aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/openssl/update-snapshot.sh
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2016-10-10Update to OpenSSL 1.0.2j.Rob Austein
There would (probably) be no security issue with continuing to use OpenSSL 1.0.2h for RPKI, but it's usually best to stay current. Update the update-snapshot script to use git instead of svn.
2016-05-05OpenSSL 1.0.2h.Rob Austein
svn path=/trunk/; revision=6423
2016-04-08Bump OpenSSL to 1.0.2g.Rob Austein
svn path=/trunk/; revision=6350
2015-12-07Update OpenSSL to version 1.0.2e.Rob Austein
svn path=/trunk/; revision=6212
2015-07-10Update to OpenSSL 1.0.2d.Rob Austein
svn path=/trunk/; revision=6075
2015-03-20Update to OpenSSL 1.0.1m.Michael Elkins
http://openssl.org/news/secadv_20150319.txt svn path=/trunk/; revision=6069
2015-01-28Pull latest release on OpenSSL 1.0.1 branch, just to keep current.Rob Austein
Most of the vulnerabilities fixed are in TLS and DTLS code we don't use, and all of them are minor, see OpenSSL release notes if you care. svn path=/trunk/; revision=6046
2014-10-15Track OpenSSL even though Poodle doesn't affect us.Rob Austein
svn path=/trunk/; revision=5999
2014-09-29Update to OpenSSL 1.0.1i. Not a security issue in our case, justRob Austein
staying current. svn path=/trunk/; revision=5975
2014-06-05Update to OpenSSL 1.0.1h. Changes from 1.0.1g to 1.0.1h shouldn'tRob Austein
affect anything the RPKI code does, but it's easiest to stay current. svn path=/trunk/; revision=5861
2014-04-08CVE-2014-0160. Not strictly relevant as we don't use TLS, but it'sRob Austein
easier to upgrade than to answer that question even once. svn path=/trunk/; revision=5767
2014-01-08Update OpenSSL to 1.0.1f.Rob Austein
svn path=/trunk/; revision=5619
2013-03-21Update bundled OpenSSL to release 1.0.1e.Rob Austein
svn path=/trunk/; revision=5190
2012-04-19Update to OpenSSL 1.0.0i (CVE-2012-2110).Rob Austein
svn path=/trunk/; revision=4436
2012-03-12CVE-2012-0884 (Bleichenbacher's "Million Message Attack") only appliesRob Austein
to CMS when used for encryption, so I don't think it's a serious issue for RPKI CMS signed data, but upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0h anyway. svn path=/trunk/; revision=4395
2012-01-05OpenSSL 1.0.0fRob Austein
svn path=/trunk/; revision=4141
2011-09-06Upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0e (CVE-2011-3207).Rob Austein
svn path=/openssl/Makefile.in; revision=3970
2011-04-27Upgrade OpenSSL to 1.0.0dRob Austein
svn path=/openssl/Makefile.in; revision=3794
2010-11-23OpenSSL 1.0.0bRob Austein
svn path=/openssl/Makefile.in; revision=3562
2010-06-24Update to 1.0.0a -- CVE-2010-0742Rob Austein
svn path=/openssl/Makefile.in; revision=3295
2010-04-06Upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0.Rob Austein
svn path=/openssl/Makefile.in; revision=3161
2010-01-20Upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0-beta5Rob Austein
svn path=/openssl/Makefile; revision=2956
2009-11-18Update to new OpenSSL snapshot, to track TLS negotiation protocolRob Austein
bugfixes. While we're at this, switch to 1.0.0-stable snapshot series, with goal of eventually converging on OpenSSL 1.0.0. This included a few changes to track OpenSSL: - The "STRING" type used in the OpenSSL stack macros became "OPENSSL_STRING". - OpenSSL has deprecated the MD2 digest algorithm, so POW code can't refer to it unconditionally (perhaps I should remove support for it from POW entirely, but for now I just honor the compile-time conditional). - OpenSSL's configuration script was whining that I should run "make depend", so I do that now as part of the OpenSSL library build. svn path=/openssl/Makefile; revision=2883
2008-03-28Switch to using OpenSSL HEAD snapshot, for the new CMS codeRob Austein
svn path=/openssl/Makefile; revision=1566