so-called "infrastructure"
+ EE certificates (eg, the EE certificates embedded in manifests and
+ ROAs); those are constrained fairly tightly, but they're also
+ generated internally so we don't need to check them as user or
+ protocol input.
+ """
+
+ self.check_valid_request_common()
+
+ alg = self.get_POW().getSignatureAlgorithm()
+ bc = self.get_POW().getBasicConstraints()
+ sia = self.get_POW().getSIA()
+
+ caRepository, rpkiManifest, signedObject = sia or (None, None, None)
+
+ if alg not in (rpki.oids.sha256WithRSAEncryption, rpki.oids.ecdsa_with_SHA256):
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 has bad signature algorithm for EE: %s" % alg)
+
+ if bc is not None and (bc[0] or bc[1] is not None):
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 EE has bad basicConstraints")
+
+ if caRepository:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 EE must not have id-ad-caRepository")
+
+ if rpkiManifest:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 EE must not have id-ad-rpkiManifest")
+
+ if signedObject and not any(uri.startswith("rsync://") for uri in signedObject):
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 EE SIA id-ad-signedObject contains no rsync URIs")
+
+
+ def check_valid_request_router(self):
+ """
+ Check this certification request to see whether it's a valid
+ request for a BGPSEC router certificate.
+
+ Throws an exception if the request isn't valid, so if this method
+ returns at all, the request is ok.
+
+ draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles 3.2 says follow RFC 6487 3
+ except where explicitly overriden, and does not override for SIA.
+ But draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles also says that router
+ certificates don't get SIA, while RFC 6487 requires SIA. So what
+ do we do with SIA in PKCS #10 for router certificates?
+
+ For the moment, ignore it, but make sure we don't include it in
+ the certificate when we get to the code that generates that.
+ """
+
+ self.check_valid_request_ee()
+
+ alg = self.get_POW().getSignatureAlgorithm()
+ eku = self.get_POW().getEKU()
+
+ if alg != rpki.oids.ecdsa_with_SHA256:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 has bad signature algorithm for router: %s" % alg)
+
+ # Not really clear to me whether PKCS #10 should have EKU or not, so allow
+ # either, but insist that it be the right one if present.
+
+ if eku is not None and rpki.oids.id_kp_bgpsec_router not in eku:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.BadPKCS10("PKCS #10 router must have EKU")
+
+
+ @classmethod
+ def create(cls, keypair, exts = None, is_ca = False,
+ caRepository = None, rpkiManifest = None, signedObject = None,
+ cn = None, sn = None, eku = None):
+ """
+ Create a new request for a given keypair.
+ """
+
+ assert exts is None, "Old calling sequence to rpki.x509.PKCS10.create()"
+
+ if cn is None:
+ cn = "".join(("%02X" % ord(i) for i in keypair.get_SKI()))
+
+ if isinstance(caRepository, str):
+ caRepository = (caRepository,)
+
+ if isinstance(rpkiManifest, str):
+ rpkiManifest = (rpkiManifest,)
+
+ if isinstance(signedObject, str):
+ signedObject = (signedObject,)
+
+ req = rpki.POW.PKCS10()
+ req.setVersion(0)
+ req.setSubject(X501DN.from_cn(cn, sn).get_POW())
+ req.setPublicKey(keypair.get_POW())
+
+ if is_ca:
+ req.setBasicConstraints(True, None)
+ req.setKeyUsage(cls.expected_ca_keyUsage)
+
+ if caRepository or rpkiManifest or signedObject:
+ req.setSIA(caRepository, rpkiManifest, signedObject)
+
+ if eku:
+ req.setEKU(eku)
+
+ req.sign(keypair.get_POW(), rpki.POW.SHA256_DIGEST)
+ return cls(POW = req)
+
+## @var generate_insecure_debug_only_rsa_key
+# Debugging hack to let us save throwaway RSA keys from one debug
+# session to the next. DO NOT USE THIS IN PRODUCTION.
+
+generate_insecure_debug_only_rsa_key = None
+
+class insecure_debug_only_rsa_key_generator(object):
+
+ def __init__(self, filename, keyno = 0):
+ try:
+ try:
+ import gdbm as dbm_du_jour
+ except ImportError:
+ import dbm as dbm_du_jour
+ self.keyno = long(keyno)
+ self.filename = filename
+ self.db = dbm_du_jour.open(filename, "c")
+ except:
+ rpki.log.warn("insecure_debug_only_rsa_key_generator initialization FAILED, hack inoperative")
+ raise
+
+ def __call__(self):
+ k = str(self.keyno)
+ try:
+ v = rpki.POW.Asymmetric.derReadPrivate(self.db[k])
+ except KeyError:
+ v = rpki.POW.Asymmetric.generateRSA(2048)
+ self.db[k] = v.derWritePrivate()
+ self.keyno += 1
+ return v
+
+
+class PrivateKey(DER_object):
+ """
+ Class to hold a Public/Private key pair.
+ """
+
+ POW_class = rpki.POW.Asymmetric
+
+ def get_DER(self):
+ """
+ Get the DER value of this keypair.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if self.DER:
+ return self.DER
+ if self.POW:
+ self.DER = self.POW.derWritePrivate()
+ return self.get_DER()
+ raise rpki.exceptions.DERObjectConversionError("No conversion path to DER available")
+
+ def get_POW(self):
+ """
+ Get the rpki.POW value of this keypair.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if not self.POW: # pylint: disable=E0203
+ self.POW = rpki.POW.Asymmetric.derReadPrivate(self.get_DER())
+ return self.POW
+
+ def get_PEM(self):
+ """
+ Get the PEM representation of this keypair.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().pemWritePrivate()
+
+ def _set_PEM(self, pem):
+ """
+ Set the POW value of this keypair from a PEM string.
+ """
+ assert self.empty()
+ self.POW = self.POW_class.pemReadPrivate(pem)
+
+ def get_public_DER(self):
+ """
+ Get the DER encoding of the public key from this keypair.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().derWritePublic()
+
+ def get_SKI(self):
+ """
+ Calculate the SKI of this keypair.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().calculateSKI()
+
+ def get_public(self):
+ """
+ Convert the public key of this keypair into a PublicKey object.
+ """
+ return PublicKey(DER = self.get_public_DER())
+
+class PublicKey(DER_object):
+ """
+ Class to hold a public key.
+ """
+
+ POW_class = rpki.POW.Asymmetric
+
+ def get_DER(self):
+ """
+ Get the DER value of this public key.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if self.DER:
+ return self.DER
+ if self.POW:
+ self.DER = self.POW.derWritePublic()
+ return self.get_DER()
+ raise rpki.exceptions.DERObjectConversionError("No conversion path to DER available")
+
+ def get_POW(self):
+ """
+ Get the rpki.POW value of this public key.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if not self.POW: # pylint: disable=E0203
+ self.POW = rpki.POW.Asymmetric.derReadPublic(self.get_DER())
+ return self.POW
+
+ def get_PEM(self):
+ """
+ Get the PEM representation of this public key.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().pemWritePublic()
+
+ def _set_PEM(self, pem):
+ """
+ Set the POW value of this public key from a PEM string.
+ """
+ assert self.empty()
+ self.POW = self.POW_class.pemReadPublic(pem)
+
+ def get_SKI(self):
+ """
+ Calculate the SKI of this public key.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().calculateSKI()
+
+class KeyParams(DER_object):
+ """
+ Wrapper for OpenSSL's asymmetric key parameter classes.
+ """
+
+ POW_class = rpki.POW.AsymmetricParams
+
+ @classmethod
+ def generateEC(cls, curve = rpki.POW.EC_P256_CURVE):
+ return cls(POW = rpki.POW.AsymmetricParams.generateEC(curve = curve))
+
+class RSA(PrivateKey):
+ """
+ Class to hold an RSA key pair.
+ """
+
+ @classmethod
+ def generate(cls, keylength = 2048, quiet = False):
+ """
+ Generate a new keypair.
+ """
+ if not quiet:
+ rpki.log.debug("Generating new %d-bit RSA key" % keylength)
+ if generate_insecure_debug_only_rsa_key is not None:
+ return cls(POW = generate_insecure_debug_only_rsa_key())
+ else:
+ return cls(POW = rpki.POW.Asymmetric.generateRSA(keylength))
+
+class ECDSA(PrivateKey):
+ """
+ Class to hold an ECDSA key pair.
+ """
+
+ @classmethod
+ def generate(cls, params = None, quiet = False):
+ """
+ Generate a new keypair.
+ """
+
+ if params is None:
+ if not quiet:
+ rpki.log.debug("Generating new ECDSA key parameters")
+ params = KeyParams.generateEC()
+
+ assert isinstance(params, KeyParams)
+
+ if not quiet:
+ rpki.log.debug("Generating new ECDSA key")
+
+ return cls(POW = rpki.POW.Asymmetric.generateFromParams(params.get_POW()))
+
+class CMS_object(DER_object):
+ """
+ Abstract class to hold a CMS object.
+ """
+
+ econtent_oid = rpki.oids.id_data
+ POW_class = rpki.POW.CMS
+
+ ## @var dump_on_verify_failure
+ # Set this to True to get dumpasn1 dumps of ASN.1 on CMS verify failures.
+
+ dump_on_verify_failure = True
+
+ ## @var debug_cms_certs
+ # Set this to True to log a lot of chatter about CMS certificates.
+
+ debug_cms_certs = False
+
+ ## @var dump_using_dumpasn1
+ # Set this to use external dumpasn1 program, which is prettier and
+ # more informative than OpenSSL's CMS text dump, but which won't
+ # work if the dumpasn1 program isn't installed.
+
+ dump_using_dumpasn1 = False
+
+ ## @var require_crls
+ # Set this to False to make CMS CRLs optional in the cases where we
+ # would otherwise require them. Some day this option should go away
+ # and CRLs should be uncondtionally mandatory in such cases.
+
+ require_crls = False
+
+ ## @var allow_extra_certs
+ # Set this to True to allow CMS messages to contain CA certificates.
+
+ allow_extra_certs = False
+
+ ## @var allow_extra_crls
+ # Set this to True to allow CMS messages to contain multiple CRLs.
+
+ allow_extra_crls = False
+
+ ## @var print_on_der_error
+ # Set this to True to log alleged DER when we have trouble parsing
+ # it, in case it's really a Perl backtrace or something.
+
+ print_on_der_error = True
+
+ def get_DER(self):
+ """
+ Get the DER value of this CMS_object.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if self.DER:
+ return self.DER
+ if self.POW:
+ self.DER = self.POW.derWrite()
+ return self.get_DER()
+ raise rpki.exceptions.DERObjectConversionError("No conversion path to DER available")
+
+ def get_POW(self):
+ """
+ Get the rpki.POW value of this CMS_object.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if not self.POW: # pylint: disable=E0203
+ self.POW = self.POW_class.derRead(self.get_DER())
+ return self.POW
+
+ def get_signingTime(self):
+ """
+ Extract signingTime from CMS signed attributes.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().signingTime()
+
+ def verify(self, ta):
+ """
+ Verify CMS wrapper and store inner content.
+ """
+
+ try:
+ cms = self.get_POW()
+ except (rpki.async.ExitNow, SystemExit):
+ raise
+ except Exception:
+ if self.print_on_der_error:
+ rpki.log.debug("Problem parsing DER CMS message, might not really be DER: %r" %
+ self.get_DER())
+ raise rpki.exceptions.UnparsableCMSDER
+
+ if cms.eContentType() != self.econtent_oid:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.WrongEContentType("Got CMS eContentType %s, expected %s" % (
+ cms.eContentType(), self.econtent_oid))
+
+ certs = [X509(POW = x) for x in cms.certs()]
+ crls = [CRL(POW = c) for c in cms.crls()]
+
+ if self.debug_cms_certs:
+ for x in certs:
+ rpki.log.debug("Received CMS cert issuer %s subject %s SKI %s" % (
+ x.getIssuer(), x.getSubject(), x.hSKI()))
+ for c in crls:
+ rpki.log.debug("Received CMS CRL issuer %r" % (c.getIssuer(),))
+
+ store = rpki.POW.X509Store()
+
+ now = rpki.sundial.now()
+
+ trusted_ee = None
+
+ for x in X509.normalize_chain(ta):
+ if self.debug_cms_certs:
+ rpki.log.debug("CMS trusted cert issuer %s subject %s SKI %s" % (
+ x.getIssuer(), x.getSubject(), x.hSKI()))
+ if x.getNotAfter() < now:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.TrustedCMSCertHasExpired("Trusted CMS certificate has expired",
+ "%s (%s)" % (x.getSubject(), x.hSKI()))
+ if not x.is_CA():
+ if trusted_ee is None:
+ trusted_ee = x
+ else:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.MultipleCMSEECert("Multiple CMS EE certificates", *("%s (%s)" % (
+ x.getSubject(), x.hSKI()) for x in ta if not x.is_CA()))
+ store.addTrust(x.get_POW())
+
+ if trusted_ee:
+ if self.debug_cms_certs:
+ rpki.log.debug("Trusted CMS EE cert issuer %s subject %s SKI %s" % (
+ trusted_ee.getIssuer(), trusted_ee.getSubject(), trusted_ee.hSKI()))
+ if len(certs) > 1 or (len(certs) == 1 and
+ (certs[0].getSubject() != trusted_ee.getSubject() or
+ certs[0].getPublicKey() != trusted_ee.getPublicKey())):
+ raise rpki.exceptions.UnexpectedCMSCerts("Unexpected CMS certificates", *("%s (%s)" % (
+ x.getSubject(), x.hSKI()) for x in certs))
+ if crls:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.UnexpectedCMSCRLs("Unexpected CRLs", *("%s (%s)" % (
+ c.getIssuer(), c.hAKI()) for c in crls))
+
+ else:
+ untrusted_ee = [x for x in certs if not x.is_CA()]
+ if len(untrusted_ee) < 1:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.MissingCMSEEcert
+ if len(untrusted_ee) > 1 or (not self.allow_extra_certs and len(certs) > len(untrusted_ee)):
+ raise rpki.exceptions.UnexpectedCMSCerts("Unexpected CMS certificates", *("%s (%s)" % (
+ x.getSubject(), x.hSKI()) for x in certs))
+ if len(crls) < 1:
+ if self.require_crls:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.MissingCMSCRL
+ else:
+ rpki.log.warn("MISSING CMS CRL! Ignoring per self.require_crls setting")
+ if len(crls) > 1 and not self.allow_extra_crls:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.UnexpectedCMSCRLs("Unexpected CRLs", *("%s (%s)" % (
+ c.getIssuer(), c.hAKI()) for c in crls))
+
+ for x in certs:
+ if x.getNotAfter() < now:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.CMSCertHasExpired("CMS certificate has expired", "%s (%s)" % (
+ x.getSubject(), x.hSKI()))
+
+ for c in crls:
+ if c.getNextUpdate() < now:
+ rpki.log.warn("Stale BPKI CMS CRL (%s %s %s)" % (c.getNextUpdate(), c.getIssuer(), c.hAKI()))
+
+ try:
+ content = cms.verify(store)
+ except (rpki.async.ExitNow, SystemExit):
+ raise
+ except Exception:
+ if self.dump_on_verify_failure:
+ if self.dump_using_dumpasn1:
+ dbg = self.dumpasn1()
+ else:
+ dbg = cms.pprint()
+ rpki.log.warn("CMS verification failed, dumping ASN.1 (%d octets):" % len(self.get_DER()))
+ for line in dbg.splitlines():
+ rpki.log.warn(line)
+ raise rpki.exceptions.CMSVerificationFailed("CMS verification failed")
+
+ return content
+
+ def extract(self):
+ """
+ Extract and store inner content from CMS wrapper without verifying
+ the CMS.
+
+ DANGER WILL ROBINSON!!!
+
+ Do not use this method on unvalidated data. Use the verify()
+ method instead.
+
+ If you don't understand this warning, don't use this method.
+ """
+
+ try:
+ cms = self.get_POW()
+ except (rpki.async.ExitNow, SystemExit):
+ raise
+ except Exception:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.UnparsableCMSDER
+
+ if cms.eContentType() != self.econtent_oid:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.WrongEContentType("Got CMS eContentType %s, expected %s" % (
+ cms.eContentType(), self.econtent_oid))
+
+ return cms.verify(rpki.POW.X509Store(), None,
+ (rpki.POW.CMS_NOCRL | rpki.POW.CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY |
+ rpki.POW.CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY | rpki.POW.CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY))
+
+
+ def sign(self, keypair, certs, crls = None, no_certs = False):
+ """
+ Sign and wrap inner content.
+ """
+
+ rpki.log.trace()
+
+ if isinstance(certs, X509):
+ cert = certs
+ certs = ()
+ else:
+ cert = certs[0]
+ certs = certs[1:]
+
+ if crls is None:
+ crls = ()
+ elif isinstance(crls, CRL):
+ crls = (crls,)
+
+ if self.debug_cms_certs:
+ rpki.log.debug("Signing with cert issuer %s subject %s SKI %s" % (
+ cert.getIssuer(), cert.getSubject(), cert.hSKI()))
+ for i, c in enumerate(certs):
+ rpki.log.debug("Additional cert %d issuer %s subject %s SKI %s" % (
+ i, c.getIssuer(), c.getSubject(), c.hSKI()))
+
+ self._sign(cert.get_POW(),
+ keypair.get_POW(),
+ [x.get_POW() for x in certs],
+ [c.get_POW() for c in crls],
+ rpki.POW.CMS_NOCERTS if no_certs else 0)
+
+ @property
+ def creation_timestamp(self):
+ """
+ Time at which this object was created.
+ """
+ return self.get_signingTime()
+
+
+class Wrapped_CMS_object(CMS_object):
+ """
+ Abstract class to hold CMS objects wrapping non-DER content (eg, XML
+ or VCard).
+
+ CMS-wrapped objects are a little different from the other DER_object
+ types because the signed object is CMS wrapping some other kind of
+ inner content. A Wrapped_CMS_object is the outer CMS wrapped object
+ so that the usual DER and PEM operations do the obvious things, and
+ the inner content is handle via separate methods.
+ """
+
+ other_clear = ("content",)
+
+ def get_content(self):
+ """
+ Get the inner content of this Wrapped_CMS_object.
+ """
+ if self.content is None:
+ raise rpki.exceptions.CMSContentNotSet("Inner content of CMS object %r is not set" % self)
+ return self.content
+
+ def set_content(self, content):
+ """
+ Set the (inner) content of this Wrapped_CMS_object, clearing the wrapper.
+ """
+ self.clear()
+ self.content = content
+
+ def verify(self, ta):
+ """
+ Verify CMS wrapper and store inner content.
+ """
+
+ self.decode(CMS_object.verify(self, ta))
+ return self.get_content()
+
+ def extract(self):
+ """
+ Extract and store inner content from CMS wrapper without verifying
+ the CMS.
+
+ DANGER WILL ROBINSON!!!
+
+ Do not use this method on unvalidated data. Use the verify()
+ method instead.
+
+ If you don't understand this warning, don't use this method.
+ """
+
+ self.decode(CMS_object.extract(self))
+ return self.get_content()
+
+ def extract_if_needed(self):
+ """
+ Extract inner content if needed. See caveats for .extract(), do
+ not use unless you really know what you are doing.
+ """
+
+ if self.content is None:
+ self.extract()
+
+ def _sign(self, cert, keypair, certs, crls, flags):
+ """
+ Internal method to call POW to do CMS signature. This is split
+ out from the .sign() API method to handle differences in how
+ different CMS-based POW classes handle the inner content.
+ """
+
+ cms = self.POW_class()
+ cms.sign(cert, keypair, self.encode(), certs, crls, self.econtent_oid, flags)
+ self.POW = cms
+
+
+class DER_CMS_object(CMS_object):
+ """
+ Abstract class for CMS-based objects with DER-encoded content
+ handled by C-level subclasses of rpki.POW.CMS.
+ """
+
+ def _sign(self, cert, keypair, certs, crls, flags):
+ self.get_POW().sign(cert, keypair, certs, crls, self.econtent_oid, flags)
+
+
+ def extract_if_needed(self):
+ """
+ Extract inner content if needed. See caveats for .extract(), do
+ not use unless you really know what you are doing.
+ """
+
+ try:
+ self.get_POW().getVersion()
+ except rpki.POW.NotVerifiedError:
+ self.extract()
+
+
+class SignedManifest(DER_CMS_object):
+ """
+ Class to hold a signed manifest.
+ """
+
+ econtent_oid = rpki.oids.id_ct_rpkiManifest
+ POW_class = rpki.POW.Manifest
+
+ def getThisUpdate(self):
+ """
+ Get thisUpdate value from this manifest.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getThisUpdate()
+
+ def getNextUpdate(self):
+ """
+ Get nextUpdate value from this manifest.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getNextUpdate()
+
+ @classmethod
+ def build(cls, serial, thisUpdate, nextUpdate, names_and_objs, keypair, certs, version = 0):
+ """
+ Build a signed manifest.
+ """
+
+ filelist = []
+ for name, obj in names_and_objs:
+ d = rpki.POW.Digest(rpki.POW.SHA256_DIGEST)
+ d.update(obj.get_DER())
+ filelist.append((name.rpartition("/")[2], d.digest()))
+ filelist.sort(key = lambda x: x[0])
+
+ obj = cls.POW_class()
+ obj.setVersion(version)
+ obj.setManifestNumber(serial)
+ obj.setThisUpdate(thisUpdate)
+ obj.setNextUpdate(nextUpdate)
+ obj.setAlgorithm(rpki.oids.id_sha256)
+ obj.addFiles(filelist)
+
+ self = cls(POW = obj)
+ self.sign(keypair, certs)
+ return self
+
+class ROA(DER_CMS_object):
+ """
+ Class to hold a signed ROA.
+ """
+
+ econtent_oid = rpki.oids.id_ct_routeOriginAttestation
+ POW_class = rpki.POW.ROA
+
+ @classmethod
+ def build(cls, asn, ipv4, ipv6, keypair, certs, version = 0):
+ """
+ Build a ROA.
+ """
+ ipv4 = ipv4.to_POW_roa_tuple() if ipv4 else None
+ ipv6 = ipv6.to_POW_roa_tuple() if ipv6 else None
+ obj = cls.POW_class()
+ obj.setVersion(version)
+ obj.setASID(asn)
+ obj.setPrefixes(ipv4 = ipv4, ipv6 = ipv6)
+ self = cls(POW = obj)
+ self.sign(keypair, certs)
+ return self
+
+ def tracking_data(self, uri):
+ """
+ Return a string containing data we want to log when tracking how
+ objects move through the RPKI system.
+ """
+ msg = DER_CMS_object.tracking_data(self, uri)
+ try:
+ self.extract_if_needed()
+ asn = self.get_POW().getASID()
+ text = []
+ for prefixes in self.get_POW().getPrefixes():
+ if prefixes is not None:
+ for prefix, prefixlen, maxprefixlen in prefixes:
+ if maxprefixlen is None or prefixlen == maxprefixlen:
+ text.append("%s/%s" % (prefix, prefixlen))
+ else:
+ text.append("%s/%s-%s" % (prefix, prefixlen, maxprefixlen))
+ text.sort()
+ msg = "%s %s %s" % (msg, asn, ",".join(text))
+ except: # pylint: disable=W0702
+ pass
+ return msg
+
+class DeadDrop(object):
+ """
+ Dead-drop utility for storing copies of CMS messages for debugging or
+ audit. At the moment this uses Maildir mailbox format, as it has
+ approximately the right properties and a number of useful tools for
+ manipulating it already exist.
+ """
+
+ def __init__(self, name):
+ self.name = name
+ self.pid = os.getpid()
+ self.maildir = mailbox.Maildir(name, factory = None, create = True)
+ self.warned = False
+
+ def dump(self, obj):
+ try:
+ now = time.time()
+ msg = email.mime.application.MIMEApplication(obj.get_DER(), "x-rpki")
+ msg["Date"] = email.utils.formatdate(now)
+ msg["Subject"] = "Process %s dump of %r" % (self.pid, obj)
+ msg["Message-ID"] = email.utils.make_msgid()
+ msg["X-RPKI-PID"] = str(self.pid)
+ msg["X-RPKI-Object"] = repr(obj)
+ msg["X-RPKI-Timestamp"] = "%f" % now
+ self.maildir.add(msg)
+ self.warned = False
+ except Exception, e:
+ if not self.warned:
+ rpki.log.warn("Could not write to mailbox %s: %s" % (self.name, e))
+ self.warned = True
+
+class XML_CMS_object(Wrapped_CMS_object):
+ """
+ Class to hold CMS-wrapped XML protocol data.
+ """
+
+ econtent_oid = rpki.oids.id_ct_xml
+
+ ## @var dump_outbound_cms
+ # If set, we write all outbound XML-CMS PDUs to disk, for debugging.
+ # If set, value should be a DeadDrop object.
+
+ dump_outbound_cms = None
+
+ ## @var dump_inbound_cms
+ # If set, we write all inbound XML-CMS PDUs to disk, for debugging.
+ # If set, value should be a DeadDrop object.
+
+ dump_inbound_cms = None
+
+ ## @var check_inbound_schema
+ # If set, perform RelaxNG schema check on inbound messages.
+
+ check_inbound_schema = True
+
+ ## @var check_outbound_schema
+ # If set, perform RelaxNG schema check on outbound messages.
+
+ check_outbound_schema = False
+
+ def encode(self):
+ """
+ Encode inner content for signing.
+ """
+ return lxml.etree.tostring(self.get_content(),
+ pretty_print = True,
+ encoding = self.encoding,
+ xml_declaration = True)
+
+ def decode(self, xml):
+ """
+ Decode XML and set inner content.
+ """
+ self.content = lxml.etree.fromstring(xml)
+
+ def pretty_print_content(self):
+ """
+ Pretty print XML content of this message.
+ """
+ return lxml.etree.tostring(self.get_content(),
+ pretty_print = True,
+ encoding = self.encoding,
+ xml_declaration = True)
+
+ def schema_check(self):
+ """
+ Handle XML RelaxNG schema check.
+ """
+ try:
+ self.schema.assertValid(self.get_content())
+ except lxml.etree.DocumentInvalid:
+ rpki.log.error("PDU failed schema check")
+ for line in self.pretty_print_content().splitlines():
+ rpki.log.warn(line)
+ raise
+
+ def dump_to_disk(self, prefix):
+ """
+ Write DER of current message to disk, for debugging.
+ """
+ f = open(prefix + rpki.sundial.now().isoformat() + "Z.cms", "wb")
+ f.write(self.get_DER())
+ f.close()
+
+ def wrap(self, msg, keypair, certs, crls = None):
+ """
+ Wrap an XML PDU in CMS and return its DER encoding.
+ """
+ rpki.log.trace()
+ if self.saxify is None:
+ self.set_content(msg)
+ else:
+ self.set_content(msg.toXML())
+ if self.check_outbound_schema:
+ self.schema_check()
+ self.sign(keypair, certs, crls)
+ if self.dump_outbound_cms:
+ self.dump_outbound_cms.dump(self)
+ return self.get_DER()
+
+ def unwrap(self, ta):
+ """
+ Unwrap a CMS-wrapped XML PDU and return Python objects.
+ """
+ if self.dump_inbound_cms:
+ self.dump_inbound_cms.dump(self)
+ self.verify(ta)
+ if self.check_inbound_schema:
+ self.schema_check()
+ if self.saxify is None:
+ return self.get_content()
+ else:
+ return self.saxify(self.get_content()) # pylint: disable=E1102
+
+ def check_replay(self, timestamp, *context):
+ """
+ Check CMS signing-time in this object against a recorded
+ timestamp. Raises an exception if the recorded timestamp is more
+ recent, otherwise returns the new timestamp.
+ """
+ new_timestamp = self.get_signingTime()
+ if timestamp is not None and timestamp > new_timestamp:
+ if context:
+ context = " (" + " ".join(context) + ")"
+ raise rpki.exceptions.CMSReplay(
+ "CMS replay: last message %s, this message %s%s" % (
+ timestamp, new_timestamp, context))
+ return new_timestamp
+
+ def check_replay_sql(self, obj, *context):
+ """
+ Like .check_replay() but gets recorded timestamp from
+ "last_cms_timestamp" field of an SQL object and stores the new
+ timestamp back in that same field.
+ """
+ obj.last_cms_timestamp = self.check_replay(obj.last_cms_timestamp, *context)
+ obj.sql_mark_dirty()
+
+ ## @var saxify
+ # SAX handler hook. Subclasses can set this to a SAX handler, in
+ # which case .unwrap() will call it and return the result.
+ # Otherwise, .unwrap() just returns a verified element tree.
+
+ saxify = None
+
+class SignedReferral(XML_CMS_object):
+ encoding = "us-ascii"
+ schema = rpki.relaxng.myrpki
+ saxify = None
+
+class Ghostbuster(Wrapped_CMS_object):
+ """
+ Class to hold Ghostbusters record (CMS-wrapped VCard). This is
+ quite minimal because we treat the VCard as an opaque byte string
+ managed by the back-end.
+ """
+
+ econtent_oid = rpki.oids.id_ct_rpkiGhostbusters
+
+ def encode(self):
+ """
+ Encode inner content for signing. At the moment we're treating
+ the VCard as an opaque byte string, so no encoding needed here.
+ """
+ return self.get_content()
+
+ def decode(self, vcard):
+ """
+ Decode XML and set inner content. At the moment we're treating
+ the VCard as an opaque byte string, so no encoding needed here.
+ """
+ self.content = vcard
+
+ @classmethod
+ def build(cls, vcard, keypair, certs):
+ """
+ Build a Ghostbuster record.
+ """
+ self = cls()
+ self.set_content(vcard)
+ self.sign(keypair, certs)
+ return self
+
+
+class CRL(DER_object):
+ """
+ Class to hold a Certificate Revocation List.
+ """
+
+ POW_class = rpki.POW.CRL
+
+ def get_DER(self):
+ """
+ Get the DER value of this CRL.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if self.DER:
+ return self.DER
+ if self.POW:
+ self.DER = self.POW.derWrite()
+ return self.get_DER()
+ raise rpki.exceptions.DERObjectConversionError("No conversion path to DER available")
+
+ def get_POW(self):
+ """
+ Get the rpki.POW value of this CRL.
+ """
+ self.check()
+ if not self.POW: # pylint: disable=E0203
+ self.POW = rpki.POW.CRL.derRead(self.get_DER())
+ return self.POW
+
+ def getThisUpdate(self):
+ """
+ Get thisUpdate value from this CRL.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getThisUpdate()
+
+ def getNextUpdate(self):
+ """
+ Get nextUpdate value from this CRL.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getNextUpdate()
+
+ def getIssuer(self):
+ """
+ Get issuer value of this CRL.
+ """
+ return X501DN.from_POW(self.get_POW().getIssuer())
+
+ def getCRLNumber(self):
+ """
+ Get CRL Number value for this CRL.
+ """
+ return self.get_POW().getCRLNumber()
+
+ @classmethod
+ def generate(cls, keypair, issuer, serial, thisUpdate, nextUpdate, revokedCertificates, version = 1):
+ """
+ Generate a new CRL.
+ """
+ crl = rpki.POW.CRL()
+ crl.setVersion(version)
+ crl.setIssuer(issuer.getSubject().get_POW())
+ crl.setThisUpdate(thisUpdate)
+ crl.setNextUpdate(nextUpdate)
+ crl.setAKI(issuer.get_SKI())
+ crl.setCRLNumber(serial)
+ crl.addRevocations(revokedCertificates)
+ crl.sign(keypair.get_POW())
+ return cls(POW = crl)
+
+ @property
+ def creation_timestamp(self):
+ """
+ Time at which this object was created.
+ """
+ return self.getThisUpdate()
+
+## @var uri_dispatch_map
+# Map of known URI filename extensions and corresponding classes.
+
+uri_dispatch_map = {
+ ".cer" : X509,
+ ".crl" : CRL,
+ ".gbr" : Ghostbuster,
+ ".mft" : SignedManifest,
+ ".mnf" : SignedManifest,
+ ".roa" : ROA,
+ }
+
+def uri_dispatch(uri):
+ """
+ Return the Python class object corresponding to a given URI.
+ """
+ return uri_dispatch_map[os.path.splitext(uri)[1]]